

Suicide Terror and Religious Cleavage

Andra Filote, Niklas Potrafke and Heinrich W. Ursprung*

December 9, 2011

Abstract

We empirically investigate to what extent suicide terrorism relies on religious cleavages between perpetrators and victims. To assign religious affiliations to the terrorists and their victims, we compiled a new dataset. Our results show that religious cleavages are no longer an important precondition for suicide terrorism. Deliberately instigating casualties among coreligionists, second-generation suicide attacks have rather been perpetrated to destabilize weak states in order to increase the power of terrorist organizations that compete with the state in providing club goods to their members.

JEL Classification: Z12, D74, H56, F51

Keywords: suicide terrorism, religion, club goods

* Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, Box D-138, 78457 Konstanz, Germany. Email: Heinrich.Ursprung@uni-konstanz.de

Hillman, Esteban Klor, Schneider, Schulze

1. Introduction

Suicide terrorism has begun to proliferate in the 1980s and has quickly become one of the main global security threats. The declared intention to die in order to kill others turns a suicide attacker into a powerful, unpredictable, and highly dangerous weapon. Not only are suicide attacks more expedient than other forms of terrorism, they also require fewer resources and less preparation than traditional means of combat.¹

Many studies explore under which circumstances suicide tactics are likely to be employed in carrying out an attack. The most prominent among the examined influencing factors are foreign occupations, targets in democratic countries, rebellions, and religious cleavages between perpetrators and victims. Some scholars have argued that Muslim fundamentalism is the root cause of suicide attacks. Israeli (2002) explores this hypothesis and arrives at the conclusion that the perpetrators of suicide terrorism like to think of themselves as defenders of occupied Muslims territories who rescue Islam from evil westernization. Berman and Laitin (2008), on the other hand, argue that suicide attackers are not primarily motivated by religious concerns. Even though suicide attackers often are members of radical religious sects, it is not the religious fervor that drives the suicide attacks but rather the ability of such closely-knit sects to protect their high stake attacks against defection. The affiliation of suicide terrorists with radical religious sects is in this view not a signal of religious delusion but of commitment to the organization whose objectives transcend its theological foundations.

¹ The first suicide attacks in modern conflicts were carried out in the Israeli occupied South Lebanon by the terrorist organization Hezbollah in 1982. Afterwards the incidence rate of suicide attacks quickly increased from an average of three attacks per year in the 1980's to about ten per year in 1990's and approximately 200 per year in the first decade of the second millennium (Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism database).

Other scholars, such as, for example, Bloom (2005), Pape (2005), and Bergman and Laitin (2008) also argue that suicide attackers are not necessarily Muslim fundamentalists or, for that matter, any other kind of religious fanatics. In the view of these authors suicide terrorism is not driven by religion per se but rather by religious cleavages between attackers and victims.

A case in point is the study by Pape (2005) who puts forward an innovative, though highly controversial argument.² He contends that all suicide terrorist share the secular and strategic goal of compelling democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland. According to Pape's view, this kind of nationalism gives rise to rebellion which, in turn, engenders suicide attacks. To accomplish their strategic goal, terrorist organizations use religious cleavages as a tactical device. If the foreign occupier and the local community have different religious affiliations, terrorists have an easy job of uniting their constituency by portraying the conflict as a zero-sum situation, demonizing the opponent, and grant the suicide terrorists the status of martyrs.³

Although the existence of a religious cleavage is in Pape's view neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a suicide terrorist campaign to occur, his contention nevertheless admits straightforward empirical tests. One objective of our study is to empirically explore the role of religious differences in incidences of suicide terrorism. In a well known cross country study Abadie (2006) does not find any relationship between religious fractionalization and risk from terrorist attacks at a country level. Our study however explores a special type of suicide attacks and focuses on the religious cleavage between the directly involved persons, the terrorist and his or her victims.

Our results confirm that in the 20th century suicide attacks indeed tended to target members of other religions. Moreover, we show that in this earlier period no specific

² See Bloom 2005, Cook 2007, and Wade and Reiter 2007 for critical assessments of Pape's theory.

³ See Pape (2005, 89-92) for a detailed discussion.

combination of the religion of attacker and victim contributed to explaining the frequency of suicide attacks above the effect deriving from any religious cleavage per se. The evidence for the 21st century is however different. In this second period we cannot identify anymore a relationship between religious cleavage and the incidence of suicide attacks. In other words, suicide terror attacks have increasingly been targeted at coreligionists. We interpret this result to indicate that terrorist organizations, whether they are rooted in radical religious sects or not, do not contend themselves anymore with providing club goods to their members if market mechanisms fail and the supply of local public goods by established government institutions fall short of the perceived needs of their clientele; terrorist organizations have begun to compete with the established order by raising the government's cost of conducting its core tasks. By destabilizing the public order, the terrorist organizations aim at increasing their influence over the local population with the ultimate objective of superseding the government. This objective can only be reached if terrorist organizations havoc terror among the population that is still under the control of the government. Whereas the earlier literature argued that suicide attacks are predominantly used against hard targets, i.e. targets protected by strong and well functioning state authorities that were often supported by foreign military personnel, we propose that when states are about to fail, suicide attacks are targeted against the population at large with the intent to terrorize and even kill coreligionists.

Apart from the novel specific subject of inquiry, we also deviate from the related literature by using a different method of identifying potential centers of conflict. In particular, we do not rely on the Minority at Risk Project which is commonly used to identify the countries in which suicide attacks are likely to occur (see, for example, Pape 2005, Asal 2006, Wade and Reiter 2007). Because many hard-pressed minorities never consider suicide attacks to be a suitable method of alleviating their predicament, the occurrence of no such attacks in the home countries of these minorities would bias our estimates of the determinants

of suicide attacks. We therefore rather rely on the Armed Conflict Dataset by Gleditsch (2002) to identify the centers of conflict which are likely to give rise to suicide attacks. A second novelty concerns our main explaining variable, i.e. the religious cleavage. We use two different methods. To identify religious cleavages we make, first, use of Lindberg's (2008) respective coding of all conflicts indexed in the Armed Conflict Dataset. Second, we compiled for all suicide attacks indexed by the Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism (CPOST) the religious affiliations of the suicide terrorists and their respective victims.

The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the related empirical literature with a special focus on Pape's work. Section 3 describes the data and specifies the empirical model. Section 4 describes and discusses the regression results. Section 5 concludes.

