

Lisbon and the Coherence of Council Votes¹

PRELIMINARY – WORK IN PROGRESS

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Abstract

This paper explores patterns of voting in the Council of the European Union. We analyze the full set of voting records for this institution between 2003 and 2009, i.e., under the Treaty of Nice. The relationship in voting behavior between two countries is measured by Spearman's rank correlation coefficients. Based on this relationship, we determine the support for the positions Member States take in the Council. The correlations can also be used as a prediction of future voting behavior, and we identify the effect the Treaty of Lisbon has on the support for the positions of the Member States.

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I. Introduction

The European Union (EU) started its life with the Treaty of Paris (1951) as a rather specialized Coal and Steel Community with rather strong powers over these two key sectors. Subsequent treaties gave the EU powers over an increasing swathe of policy areas, although with weaker supervisory powers than those that had been attributed over coal and steel. In 1957, the Rome Treaties were signed, and the new European Communities took on responsibilities relating to atomic energy (Euratom Treaty), and to common agricultural, commercial and transport policies (the European Economic Community Treaty). The Single European Act of 1986 set the objective of establishing a single market by the end of 1992 and in this year, the Maastricht Treaty led to the creation of the euro and the European Union (with the European Community pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Policy pillar, and the Justice and Home Affairs pillar). The single European Act was particularly significant in that, in matters linked to the establishment of the Single Market, it largely replaced the unanimity requirement with qualified majority voting, a trend that was reinforced in subsequent treaties. The Maastricht Treaty extended EU competencies to include a Common Foreign and Security Policy and police and judicial cooperation, although decisions in these two areas are taken on an intergovernmental basis rather than on the basis of the essentially supranational setting of the first Community pillar. The Amsterdam Treaty (1997) and the Nice Treaty (2001) amended previous treaties, among other things to reform institutions to prepare for the enlargement of the EU. The last treaty, the Treaty of Lisbon (2007), implies the move from required unanimity in several additional policy fields to decisions by majority voting. The European Union has thus expanded the range of activities substantially, and nowadays its policies do not only cover economic activities, but almost every conceivable

area of political, economic and social life.⁴ For some issue areas, most or even all policy decision are now taken at the European level, examples include capital and labor mobility and international commercial negotiations (also see Pollack 2000).

The EU did not only extend its prerogatives, but also more and more countries have joined the Union. Since the 1950s, membership has grown from the original six founding states to the present 27 member states. In addition, there are now four official candidate countries, Croatia, Iceland, Macedonia and Turkey. There are approximately half a billion citizens in the Union (cf. United States of America 310 million), and its GDP is roughly \$16 trillion (cf. USA \$14 trillion). In this paper, we study the relationship between the member states in Union.

One important innovation of the Treaty of Amsterdam was that it added legislation requiring the Council to grant access to documents relating to its legislative activities. As a minimum requirement, the results of votes, explanations of votes, and statements in the minutes must be made public. As a result, we now have a full record of votes in the Council stretching back to the year 1996. In the following, we present an analysis of votes cast by member countries over EU proposals and put forward a novel method to measure the dependency between voting behavior of countries. This allows us to measure and to compare these dependencies, and use these measures as predictions of future voting behavior.

The supreme political body in the EU is the European Council.⁵ It composes of the heads of government of the Member States and the president of the European Commission. The European Council, among other issues, decides on the appointment of senior officials of EU institutions, on treaties and their amendments that shape the framework of the Union and

⁴ See Alesina et al. for an analysis and normative evaluation of the attribution of policy prerogatives to EU level.

⁵ Note that the European Council and the Council of the European Union (officially the Council but also commonly referred to as the Council of Ministers or Consilium) are two different institutions.

serves as the ultimate decision-maker on issues too complex or contentious for the Council of Ministers. However, there is no voting on concrete proposals in the European Council, which instead essentially produces a policy orientation. It is the Council of the European Union that gets to vote on a concrete, specific act, drawn up by the European Commission and as such the Council can be seen as the principal decision making institution of the EU. Member states representatives sit and vote in the Council of the European Union so that the results of its votes can be taken to represent a direct expression of national interest, unlike the acts of the Commission or the European Parliament which by their nature express a European interest.