2. Related Literature

Systematic empirical research on the causes and consequences of terrorism at large is by now a firmly established field in political science and economics. Nonetheless, some fundamental issues are still hotly debated. Most studies find, for example, that the socio-economic development of a country does not significantly affect terrorism. A case in point is the study by Kis-Katos et al. (2011) that provides evidence that terrorism is not rooted in economic deprivation. Freytag et al. (2011), on the other hand, find that socio-economic variables do matter for terrorism, implying that terrorism might be reduced by economic development and growth, and Caruso and Schneider (2011) confirm that in Western European countries the classical economic argument of opportunity cost is indeed predicative of an individual's willingness to be involved in a terrorist activity. Less controversial is that the viability of a terrorist organization heavily depends on the public opinion in the organization's constituency. Especially an unfavorable opinion towards the target increases community support which, in turn, facilitates recruitment, reduces the danger of detection, and justifies

terrorist attacks (Pape, 2005). These channels of influence give rise to a robust positive relationship between public support for terrorism and terrorist attacks. (Maleckova and Stanisic, 2011).

Another strand of the political-economic literature on terrorism deals with the consequences of terrorist attacks and on defensive measures. Terrorism has especially been associated with reduced economic growth (Blomberg et al., 2011) and the attendant stock market reactions (Kollias, 2011). To counter these adverse effects, small individual stake holders can seek corporate terrorist insurance (Michel-Kerjan and Raschky, 2011) and target countries can resort to protective measures, including military missions. The effectiveness of such protective measures depends, of course, on the attendant circumstances; the international counter-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden, for example, have been a qualified success (Shortland and Vothknecht, 2011), whereas the effectiveness of other missions is more doubtful. Homeland security measures are, as a rule, less costly than military missions, but they nevertheless may come at a high cost in terms of forgone individual liberty. The willingness to trade off security for liberties does, of course, depend on individual assessment of the pertaining terrorist risk (Bozzoli and Müller, 2011).

The literature on suicide terrorism is much smaller. Pape (2005) is most closely related to our study. : the relationship between religious cleavages and suicide terrorism. As already mentioned, his theory portrays nationalism as the main root of suicide terrorism. He defines nationalism as “the belief among members of a community that they share a distinct set of ethnic, linguistic, and historical characteristics and are entitled to govern their national homeland without interference from foreigners” (p.79). Many scholars argue that from this set of cultural differences language discrepancies is the most important attribute separating the identity of foreign occupiers from the local community. However, Pape develops another intriguing hypothesis: under extreme situations such as war or foreign military occupation

“the relative importance of religious and linguistic differences normally reverse and religious difference can inflame nationalist sentiments in ways that encourage mass support for martyrdom and suicide terrorism” (p.88). A religious cleavage between the occupier and the occupied allows for portraying the enemy in the most negative way possible in order to gain mass support for the resistance. It also fosters the willingness to die and the willingness to kill others since “rewards in the afterlife will compensate them from losing their lives in suicide attacks, but not if they kill coreligionists” (Bergman and Laitin 2008: 1949).

To test his theory, Pape (2005) uses perceived occupations as units of observation and the presence/absence of a suicide terrorist campaign as dependent variable. The explanatory variables are the presence of a rebellion and the existence of a religious difference. Cases are limited to the period 1980-2003 and only to democratic occupations as “all suicide terrorist campaigns have been targeted against democracies” (p.98). In this context, he shows that a strong, positive correlation between religious cleavage, presence of a rebellion and the use of suicide terrorism exists. Pape claims that 49 out of 53 cases that he identified are predicted by this theory, a result that is statistically significant at the highest common benchmark of 1%.

Pape’s research method is in many ways questionable (see Wade and Reiter 2007). His universe of foreign occupations is problematic in the sense that the author uses a quite selective criterion in selecting the cases. A democratic occupation includes “not only cases in which a democratic state moved military forces across an internationally recognized boundary to govern the homeland of another community but also the far larger number of cases in which a democratic state controlled the homeland of a distinct national minority within its own borders” (p.97). Pape relies on the Minority at Risk database to select his universe of observations and augments this dataset by including foreign military interventions for the period 1980-2003. However, Pape’s approach to code perceived occupations is inconsistent: it is not clear why some cases of minorities at risk or foreign military

interventions are considered perceived occupations and others not. As Wade and Reiter (2007) remark, Pape does not code all minorities listed in the MAR dataset for the period in question as perceived occupations and includes only two military interventions, although this criterion is fulfilled by others.

To test the relationship between regime type and suicide terrorism, Wade and Reiter (2007) rely only on the Minorities at Risk database and do not use military intervention as a proxy for perceived occupation. Asal (2006) employs the same strategy in selecting the universe of observations. He explores the societal preconditions for ethnic suicide attack campaigns, providing supporting empirical evidence for the hypothesis that suicide terrorism is linked to religious cleavages between perpetrators and their victims. Berman and Laitin (2008) also find a strong, positive association between religious difference and the use of suicide attacks. They present data confirming this pattern: almost 90% of the suicide attacks during their sample period were aimed at victims whose religion was different than the one of the attacker. Scholars do, however, underline that religious differences are neither necessary, nor sufficient conditions for a suicide terrorist campaign to take place. They just nurture a favorable environment for the terrorist leaders to justify the use of such tactics.

This paper provides additional empirical evidence confirming the positive correlation between religious cleavages and suicide terrorism. The novelty consists in a new research method. This implies that I do not rely anymore on the classic Minorities at Risk database to build the universe of observations, but instead I employ the Armed Conflict Dataset by Gleditsch (2002) to select the cases and the data on religious cleavages by Lindberg (2008) to code the main explanatory variable. This makes more sense as not every instance of a minority at risk results in a conflict inside a country and hence there is no risk for a suicide attack to take place. Furthermore, just relying on this dataset to select the relevant cases excludes the foreign military interventions as the case of USA in Afghanistan or Iraq for

example. These interventions resulted in a high number of suicide bombings from the moment in which USA got involved in the conflict, whereas before that moment the attackers didn't use this warfare tactic. Regression estimates using this method are nonetheless in line with existing empirical literature: suicide attacks are more likely to occur when a religious difference exists between attackers and their victims. A detailed description of the empirical strategy and the datasets is provided in the following section.

3. Empirical Strategy

3.1. Data and Variables

The unit of analysis is country-year. Using a panel data model rather than a cross-sectional model as Pape did in his research allows for the dependent and independent variables to vary over time. The sample covers all countries that have been involved as a main side in a conflict between 1981 and 2008 (66 countries). Table A1 presents a list of the countries included and the number of distinct conflicts a country was involved during the period in question. Due to time consideration the conflicts with duration of only one year have not been included. This is without loss of generality as argued above. The data is taken from the Armed Conflict Dataset⁴ by Gleditsch et al. (2002), version 4-2010. An armed conflict is defined as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths”⁵. Various countries have experienced simultaneously more conflicts which may or may have not resulted in suicide terrorist campaigns. Therefore I disaggregated every country by conflicts by replicating it as many times as needed in order to capture the variance of suicide attacks also across conflicts.

⁴ a joint project between the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University and the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO)

⁵ This definition is according to UCDP. For a more in-depth discussion on the definition see the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, version 4-2010.

Because some conflicts resulted in transnational suicide attacks I also included these cases⁶. The dependent variable in my model is the annual number of suicide attacks in a given country due to a conflict. The main explanatory variable is the presence of a religious cleavage between the two parties involved in a conflict.

Suicide Attacks Data

I employ the data on suicide attacks from Pape's Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism⁷. This database includes "every suicide attack in which at least one terrorist killed himself or herself while attempting to kill others; it excludes attacks authorized by a national government" (Pape 2005: 3). Hence I excluded from my analysis the interstate conflicts where the main sides are implicitly the governments of two distinctive countries. Pape draws the information "from suicide terrorist groups themselves, from the main organizations that collect such data in target countries and from news media around the world" (p. 4). His database was put under scrutiny by other scholars as it is not clear under which circumstances an attack is classified as part of a suicide terrorist campaign. This aspect has no relevance for my research as my dependent variable is the yearly number of suicide attacks on the territory of and not against a particular country. However, one may argue that a measurement error in the event count might exist due to the uncertainty related to reported incidents in a country. Wade and Reiter (2007) make use of a broader dataset by combining Pape's database with the one compiled by Pedhazur (2005). I am not able to follow the same course of action as Pedhazur's dataset is available for a shorter period than my empirical research focuses on.

⁶ So far I managed to include only the case of Lebanon, where suicide attacks were due to the conflict between Israel and the terrorist group Hezbollah. The conflict between USA and Al Qaeda resulted mainly in transnational suicide attacks against US allies. At this stage, they are not included in the sample as a further research needs to be conducted to see exactly which country's interests were targeted. Table A2 presents a list of these countries.

⁷ <http://cpost.uchicago.edu/search.php>

Hence I am forced to stick to the Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism Database in quantifying my dependent variable.

Religious Cleavage Data

To measure the religious difference I rely on Lindberg's (2008) variable on religious cleavage. Using the same Armed Conflict Dataset by Gleditsch (2002), he coded the religious affiliations of the relevant groups and then decided whether or not fighting parties differ from each other. A religious cleavage exists "when the two parties belong to separate religions, when they adhere to different denominations of one religion, or when one side is religious and the other side not" (p. 49). The variable takes the value 0 for cases without a religious difference and 1 when such a religious difference exists. In his thesis, Lindberg describes thoroughly the methodology of assigning religious affiliations to groups and governments (see p. 52-53) and provides a detailed listing of the sources used (see Appendix A)⁸. He acknowledges the fact that missing values is a problem in his dataset as it is in all studies of violent conflicts. For the period 1981-2008, Lindberg wasn't able to identify whether a religious difference is present in just four conflicts⁹. For the purposes of this paper, I consider an extension of the religious cleavage definition and build a new variable by considering the case of different denominations of one religion as the same religion.

Correlation between Suicide Terrorism and Religious Cleavage

To illustrate the association between suicide terrorism and the presence of religious cleavages in a conflict, I run correlation tests between the annual number of suicide attacks in a country

⁸ Lindberg's dataset stops at the year 2004. For the remaining years, I code the religious cleavage variable myself. This is quite straightforward for almost all of the cases as they are episodes of an already existing conflict for which the coding has already been done. For the remaining conflicts I use primarily the Minorities at Risk database. I was not able to assign a value for the religious cleavage variable in 4 cases: Central African Republic (2006), Chad (2005-2008), India (2008) and Russia (2007-2008)

⁹ This reduces the sample by four countries: Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Haiti and Uganda.

due to a conflict and the presence/absence of religious discrepancies. Figure 1 suggests that there is roughly no connection between these two variables. The correlation coefficient is approximately equal to 0.08 and does not provide supporting evidence for the above formulated hypothesis. However, the estimates may suffer from a substantial downward bias as the correlation does not take into account the development over time and other covariates that I include in the panel data model.

3.2. The Econometric Model

The baseline econometric model has the following form:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Suicide Attacks}_{it} &= c + \alpha \text{Religious Cleavage}_{it} + \sum_j \beta_j X_{ijt-1} + \sum_k \gamma_k \text{Region}_{ik} \\
 &+ \sum_l \delta_l \text{Legal Origin}_{il} + \theta \text{Islam}_{it} + \theta \text{Democracy}_{it-1} + \sigma \text{After 2001}_t \\
 &+ \varphi \text{Total Attacks}_{t-1} + \mu \text{Suicide Attacks}_{t-1} + u_{it}
 \end{aligned}$$

with $i=1, \dots, 100$; $j=1, 2$; $k=1, \dots, 5$; $l=1, \dots, 3$; $t=1, \dots, 28$.

The dependent variable *Suicide Attacks*_{it} denotes the annual number of suicide attacks in a given country due to a certain conflict. The explanatory variable *Religious Cleavage*_{it} is a dummy variable which takes the value 0 if there is no religious difference between the two parties in a conflict and 1 when such a difference exists. $\sum_j \beta_j X_{ijt-1}$ describes two exogenous control variables: the population size and GDP per capita. Both variables are logged and lagged one year in order to avoid endogeneity. Data is taken from World Penn Tables, version 7.0. $\sum_k \gamma_k \text{Region}_{ik}$ is a set of regional dummy variables that takes the value one when a country belongs to a certain region and 0 otherwise. I distinguish between five regions: Africa, America, Asia, Europe and Middle East. No countries from Australia or