Council meetings vary per subject; there are, for example, the Agriculture and Fisheries or the General Affairs and External Relation meetings, but we leave the analysis of the different meetings for further research. Decision making in the EU and by the Council is described in more detail by Häge (2007, 2008) and Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (2006).

The Council acts give a description of the positions of Member States on the legislative proposals made by the European Commission. We contend that the positions are based on the national interests of the Member States. Based on these positions, we calculate Spearman rank correlation coefficients between the Member States. These correlations give insights in the position of countries in European decision making; countries with high correlation levels will generally be on the same side when a vote is taken. These correlations can also be used to determine the support the position of a member state gets in the Council and from what countries it typically gets this support. The positions of a country with low positive correlations, thus will not systematically enjoy the support of other countries get in the Council, and will have to find support on a case-by-case basis. When voting weights and the coherence in voting behavior are both taken into account, then it follows that the

positions of Lithuania, Estonia and Sweden get most support. Another point we look at is the consequences of the Treaty of Lisbon. One of the implications of this Treaty is the change in the voting weights. These voting weights were previously set in the Treaty of Nice, which implied a more obvious overrepresentation of the small member states in comparison with the Treaty of Lisbon. We use the calculated correlations as predictors of future voting behavior and subsequently look at the question whether these changes in voting weights have a significant effect on the support the position of member states get in the Council. From our analysis it follows that these changes only significantly affect (increase) the support for the positions of Germany, France, UK and Italy, while for the other countries there are no significant effects.

In Section II discusses the basic approach while Section III introduces the data and its descriptive statistics. Section IV studies the support member states get for their positions in the Council and then discusses the implications of the Treaty of Lisbon, and Section V concludes.

II. Basic Approach

It has long be a tenet of foreign relations that a country's relation with foreign powers is less subject to be fundamentally altered upon a change in government than domestic policy, the former being largely determined by long-term national interest. This paper aims at investigating this and this and other aspects of foreign relations through a rigorous quantitative approach, in the specific context of relations between European Union member states.

The choice of focusing on relations within the European Union is not only due to the objective interest of the field – nowhere else have independent states achieved such a high degree of integration – but also because the EU Council of Ministers offers a wealth of data that can be used to carry out the analysis on the basis of a quantitative approach, rather than the usual qualitative analysis.

The quantitative approach we have formulated is based on the fact that decision-making in the EU is, legally speaking, based on votes that member states' governments express within the Council of Ministers, one of the two legislative bodies in the EU and the only one to represent directly member states' governments (the other being the European Parliament). Since 1999 the records of these votes are public.

We shall first illustrate the approach and subsequently discuss its assumptions. Suppose Y is a vector describing the result of each vote in the Council. The vector has dimensions $(N,1)$, where N is the number of member states of the EU at that moment of time. A state can vote against, for, or abstain on any act which is put to vote (for simplicity we shall henceforth call all Council acts directives, as these contribute the majority of cases). Hence, all votes in the Council under the Treaty of Nice can be described as a matrix in which the columns identify a member state and the row a particular topic.

Often member states hang a *declaration* on their vote, which signals that a country would like to limit the significance of its vote or abstention by a public statement. Most declarations take the following form: "Country X votes in favor but lets it be known that it has objections on the following points..." or "Country X votes against (or abstains) but would like to stress that its opposition is limited to the following points...". We can therefore interpret these declarations as always "weakening" the yes vote (or the no vote), on the

basis that a vote stated with a limiting condition is always a weaker expression of will than a vote expressed unconditionally. The reason why we assume that an abstention with a declaration is more 'positive' than an abstention without declaration is due to the fact that in the majority of cases the Council approves with a large majority. The 'normal' vote is therefore assumed to be a yes-vote; furnishing an explanation of why a country is abstaining thus shows a more conciliatory position than an unexplained abstention.