Oceania are included in the sample. To avoid multicollinearity between the regional dummies, one region must function as the reference category, here America. The regression results must be interpreted then as deviations from the reference category. $\sum_i \delta_i \text{Legal Origin}_{it}$ is a set of legal origin dummies (La Porta et al. 1999). I distinguish between three legal origins: British, French and Socialist. No countries with German or Scandinavian legal origins are included in the sample. The reference category is Socialist. δIslam_{it} is included to test if this particular religion is more likely to nurture the use of suicide attacks. Data is taken from Lindberg (2008)¹⁰. The variable takes the value 1 if the attacker has affiliations to Islam fundamentalism and 0 otherwise. Democracy_{it-1} is the Democracy-Dictatorship index by Cheibub et al. (2010) and measures whether a country was democratic or not when suicide attacks were conducted on its territory. The variable takes the value 1 for democracies and 0 otherwise. Since suicide terrorism may affect the political stability of a state, the variable is lagged one year behind the dependent variable. $\text{Total Attacks}_{it-1}$ is a variable that comprises the worldwide annual number of suicide attacks one year before the current observations and controls for a global increasing trend of this phenomenon. After 2001_t is a dummy variable that controls for temporal dependencies. It takes the value 1 if the attacks occurred after 2001 and 0 otherwise. I have chosen this year as a benchmark due to the infamous 9/11 suicide attacks in USA where almost 3000 people lost their lives. The success of these attacks has triggered an intense use of suicide terrorism in conflicts all over the world.

Table A3 shows descriptive statistics of all variables incorporated in the model. Since the dependent variable is an event count, OLS method is likely to be inefficient, inconsistent and biased. I apply instead a negative binomial regression with robust standard errors. I

¹⁰ Lindberg (2008) codes the religious affiliation of groups and governments by using subdivisions of a religion. For example he splits Islam in: Shi'ite, Sunni and Other Muslim. I combine these into one single variable.

choose not to use a fixed effects model as three of the explanatory variables are constant over time and they will drop out.

One may plausibly argue that a measurement error in the event count might exist due to the uncertainty related to reported incidents in a country. For this reason I truncated the dependent variable and created a dummy variable, coded 1 if any attacks occurred within a country during the year in question and 0 otherwise. I apply a logistic regression with robust standard errors. The drawback of this method is that information is lost due to the truncation of the dependent variable.

4. Empirical Results

4.1. Basic Results

Table 1 shows the base-line results for the negative binomial regression model with robust standard errors. Column (1) shows the results when only the *Religious Cleavage* variable is included. Columns (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6) display the results by incorporating other explanatory variables in the model. The coefficients for the religious difference dummy turn out to be statistically significant at 1% level in every column and have a positive sign. This indicates that a strong positive correlation exists between suicide terrorism and the presence of religious discrepancies in a conflict. The result is in line with existing empirical evidence on the relationship between suicide terrorism and religious cleavages.

The coefficients for the control variables turn out to be statistically significant in most cases and they present the expected signs. The variable GDP per capita has the expected positive sign and it is statistically significant at 1% level in columns (3), (5) and (6) and at 10% level in column (4). The variable measuring the population size presents negative coefficients and turns out to be statistically significant at conventional levels in column (3), (4) and (5). The regional dummy variables present a positive sign and are always statistically significant, indicating that countries from other regions than America are more inclined to

experience suicide attacks than American countries. The coefficients for the legal origin dummies present negative signs, though they lack statistical significance. The democracy variable has a negative sign and is statistically significant at 1% level in columns (5) and (6), indicating that democratic countries are less affected by suicide terrorism than autocratic countries. This is quite an intriguing result as one would expect quite the opposite. One explanation for this pattern may be the huge wave of suicide attacks conducted in non-democratic countries as Afghanistan and Iraq, where suicide terrorism has been used to determine democratic countries to withdraw from their territories. The coefficient for Muslim religion in column (8) presents a positive sign and is statistically significant at 1% level. This indicates a strong positive connection between Islamism and the use of suicide attacks as a warfare tactic. A country's historical experience with suicide terrorism is also significant. The estimated coefficients for the lagged dependent variable have a positive sign and are statistically significant at 1% level in all columns, indicating that countries that experienced suicide attacks on their territories are more prone to this phenomenon in the following year. The variable *Total Attacks* lacks statistical significance at common benchmarks in all columns. However, temporal dependencies are important. The variable *After 2001* is statistically significant at 1% level in all columns and has a positive sign, indicating that countries have experienced more suicide attacks after the 9/11 attacks than before this event.

Estimating the model using the logistic regression does not change inferences. Results are presented in Table 3. The estimated coefficients for the Religious Cleavage variable keep their sign and statistical significance in all columns. Various control variables lose statistical significance as the magnitude of suicide terrorism phenomenon is lost due to the truncation of the dependent variable. The variables Democracy, Islam and After 2001 keep their signs and turn out to be statistically significant at conventional levels in all columns.

Based on the coefficient estimates for the *Religious Cleavage* dummy, I calculate the marginal effects of the independent variable on the probability for a country to experience a suicide attack when this country is involved in a conflict. The results for the negative binomial regression model are presented in Table 2. The coefficients present a positive sign and are statistically significant at 1% level in all columns. The numerical meaning of the coefficient when all variables are included is the following: the probability for a country to experience a suicide attack is higher by about 1,7% when a religious difference exists between the two fighting parties in a conflict than when such a difference is not present.

Table 4 presents the marginal effects for the religious cleavage variable when the logistic regression is applied. The results are in line with the estimations from above. The coefficients turn out to be statistically significant at 1% level in all cells and have a positive sign. The numerical meaning of the coefficient in column (6) is that the probability for a country to experience a suicide attack is higher by about 0,8% when religious discrepancies are present between the two fighting parties in a conflict than when such differences do not exist.

4.2. Robustness Tests

I have checked the robustness of the results by testing whether the results differ for sub samples. Hence I have examined the effects of religious discrepancies on suicide terrorism before and after 2001, in democracies and autocracies, in high and low income countries and in territorial and governmental conflicts. To do so, I have included interaction terms and calculated marginal effects on how religious cleavages influence the use of suicide attacks before and after 2001, in democratic and autocratic countries, in low and high income countries and in territorial and governmental conflicts. I have normalized (mean 0, variance 1) the religious cleavage variable as well as the other variables need for interaction purposes

before the interaction process. Thereafter I estimated marginal effects at the minimum and maximum level of the interacted variable. Inferences do not change. The estimated coefficients for the religious cleavage variable maintain a positive sign and are always statistically significant at the common benchmarks.

The marginal effects in Table 6 can be interpreted as follows: the probability for a democratic country to be the location of a suicide attack is higher by about 2.2% when religious cleavages are present in a conflict than in the opposite case. For autocratic countries the probability is somehow smaller (1.8%). The marginal effects are statistically significant at 1% in all columns, indicating that religious discrepancies had a strong effect on suicide terrorism in both democratic and autocratic countries. Table 8 shows the results for the marginal effects when the variable *After 2001* is included. The coefficients turn out to be statistically significant at 1% level in all columns, revealing that religious cleavages had a strong impact on the use of suicide attacks not only before, but also after 2001. The numerical meaning of the coefficients is as follows: religious differences increased the probability of suicide terrorism by around 2% before 2001 and by about 1.7% after 2001. The interaction of the religious cleavage variable with GDP per Capita shows that the positive influences appear to be driven by low income countries. Results are presented in Table 10. The marginal effects are statistically significant only at minimum levels, whereas at maximum levels they lack statistical significance. Table 12 shows the marginal effects for the religious cleavage variable in territorial and governmental conflicts. The coefficients have a positive sign and are statistically significant at the highest benchmark of 1%. This indicates that religious discrepancies have a powerful impact on the use of suicide attacks as a warfare tactic both in territorial and governmental conflicts. The probability for suicide terrorism to be used in a conflict increases by about 12% when religious differences were present in territorial conflicts and by about 8.5% in governmental ones.

The results could suffer from omitted variable bias. However, the connection between suicide terrorism and religious cleavages is so strong that it is quite unlikely for the inferences to change when including other variables in the model.

5. Conclusion

The theoretical background on the relationship between suicide terrorism and religious cleavages tells us that a strong positive correlation is expected to be found between these two variables. As Pape (2005) points out, a religious difference between the attacker and the attacked party makes it easier for the terrorist leader “to portray the conflict in zero-sum terms, demonize the opponent, and gain legitimacy for martyrdom from the local community” (p. 89). To test this theory, I develop a new research method. I employ the Armed Conflict Dataset by Gleditsch (2002) to select the relevant universe of observations and the data on religious cleavages by Lindberg (2008) to code the main explanatory variable. The motivation behind this approach is that suicide terrorism is primarily a ‘last resort’ strategy, usually found in the second stage of a conflict. The findings confirm the above formulated hypothesis: suicide attacks are a tactic more likely to be used in conflicts with religious discrepancies between the involved sides, rather than in conflicts without religious cleavages. The results are line with already existing empirical evidence provided by Pape (2005), Asal (2006) and Bergman and Laitin (2007).

References:

[The origins of terrorism: Cross-country estimates of socio-economic determinants of terrorism](#)

Pages S5-S16

Andreas Freytag, Jens J. Krüger, Daniel Meierrieks, Friedrich Schneider

[On the origin of domestic and international terrorism](#)

Pages S17-S36

Krisztina Kis-Katos, Helge Liebert, Günther G. Schulze

[The socio-economic determinants of terrorism and political violence in Western Europe \(1994–2007\)](#)

Pages S37-S49

Raul Caruso, Friedrich Schneider

[Stock markets and terrorist attacks: Comparative evidence from a large and a small capitalization market](#)

Pages S64-S77

Christos Kollias, Efthalia Manou, Stephanos Papadamou, Apostolos Stagiannis

[Public opinion and terrorist acts](#)

Pages S107-S121

Jitka Malečková, Dragana Stanišić

[The effects of government intervention on the market for corporate terrorism insurance](#)

Pages S122-S132

Erwann Michel-Kerjan, Paul A. Raschky

[Combating “maritime terrorism” off the coast of Somalia](#)

Pages S133-S151

Anja Shortland, Marc Vothknecht

[Perceptions and attitudes following a terrorist shock: Evidence from the UK](#)

Pages 589-5106

Carlos Bozzoli, Cathérine Müller


- Abadie, A. (2006). Polity, Political freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism. *American Economic Review* 96(2), 50-56.
- Asal, V. (2006). The preconditions for ethnic suicide bombing campaigns 1991-2003. Presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, California, March 22 (http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p100001_index.html)
- Bloom, M. (2005): *Dying to kill: The allure of suicide terror*. New York: Columbia University Press
- Berman, E., & Laitin, D. (2008). Religion, terrorism and public goods: testing the club model. *Journal of Public Economics* 92, 1942-1967
- Cheibub, J., Gandhi, J., & Vreeland, J.R. (2010). Democracy and dictatorship revisited. *Public Choice* 143(1-2), 67-101.
- Cook, D. (2007). A critique to Robert Pape's Dying to Win. *Journal of Strategic Studies* 30(2), 243-254
- Fearon, J. and D. Laitin (2003). Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. *American Political Science Review* 97(1), 75-90.
- Gleditsch, N. P., Wallensteen, P., Eriksson, M., Sollenberg, M., & Strand, H.(2002). Armed Conflict 1946-2001: a new dataset. *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5), 615-637
- Israeli, R. (2002). A manual of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 14(4), 23-40
- La Porta, R., Lopez-di-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1999). The quality of government. *Journal of Law, Economics and Government*, 15(1), 222-279.
- Li, Q. (2005). Does democracy promote or reduce transnational terrorist incidents? *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(2), 278-297
- Lindberg, J. E. (2008). *Running on faith? A quantitative analysis of the effect of religious cleavage on the intensity and duration of internal conflicts*. Master's Thesis. University of Oslo
- Minorities at Risk Project. 2009. Minorities at Risk Dataset. College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management.
- Pape, R. (2003). The strategic loss of suicide terrorism. *American Political Science Review* 97(3), 343-361

Pape, R. (2005). *Dying to win: the strategic loss of suicide terrorism*. New York: Random House

Pedhazur, A. (2005). *Suicide terrorism*. Malden, MA: Polity Press


Wade, S. J., & Reiter, D. (2007). Does democracy matter? Regime type and suicide terrorism. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51(2), 329-348.

Figure 1. Suicide Attacks (No.) and Religious Cleavage



Correlation Coefficient: 0.0799. Source: Chicago Project on Suicide and Terrorism and Lindberg (2008)

Figure 2. Suicide Attacks (Dummy) and Religious Cleavage



Correlation Coefficient: 0.1688. Source: Chicago Project on Suicide and Terrorism and Lindberg (2008)

Table 1. Regression Results.