From a modeling viewpoint, we therefore take that the vote result is not limited to yes, abstention, and no, but can assume the following values, from higher to lower levels of agreement: 1) yes-vote without declaration; 2) yes-vote with declaration; 3) abstention with a declaration; 4) abstention without a declaration; 5) vote against with a declaration; and 6) vote against without declaration.

The next step is to use the matrix with the votes to calculate correlations between columns, i.e., between the votes that are cast by member states. Since the vote results are measured on an ordinal scale, we have to use a non-parametric measure. We therefore calculate Spearman's ranked correlation coefficient, i.e., the 'normal' Pearson correlation coefficient based on the ranks of the vote results. Once we have the matrix with the votes, we can calculate all the correlations between the voting behaviors of each country. In the EU with 27 member states there are $27 \cdot 26 / 2 = 351$ different correlation coefficients. These cross-country correlations (denoted by r) are stochastic variables which, by definition, measure to what extent the voting behavior of a given member state is similar to that of any other EU member state.

We can test whether the calculated correlations r_s (which are based on n votes) are significantly different from zero by using

$$t = r \sqrt{\frac{n-2}{1-r^2}}$$

which approximately has a Student's t-distribution with $n-2$ degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis (the justification is based on a permutation argument, see §27.24 in Stuart et al. 1999).

In the Council, larger countries have larger voting weights. These larger voting weights, however, do not necessarily imply that the positions of the larger member states get more *support* (from itself and from the others) than the positions of the smaller states. In the case a large country frequently takes a position that is not shared by other countries, then the positions this country takes do not get much support in the Council. This low level of support is reflected in low values of the correlations of this country with other member states.

The support S_i the position of member state i gets can be expressed as the weighted average of the voting weights of the countries w_j and the correlations r_{ij} with these countries

$$S_i = \sum_j r_{ij} w_j .$$

One of the implications of the Treaty of Lisbon is a change in the voting weights. These voting weights were previously set in the Treaty of Nice. The changes in voting weights obviously have implications for the support in the Council that member states can expect for their positions. These implications stem from two effects: a (non-stochastic) direct one through the change in voting weight of the respective country, and a (stochastic) indirect one through the changes in voting weights of the countries that support the position through similar voting behavior. The joint effect on the support a member state i can expect,

ΔS_i , can thus be determined a weighted average of the correlations r_{ij} and the differences in voting weights under both Treaties (w^{Lisbon} and w^{Nice}). These differences are given by

$$\Delta S_i = w_i^{Lisbon} - w_i^{Nice} + \sum_{j \neq i} r_{ij} (w_j^{Lisbon} - w_j^{Nice})$$

where w^{Lisbon} and w^{Nice} are the percentage voting weights under the Lisbon and the Nice Treaties, respectively.

Our approach basic approach is based on two main assumptions. The first is that voting behavior in the Council of Ministers is shaped, in the long run, by country-specific structural factors that are relatively permanent. In other words, factors such as geography, economic structure and cultural or political traditions create policy preferences that are relatively stable. This assumption seems intuitively plausible and is in line with the experience showing that, i.e., on trade policy EU member states have tended to retain their free-trade or protectionist bent over long periods of time. This assumption might be criticized on the basis that votes in the Council are not always driven by long-term interests but also by short-term considerations. Note, however, that for this approach to work, it is not necessary that structural factors determine the vote outcome every time, but merely that they exert a detectable level of influence on voting behavior.

The second main assumption is that member states express in the Council votes that, on average and in the long run, represent a correct (or more precisely, asymptotically unbiased) representation of their policy stance. This is a non-trivial assumption, as member states may at times express a vote that is not in line with their real policy preference, out of short-term political expedience or tactics. Essentially, this may happen in three cases: in the first, a member state is against a given policy in the Council, but realizing that it will be outvoted, it

might abstain or go along with the majority to avoid the embarrassment – a theory of high political cost of dissent. The other possibility is that a member state willingly chooses to vote otherwise than its policy preference, trading its vote with another member state (or a group of member states) in exchange for receiving support on another issue that is deemed more important. In the third case, a member state government may put up a fake opposition to a measure to please some domestic constituency knowing, however, that this will have no impact on the decision.