Dependent Variable: Suicide Attacks (number)
 Negative binomial regression (robust standard errors)

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Religious Cleavage	2.020*** (0.585)	1.580*** (0.369)	1.234*** (0.326)	1.152*** (0.288)	1.642*** (0.294)	1.724*** (0.277)
Europe				2.839** (1.323)	2.464* (1.316)	2.576* (1.325)
Middle East				3.659*** (1.189)	3.427*** (1.167)	3.303*** (1.208)
Asia				3.610*** (1.318)	3.949*** (1.294)	4.101*** (1.328)
Africa				2.360* (1.383)	2.257* (1.372)	2.408* (1.432)
Legal Origin (British)				-0.259 (0.540)	0.462 (0.620)	0.398 (0.643)
Legal Origin (French)				-0.772 (0.507)	-0.411 (0.568)	-0.345 (0.573)
Total Attacks		-0.000853 (0.00215)	-0.00270 (0.00193)	-0.000641 (0.00160)	-0.000397 (0.00154)	-0.000453 (0.00147)
Lagged Dep. Var.		5.450*** (0.866)	4.706*** (0.534)	3.766*** (0.489)	3.531*** (0.486)	3.494*** (0.494)
After 2001		1.688*** (0.583)	2.110*** (0.508)	1.932*** (0.430)	1.439*** (0.393)	1.214*** (0.395)
GDP per Capita			1.455*** (0.314)	1.279* (0.714)	1.970*** (0.727)	1.835*** (0.706)
Population			-0.319 (0.208)	-0.616*** (0.232)	-0.427* (0.242)	-0.470* (0.243)
Democracy					-1.472*** (0.371)	-0.969*** (0.349)
Islam						0.957*** (0.305)
Constant	-1.077** (0.513)	-3.696*** (0.316)	-6.884*** (1.487)	-7.568*** (2.936)	-10.83*** (3.032)	-10.99*** (3.072)
Inalpha	3.729*** (0.133)	2.082*** (0.192)	1.803*** (0.153)	1.578*** (0.172)	1.473*** (0.179)	1.444*** (0.190)
Observations	1,010	976	891	891	891	891

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2. Marginal Effects. Negative Binomial Regression.

	Variable	Suicide Attacks (number)
Model 1	Religious Cleavage	2.020 (3.46)**
Model 2	Religious Cleavage	1.580 (4.28)**
Model 3	Religious Cleavage	1.234 (3.78)**
Model 4	Religious Cleavage	1.152 (4.00)**
Model 5	Religious Cleavage	1.642 (5.59)**
Model 6	Religious Cleavage	1.724 (6.22)**

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Table 3. Regression Results.

Dependent Variable: Suicide Attacks (dummy)
 Logistic Regression (robust standard errors)

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Religious Cleavage	1.521*** (0.307)	1.172*** (0.358)	1.048*** (0.372)	1.086*** (0.386)	1.530*** (0.425)	1.956*** (0.504)
Europe				1.612 (1.368)	1.078 (1.454)	0.671 (1.625)
Middle East				2.460** (1.121)	2.342** (1.078)	1.833 (1.160)
Asia				2.187** (1.052)	2.187** (1.098)	1.812 (1.208)
Africa				0.693 (1.119)	0.368 (1.168)	-0.333 (1.490)
Legal Origin (British)				-0.227 (0.860)	0.327 (0.963)	0.254 (1.104)
Legal Origin (French)				-0.678 (0.833)	-0.533 (0.938)	-0.553 (1.043)
Total Attacks		0.000672 (0.00174)	-0.000270 (0.00167)	0.000305 (0.00167)	-0.000254 (0.00190)	-0.000201 (0.00197)
Lagged Dep. Var.		9.211*** (2.193)	8.520*** (2.170)	7.547*** (1.864)	7.484*** (1.799)	7.560*** (1.782)
After 2001		0.829* (0.430)	0.948** (0.469)	1.106** (0.508)	0.997* (0.511)	0.807 (0.517)
GDP per Capita			0.983*** (0.326)	0.507 (0.823)	1.096 (0.811)	0.530 (0.891)
Population			-0.286 (0.259)	-0.556* (0.302)	-0.255 (0.317)	-0.259 (0.331)
Democracy					-1.554*** (0.401)	-1.363*** (0.450)
Islam						1.470*** (0.424)
Constant	-3.429*** (0.282)	-4.125*** (0.326)	-5.895*** (1.651)	-4.510 (2.950)	-7.625** (3.060)	-6.416* (3.491)
Observations	1,010	976	891	891	891	891

Robust standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4. Marginal Effects. Logistic Regression.

	Variable	Suicide Attacks (dummy)
Model 1	Religious Cleavage	0.120 (4.71)**
Model 2	Religious Cleavage	0.052 (2.99)**
Model 3	Religious Cleavage	0.050 (2.65)**
Model 4	Religious Cleavage	0.050 (2.72)**
Model 5	Religious Cleavage	0.068 (3.49)**
Model 5	Religious Cleavage	0.083 (3.97)**

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Table 5. Regression Results.

Dependent Variable: Suicide Attacks (number)
 Negative binomial regression (robust standard errors).
 Democracy dummy variable included

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Religious Cleavage	3.074*** (0.539)	1.730*** (0.463)	1.870*** (0.440)	1.870*** (0.440)	1.925*** (0.402)
Europe			3.009** (1.471)	3.009** (1.471)	2.999** (1.444)
Middle East			3.403*** (1.167)	3.403*** (1.167)	3.273*** (1.203)
Asia			3.891*** (1.268)	3.891*** (1.268)	4.034*** (1.298)
Africa			2.153 (1.327)	2.153 (1.327)	2.310* (1.384)
Legal Origin (British)			0.779 (0.696)	0.779 (0.696)	0.641 (0.699)
Legal Origin (French)			-0.0529 (0.697)	-0.0529 (0.697)	-0.0639 (0.678)
Total Attacks		-0.00256 (0.00193)	-0.000402 (0.00160)	-0.000402 (0.00160)	-0.000487 (0.00151)
Lagged Dep. Var.		4.660*** (0.533)	3.458*** (0.474)	3.458*** (0.474)	3.435*** (0.478)
After 2001		1.913*** (0.487)	1.487*** (0.403)	1.487*** (0.403)	1.266*** (0.406)
GDP per Capita		1.572*** (0.346)	1.834*** (0.683)	1.834*** (0.683)	1.720*** (0.666)
Population		-0.199 (0.236)	-0.470* (0.244)	-0.470* (0.244)	-0.504** (0.242)
Democracy	-2.507*** (0.523)	-1.044** (0.518)	-1.832*** (0.552)	-1.832*** (0.552)	-1.284** (0.542)
Islam					0.939*** (0.316)
Religious Cleavage*Democracy	0.539* (0.282)	0.382 (0.274)	0.337 (0.302)	0.337 (0.302)	0.290 (0.283)
Constant	-1.232*** (0.466)	-7.813*** (1.750)	-10.62*** (2.924)	-10.62*** (2.924)	-10.79*** (2.963)
Inalpha	3.566*** (0.126)	1.746*** (0.150)	1.455*** (0.180)	1.455*** (0.180)	1.431*** (0.189)
Observations	976	891	891	891	891

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 6. Marginal Effects. Negative Binomial Regression.

Democracy dummy variable included

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Democracy	3.612378 (5.51)**	2.112346 (3.15)**	2.207097 (3.23)**	2.207097 (3.23)**	2.214958 (3.55)**
Dictatorship	3.073534 (5.70)**	1.730479 (3.73)**	1.87016 (4.26)**	1.87016 (4.26)**	1.925131 (4.79)**

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Table 7. Regression Results.

Dependent Variable: Suicide Attacks (number)
 Negative binomial regression (robust standard errors).
 After 2001 dummy variable included

VARIABLES	(1)	(3)	(5)	(7)	(9)
Religious Cleavage	3.286*** (0.485)	1.933*** (0.477)	1.916*** (0.494)	2.219*** (0.482)	2.351*** (0.469)
Europe			3.178** (1.282)	2.667** (1.271)	2.751** (1.213)
Middle East			3.490*** (1.101)	3.288*** (1.071)	3.031*** (1.071)
Asia			3.031*** (1.164)	3.345*** (1.132)	3.339*** (1.128)
Africa			1.585 (1.205)	1.589 (1.181)	1.524 (1.208)
Legal Origin (British)			-0.00314 (0.474)	0.565 (0.574)	0.538 (0.579)
Legal Origin (French)			-0.454 (0.479)	-0.205 (0.567)	-0.0754 (0.552)
Total Attacks		-0.00264 (0.00189)	-0.000448 (0.00144)	-0.000309 (0.00141)	-0.000252 (0.00133)
Lagged Dep. Var.		4.392*** (0.498)	3.525*** (0.449)	3.383*** (0.448)	3.294*** (0.439)
After 2001	4.049*** (0.391)	2.529*** (0.553)	2.447*** (0.479)	1.998*** (0.440)	1.814*** (0.445)
GDP per Capita		1.329*** (0.317)	0.661 (0.668)	1.351** (0.668)	1.121* (0.652)
Population		-0.421** (0.208)	-0.720*** (0.232)	-0.525** (0.239)	-0.605** (0.238)
Democracy				-1.257*** (0.347)	-0.688** (0.326)
Islam					1.024*** (0.294)
Religious Cleavage*After2001	-0.490*** (0.187)	-0.470*** (0.172)	-0.557*** (0.184)	-0.487*** (0.178)	-0.533*** (0.176)
Constant	-4.386*** (0.496)	-6.731*** (1.541)	-5.676** (2.635)	-8.798*** (2.708)	-8.492*** (2.678)
Inalpha	3.089*** (0.126)	1.703*** (0.165)	1.444*** (0.178)	1.375*** (0.178)	1.339*** (0.190)
Observations	1,010	891	891	891	891

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 8. Marginal Effects. Negative Binomial Regression.

After 2001 dummy variable included

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Before 2001	3.286243 (6.77)***	1.933199 (4.05)***	1.915565 (3.88)***	2.219323 (4.61)***	2.350978 (5.01)***
After 2001	2.795862 (6.45)***	1.463429 (3.69)***	1.35817 (3.55)***	1.732806 (4.53)***	1.817612 (4.92)***

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Table 9. Regression Results.

Dependent Variable: Suicide Attacks (number)
 Negative binomial regression (robust standard errors).
 GDP per Capita included

VARIABLES	(1)	(3)	(5)	(7)	(9)	(11)
Religious Cleavage	2.173*** (0.524)	1.312*** (0.342)	1.277*** (0.325)	1.364*** (0.325)	1.907*** (0.363)	1.979*** (0.341)
Europe				1.916 (1.385)	1.592 (1.382)	1.709 (1.321)
Middle East				3.532*** (1.158)	3.302*** (1.145)	3.108*** (1.191)
Asia				3.300*** (1.212)	3.671*** (1.199)	3.756*** (1.209)
Africa				1.999* (1.215)	1.897 (1.224)	1.963 (1.266)
Legal Origin (British)				-0.934 (0.721)	-0.190 (0.782)	-0.230 (0.721)
Legal Origin (French)				-1.586** (0.671)	-1.196 (0.730)	-1.099* (0.646)
Total Attacks		-0.00278 (0.00199)	-0.00281 (0.00185)	-0.00109 (0.00154)	-0.000851 (0.00145)	-0.000911 (0.00140)
Lagged Dep. Var.		4.770*** (0.538)	4.714*** (0.529)	3.795*** (0.477)	3.547*** (0.479)	3.499*** (0.494)
After 2001		2.030*** (0.519)	2.120*** (0.511)	1.975*** (0.442)	1.498*** (0.405)	1.266*** (0.408)
GDP per Capita	3.001*** (0.625)	1.586*** (0.351)	1.551*** (0.319)	1.629** (0.775)	2.375*** (0.855)	2.229*** (0.802)
Population			-0.333 (0.218)	-0.641*** (0.238)	-0.451* (0.248)	-0.510** (0.257)
Democracy					-1.460*** (0.390)	-0.918** (0.364)
Islam						1.000*** (0.326)
Religious Cleavage*	-1.095*** (0.334)	-0.0438 (0.163)	-0.0902 (0.160)	-0.397* (0.240)	-0.405 (0.277)	-0.437* (0.259)
GDP per Capita						
Constant	-11.00*** (1.775)	-8.799*** (1.209)	-7.161*** (1.390)	-7.751*** (2.767)	-11.32*** (3.040)	-11.35*** (2.962)
Inalpha	3.520*** (0.130)	1.840*** (0.155)	1.802*** (0.153)	1.567*** (0.166)	1.462*** (0.174)	1.424*** (0.190)
Observations	891	891	891	891	891	891

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 10. Marginal Effects. Negative Binomial Regression.

GDP per Capita included

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Low	-0.4456168	1.207727	1.06141	0.4143093	0.938922	0.9334758
Income	(-0.39)	(2.45)**	(2.25)**	(0.79)	(1.68)*	(1.78)*
High	-2.939457	1.107976	0.8561409	-4.899898	.0168933	-0.0618538
Income	(-1.58)	(1.38)	(1.10)	(-0.48)***	(0.01)	(-0.06)

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 11. Regression Results.