There is little doubt that these cases occur in practice. Indeed, it is a fact that many decisions in the Council are taken by unanimity – this may be taken as a proof that member states are unwilling to be seen as publicly opposing a measure if it is expected that it will pass anyway (note that owing to extensive pre-vote negotiations, member states can anticipate to a fair extent the positions taken by the other delegates ahead of the vote).⁶ This, of course, results in reducing the preciseness of the estimated correlation. Nevertheless, there are a number of reasons to believe that it will still be the case that countries which have stronger alignment of interests will more often vote together than does that do not. Since the methodology is based on ranking policy similarities rather than measuring them in an absolute form, this should not alter the results if a sufficiently long period of data is analyzed. Moreover, there are a sufficiently high number of no votes and abstentions (only 29.9% of the votes are unanimous) to assume that the above theory of high political cost of dissent is also not convincing, the more so since we broaden the scope of the analysis from no-votes to also include milder forms of dissent allowed by the system, i.e., declarations and abstentions.

⁶Another possible critique is that member states can and do agree on certain issues ahead of coming to a formal vote. This would lead to a high clustering of votes just around the minimal threshold needed for the passage of a proposal. Such a pattern, however, cannot be detected in the records of the votes.

III. Data and Descriptive Statistics

The data on voting behavior is based on the voting records provided by the Council Secretariat⁷. These data cover the definitive legislative acts adopted by the Council and are accompanied by the formal statements Member States have made. An advantage of using these Council's monthly summaries is that they include data on all decisions which are adopted, so there is no risk of a selection bias by excluding some issue areas. Additionally, they make it possible to take into account disagreement between Member States expressed not only by voting but also by the formal statements. These statements are important, since they do not only show that a Member State disagrees with the Commission's proposal, but they also put forward country specific standards related to the proposal. A Member State may choose to make a formal statement as other methods of opposing a majority implies that a Member State is more or less excluded from any further negotiations on a policy proposal (Hagemann 2007).

We base the correlations on the votes which were held under the Treaty of Lisbon, that is, from February 2003 until November 2009. This means that the correlations are based on 1081 votes (702 for Romania and Bulgaria), while 323 votes were non-unanimous (212 for Bulgaria and Romania). The correlations based on the non-unanimous votes under the Treaty of Lisbon are reported in Table 1.⁸ As one may expect, for the Baltic countries there is a strong positive correlation in voting behavior, while for the United Kingdom this holds for only two countries, Ireland and Sweden.

⁷ Available at: «<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/>».

⁸ Table 1 can be found at the end of this paper.

A potential limitation of the data is that it refers to the member states' final voting positions. These voting positions are formulated after protracted bargaining (see Thomson et al. 2004 for a description). The final positions thus might not properly reflect the actual positions of the member states. In addition, on some proposals there is no formal vote (Hayes-Renshaw et al. 2006), what also explains the tendency towards unanimity in Council decisions (see Mattila and Lane 2001 for evidence and theoretical arguments). Indeed, 29.9% of the votes in the data is unanimous. We therefore also consider the subset of votes that were non-unanimous, as the abovementioned problems then play a smaller or no role. When the vote is non-unanimous then the actual positions of the member states are less distorted by bargaining or the lack of formal votes. When the correlations based on the non-unanimous votes pose a similar pattern as the correlations based on all votes, this would show that the Spearman rank correlation coefficient is a robust measure for the coherence in Council votes. We therefore use a regression of the correlations based on the non-unanimous votes on the correlations based on all votes. The correlations, however, cannot be directly used in an OLS regression analysis as, by construction, their values lies between -1 and 1. We therefore use the following monotonous transformation of the correlations:

$$y = \ln\left(-\frac{r+1}{r-1}\right).$$

Table 2 shows the outcome of an OLS regression of the correlations based on all votes and a constant on the correlations based only on the non-unanimous votes. It follows that the estimated parameter is close to 1 and that there is a high explanative power (R^2 90.4%), so the patterns in correlation based on non-unanimous votes are largely similar to those based on all votes. Unsurprisingly, the estimated constant is negative – excluding unanimous votes decreases the correlations, just as one might expect.

	non-unanimous votes
constant	-0.083 *** (-22.04)
all votes	1.052 *** (57.63)

t-statistics are in parentheses; ***: significant at 1%; R^2 :0.904;
estimation method: OLS; number of observations: 351

Table 2: Comparing all votes with the non-unanimous votes.

IV. Support

In this section we determine the support the member states got during the time the Treaty of Lisbon was in force. We then look at the effect the Treaty of Lisbon has on the support levels.

As becomes clear from the voting weights given in Table 3, larger countries have a larger voting weight under both treaties. These larger voting weights, however, do not necessarily imply that the positions of the larger member states get more support than the positions of the smaller states. In the case a large country frequently takes a position that is not shared by other countries, then the positions this country takes do not get much support in the Council. This low level of support is reflected in low values of the correlations of this country, and an example of such a country is the UK.

These support levels are reported in Table 4. We can clearly see two effects determining the support countries get for their position: (i) the voting weight of the respective country and (ii) the correlations of a country. The first is an important explanation why Cyprus and Austria get small support levels for their positions, while the second explains why Germany,

France and Italy do not get the largest support levels, even though they have as large countries a large voting weight.

	Nice		Lisbon	
	votes	%	pop. in mil.	%
Germany	29	8,4	82	16,5
France	29	8,4	64	12,9
UK	29	8,4	62	12,4
Italy	29	8,4	60	12,0
Spain	27	7,8	46	9,0
Poland	27	7,8	38	7,6
Romania	14	4,1	21	4,3
Netherlands	13	3,8	17	3,3
Greece	12	3,5	11	2,2
Portugal	12	3,5	11	2,1
Belgium	12	3,5	11	2,1
Czech Republic	12	3,5	10	2,1
Hungary	12	3,5	10	2,0
Sweden	10	2,9	9,2	1,9
Austria	10	2,9	8,3	1,7
Bulgaria	10	2,9	7,6	1,5
Denmark	7	2,0	5,5	1,1
Slovakia	7	2,0	5,4	1,1
Finland	7	2,0	5,3	1,1
Ireland	7	2,0	4,5	0,9
Lithuania	7	2,0	3,3	0,7
Latvia	4	1,2	2,2	0,5
Slovenia	4	1,2	2,0	0,4
Estonia	4	1,2	1,3	0,3
Cyprus	4	1,2	0,87	0,2
Luxembourg	4	1,2	0,49	0,1
Malta	3	0,9	0,41	0,1
Total	345	100	498	100
qualified major.	255	74	324	65

Table 3: Voting weights.

One of the implications of the Treaty of Lisbon is the expansion of qualified majority voting; another change is the change in the voting weights. These voting weights were previously set in the Treaty of Nice, which implied a more obvious overrepresentation of the small member states in comparison with the Treaty of Lisbon, as becomes clear from Table 3.

	support
Cyprus	0,06
Austria	0,08
UK	0,08
Luxembourg	0,09
Malta	0,09
Slovenia	0,10
Hungary	0,11
Italy	0,11
Romania	0,12
Bulgaria	0,12
Greece	0,12
Czech Republic	0,12
Belgium	0,12
Poland	0,12
Slovakia	0,13
Finland	0,13
Germany	0,13
Latvia	0,14
Ireland	0,14
France	0,14
Denmark	0,14
Portugal	0,15
Spain	0,15
Sweden	0,15
Netherlands	0,15
Estonia	0,17
Lithuania	0,18

Table 4: Support under the Nice Treaty.

The changes in voting weights obviously have implications for the support in the Council that member states can expect for their positions. These implications stem from two effects: a direct one through the change in voting weight of the respective country, and an indirect one through the changes in voting weights of the countries that support the position through similar voting behavior. The joint effect on the support a member state i can expect, ΔS_i , can thus be determined a weighted average of the correlations r_{ij} and the differences in voting weights under both Treaties (w^{Lisbon} and w^{Nice}). These values are reported in Table 5, and we can clearly see the direct effect playing a role in the increased support Germany, France, UK, Italy and Spain can expect, while the indirect effect implies that the support the

Netherlands and Ireland can expect for their position increases, even though their relative voting weight under the Lisbon Treaty is smaller than under the Nice Treaty.

	Support	change	p-value
Germany	0,19	0,067	0,02
France	0,18	0,038	0,17
UK	0,11	0,025	0,34
Italy	0,13	0,020	0,46
Spain	0,16	0,011	0,67
Netherlands	0,16	0,002	0,93
Ireland	0,14	-0,000	0,97
Austria	0,08	-0,003	0,89
Sweden	0,15	-0,006	0,80
Malta	0,08	-0,011	0,67
Belgium	0,10	-0,020	0,45
Denmark	0,12	-0,021	0,43
Luxembourg	0,07	-0,021	0,45
Greece	0,10	-0,024	0,38
Portugal	0,12	-0,026	0,35
Romania	0,09	-0,026	0,34
Cyprus	0,03	-0,028	0,30
Slovenia	0,08	-0,028	0,30
Latvia	0,11	-0,030	0,26
Poland	0,09	-0,030	0,28
Estonia	0,14	-0,035	0,20
Lithuania	0,15	-0,036	0,19
Bulgaria	0,09	-0,037	0,18
Slovakia	0,09	-0,037	0,17
Hungary	0,07	-0,038	0,16
Finland	0,10	-0,039	0,16
Czech Republic	0,07	-0,047	0,09

Table 5: Lisbon Treaty: changes in support.

We can also say something about whether the differences reported in Table 5 are statistically significant by assuming that the correlations are normally distributed. We test this assumption and normality is not rejected by the Cramer-von Mises, the Watson or the Anderson-Darling tests of normality.⁹ As a null hypothesis we have that the support is equal

⁹The p-values respectively were 0,67, 0,64 and 0,77.

under both treaties, this would imply $E(\Delta S)=0$. We can then test whether the Lisbon Treaty has a significant effect on support by using

$$t = \frac{\Delta S}{s_{\Delta S}}$$

which approximately has a Student's t-distribution with 27-1 degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis ($s_{\Delta S}$ is the standard deviation of ΔS). It turns out that the changes in support are significantly different from 0 for Germany (an increase) and the Czech Republic (a decrease) only.

V. Conclusions

There are several important possibilities for further research, either with EU or with non-EU data. With EU data, there are possibilities to study the positions of countries before proposals are discussed in the Council, while also with Council data there are many open questions. Council meetings vary per subject; there are, for example, the Agriculture and Fisheries or the General Affairs and External Relation meetings, and the difference between these meetings may be an important one. The United Kingdom and Spain, for instance, might mostly agree during Agriculture and (especially) Fisheries meetings, while this can be less the case for the issues discussed during the General Affairs and External Relation meetings.

Our analysis is based on Member States' behavior in at the last adoption stage in of the legislative process. The stages prior to the final adoption stage, however, can also be studied, as information on these stages is available via the Council website and the Union's

Prelex database¹⁰. Applying a similar methodology as used in this paper to these stages will lead to a better understanding of the decision making process in the European Union.

¹⁰ See: «<http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/>».

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	Bel.	Bul.	Cyp.	Cze.	Den.	Est.	Fin.	Fra.	Ger.	Gre.	Hun.	Ire.	Ita.	Lat.	Lit.	Lux.	Mal.	Net.	Pol.	Por.	Rom.	Slk.	Slv.	Spa.	Swe.	UK.
Aus.	-0,02	0,04	0,09	0,05	-0,00	0,07	0,07	-0,00	0,24	0,03	0,03	0,05	0,05	0,00	0,05	0,14	0,09	0,06	0,02	0,18	0,02	0,12	0,09	-0,01	0,07	0,01
Bel.		0,09	0,09	0,03	0,16	0,15	0,08	0,16	0,07	0,15	0,21	0,20	0,03	0,05	0,12	0,20	0,08	0,19	0,01	0,12	0,08	0,09	0,19	0,16	0,12	-0,02
Bul.			0,13	0,20	0,14	0,23	0,13	0,00	0,02	0,08	0,23	0,09	0,16	0,16	0,25	0,14	0,14	-0,00	0,05	0,25	0,17	0,19	0,23	0,12	0,14	-0,02
Cyp.				0,07	0,02	0,09	0,09	0,03	0,03	0,27	0,12	0,11	-0,02	0,13	0,11	0,17	0,19	0,03	0,03	0,02	-0,06	0,09	0,12	0,09	0,00	-0,01
Cze.					0,15	0,36	0,31	0,06	0,00	0,09	0,09	0,04	-0,01	0,39	0,33	0,18	0,06	0,09	0,21	0,15	0,11	0,38	0,16	-0,03	0,16	-0,01
Den.						0,22	0,21	0,08	0,07	0,16	0,09	0,13	0,05	0,19	0,18	0,05	-0,00	0,26	0,07	0,13	0,24	0,09	0,08	0,15	0,41	0,06
Est.							0,33	0,11	0,09	0,23	0,15	0,10	0,06	0,46	0,36	0,10	0,05	0,19	0,24	0,23	0,28	0,36	0,23	0,07	0,20	0,06
Fin.								0,05	0,05	0,16	0,15	0,06	0,03	0,26	0,33	0,11	0,04	0,11	0,21	0,15	0,30	0,23	0,24	0,05	0,21	-0,05
Fra.									0,14	0,11	0,04	0,12	-0,05	0,12	0,08	0,04	0,06	0,17	0,00	0,20	0,05	-0,07	-0,02	0,18	0,16	-0,05
Ger.										0,11	-0,01	0,10	0,00	0,08	0,12	0,11	0,03	0,15	0,06	0,02	-0,06	0,00	0,01	0,02	0,14	-0,09
Gre.											0,16	0,13	0,04	0,13	0,16	0,15	0,07	0,15	0,11	0,20	-0,04	-0,00	0,05	0,06	0,16	-0,00
Hun.												0,05	0,03	0,08	0,20	0,08	0,07	-0,01	0,19	0,08	0,11	0,15	0,15	0,04	0,06	-0,03
Ire.													0,09	0,07	0,07	0,09	0,08	0,22	0,01	0,14	0,22	0,07	0,17	0,20	0,11	0,27
Ita.														0,00	0,08	0,05	0,15	0,07	-0,07	0,15	0,13	0,18	0,17	0,08	0,01	-0,00
Lat.															0,39	0,12	0,04	0,15	0,19	0,13	0,29	0,35	0,14	0,10	0,07	-0,00
Lit.																0,08	0,09	0,15	0,38	0,20	0,40	0,35	0,09	0,08	0,20	-0,00
Lux.																	0,10	0,08	0,02	0,10	-0,05	0,16	0,21	0,07	0,09	0,03
Mal.																		0,06	0,04	0,20	0,10	0,16	0,03	0,22	-0,02	0,00
Net.																			0,08	0,11	0,09	0,02	0,04	0,13	0,34	0,14
Pol.																				0,09	0,04	0,20	0,12	-0,05	0,08	-0,07
Por.																					0,05	0,08	0,10	0,16	0,15	-0,02
Rom.																										-0,03
Slk.																										0,01
Slv.																								0,01	0,04	0,04
Spa.																									0,11	0,09
Swe.																										0,24

Table 1: Spearman rank correlation coefficients based on non-unanimous Council votes. **0,XX**: significant at 1%; **0,XX** significant at 5%; 0,XX: significant at 10%.