Dependent Variable: Suicide Attacks (number)
 Negative binomial regression (robust standard errors).
 Territorial conflict dummy variable included

VARIABLES	(1)	(3)	(5)	(7)
Religious Cleavage	10.49*** (0.354)	8.494*** (0.380)	8.415*** (0.309)	8.290*** (0.281)
Europe		4.358*** (1.680)	3.483** (1.625)	3.204** (1.551)
Middle East		3.248*** (1.098)	2.946*** (1.097)	2.717** (1.089)
Asia		3.844*** (1.183)	3.703*** (1.158)	3.778*** (1.160)
Africa		2.396** (1.160)	2.073* (1.141)	2.214* (1.176)
Legal Origin (British)		0.527 (0.920)	0.752 (0.958)	0.363 (0.951)
Legal Origin (French)		0.130 (0.966)	0.185 (0.966)	0.00475 (0.944)
Total Attacks		0.00202 (0.00226)	0.00198 (0.00224)	0.00202 (0.00205)
Lagged Dep. Var.		3.615*** (0.495)	3.559*** (0.491)	3.510*** (0.460)
After 2001		0.945** (0.422)	0.854** (0.415)	0.567 (0.396)
GDP per Capita		1.481** (0.699)	1.764** (0.727)	1.657** (0.708)
Population		-0.772*** (0.258)	-0.675*** (0.258)	-0.740*** (0.241)
Democracy			-0.852** (0.374)	-0.316 (0.354)
Islam				0.985*** (0.309)
Territorial Conflict	-6.867*** (0.340)	-6.488*** (0.490)	-6.005*** (0.338)	-5.688*** (0.280)
Religious Cleavage* Territorial Conflict	3.109*** (0.172)	3.795*** (0.210)	3.694*** (0.166)	3.513*** (0.151)
Constant	-6.359*** (0.409)	-12.51*** (3.024)	-13.45*** (3.080)	-13.23*** (3.085)
	3.587*** (0.135)	1.543*** (0.201)	1.527*** (0.202)	1.491*** (0.211)
Observations	983	865	865	865

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 12. Marginal Effects. Negative Binomial Regression.

Territorial conflict dummy variable included

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Territorial Conflict	13.59975 (53.48)***	12.28894 (25.85)***	11.96829 (29.79)***	12.31834 (24.69)***
Governmental Conflict	10.49072 (29.66)***	22.35 (22.35)***	8.357363 (18.82)***	8.875098 (16.29)***

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A1. List of countries

Country	Number of conflicts	Country	Number of conflicts
Afghanistan	1	Liberia	1
Algeria	1	Mali	1
Angola	2	Mexico	1
Azerbaijan	2	Morocco	1
Bangladesh	1	Mozambique	1
Bosnia	3	Myanmar	7
Burundi	1	Nepal	1
Cambodia	1	Nicaragua	1
Central African Republic	1	Niger	1
Chad	1	Pakistan	2
Colombia	1	Papua New Guinea	1
Congo	1	Peru	1
Cote D'Ivoire	1	Philippines	2
Croatia	1	Russia	2
Democratic Republic of Congo	2	Rwanda	1
Djibouti	1	Senegal	1
Egypt	1	Serbia (Yugoslavia)	1
El Salvador	1	Sierra Leone	1
Eritrea	1	Somalia	1
Ethiopia	4	South Africa	2
Georgia	3	Spain	1
Ghana	1	Sri Lanka	1
Guatemala	1	Sudan	1
Guinea	1	Syria	1
Guinea-Bissau	1	Tajikistan	1
Haiti	1	Thailand	2
India	8	Turkey	2
Indonesia	2	Uganda	1
Iran	2	United Kingdom	1
Iraq	2	United States	1
Israel	2	Uzbekistan	1
Laos	1	Venezuela	1
Lebanon	1		

Table A2. List of transnational suicide attacks: USA – Al Queda conflict

Country	Suicide Attacks	Country	Suicide Attacks
Afghanistan	2	Pakistan	1
Algeria	1	Saudi Arabia	8
Egypt	2	Syria	1
Indonesia	3	Tanzania	1
Iraq	1	Tunisia	1
Kenya	1	Turkey	2
Morocco	3	United Kingdom	1
		Yemen	6

Table A3. Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Source
Suicide Attacks (No.)	2664	0.6276276	8.473603	0	256	Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism
Suicide Attacks (Dummy)	2664	0.0341592	0.181672	0	1	Own Calculation
GDP per Capita	2424	3524.653	5313.147	118.1788	47209.53	Penn World Tables 7.0
Population	2450	119059.3	260504.6	289.431	1140566	Penn World Tables 7.0
Religion B (Buddhism)	1014	0.086785	0.2816587	0	1	Lindberg (2008)
Religion B (Christianity)	1014	0.2662722	0.4422264	0	1	Lindberg (2008)
Religion B (Hinduism)	1014	0.0394477	0.1947537	0	1	Lindberg (2008)
Religion B (Islam)	1014	0.4329389	0.4957269	0	1	Lindberg (2008)
Religion B (Sikhism)	1014	0.0128205	0.1125551	0	1	Lindberg (2008)
Religion B (None)	1014	0.1617357	0.3683899	0	1	Lindberg (2008)
Religious Cleavage	1010	0.590099	0.4920588	0	1	Lindberg (2008)
						Minorities at Risk Database
Europe	2664	0.1081081	0.3105752	0	1	Own Calculation
Middle East	2664	0.1261261	0.3320538	0	1	Own Calculation
Asia	2664	0.3393393	0.473574	0	1	Own Calculation
Africa	2664	0.3423423	0.4745826	0	1	Own Calculation
Americas	2664	0.0840841	0.277566	0	1	Own Calculation
Legal Origin (British)	2664	0.3048048	0.4604111	0	1	LaPorta et al. (1999)
Legal Origin (French)	2664	0.5	0.5000939	0	1	LaPorta et al. (1999)
Legal Origin (Socialist)	2664	0.1951952	0.3964253	0	1	LaPorta et al. (1999)
Democracy - Dictatorship	2664	0.356982	0.4791994	0	1	Cheibub et al. (2010)
After 2001	2664	0.2616366	0.4396083	0	1	Own Calculation
Total Attacks	2664	64.33784	114.3842	0	462	Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism
Average Attacks	2664	0.092447	0.79919	0	25.62963	Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism