

DOES THE FIELD OF STUDY INFLUENCE STUDENTS' POLITICAL ATTITUDES?

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Abstract

We investigate whether the field of study influences university students' political ideologies. To disentangle self-selection from learning effects, we first establish to what extent the incoming students' choice of their field of study depends on their political ideologies. In a second step we then explore how the political ideologies change as the students' progress in their studies. Our results are based on a German panel survey whose sample size exceeds that of comparable student surveys by an order of magnitude. We find systematic differences between the student's political attitudes across eight fields of study. These differences can in most cases be attributed to self-selection. The only exception is economics. Even though self-selection also plays an important role, training in economics has a decided influence on the economics students' political attitudes.

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1. Introduction

Political economists usually assume that the observed heterogeneity in political attitudes reflects different economic interests, a view that plainly contradicts John Maynard Keynes' famous dictum "that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas" (General Theory, chapter 24, part V). If it is true that political ideologies or attitudes are, at least to some extent, independent of a person's vested interests, the formation of political attitudes that are not derived from interests emerges as an important topic of political-economic research. Our study sheds some light on how ideologies are embraced by analyzing empirically the role of education in shaping political attitudes. In particular we ask whether the field of study influences university students' political attitudes. This research question has already been addressed half a century ago by George Stigler (1959) who has appreciated the complexity of the issue by insisting that "(t)he isolation of the net effect of scientific training upon the policy views of a man is a most difficult task."

We propose that early adulthood is a particularly interesting period of life for studying political socialization because political attitudes are unlikely to consolidate before the age at which young people have for some time seriously discussed political issues and have had the opportunity to exercise political rights. Attitudes to political parties may, of course, be largely based on more fundamental values that become settled at an earlier age; examples are political trust and attitudes towards immigrants both of which have been shown to be already well established by the age of 14 (cf. Hooghe and Wilkenfeld 2008). But since the process of deriving party preferences from these fundamental values requires time, early adulthood is certainly a good candidate for the age at which political preferences begin to solidify. Our first main hypothesis thus concerns the period in which political attitudes as defined by party preferences consolidate. We hypothesize that the political attitudes of young adults still undergo systematic changes as they progress in their university studies.

If political attitudes have not settled by the age at which students' usually commence their academic studies, the question arises whether the observed subsequent changes in political attitudes depend on the student's field of study. Our second main hypothesis maintains that in disciplines that closely relate to issues of interpersonal relationships, public affairs, and political issues, systematic effects of the chosen academic program on the formation of the

students' political attitudes are to be expected. The respective disciplines are in particular the "SEL" fields (i.e. the social sciences, the economic sciences, and law), and to a lesser degree the humanities and medicine. Moreover, assuming that the possibly immature political attitudes of high school graduates are sufficiently strong, it is to be expected that students select themselves into academic programs that correspond in some respects with their political attitudes. This kind of self-selection would imply that the students' political attitudes vary across fields of study already among the incoming students. Our third main hypothesis thus puts forward that self-selection into academic programs according to political attitudes is manifest in the SEL fields and, maybe to a lesser degree, in the humanities and in medicine.

We test these hypotheses, focusing especially on economics (including business administration), with the help of an extensive survey of German university students. Starting in the academic year 1982/83, eleven waves of the survey have been conducted up to now, each wave comprising data on more than 8000 students. The last survey was carried out in fall 2010. The number of observations in our data set thus exceeds the sample size of comparable student surveys by an order of magnitude. Exploiting the large number of observations and covariates we find systematic differences between the student's political attitudes across eight fields of study. Moreover, we show that these differences can in most cases be attributed to self-selection of the students into fields of study that they deem congruent with the political attitudes they hold when entering university. The only exception is economics. Even though self-selection also plays an important role in this field, the subsequent professional training has, in contrast to the other fields of study, a decided influence on the economics students' political attitudes as they progress in their professional training. This last result thus corroborates the main hypothesis advanced by George Stigler in 1959.

2. Related literature

Our study relates in particular to two subject areas that have been intensively researched in the recent past. First, we deal here with a special aspect of political socialization which falls into the domain of political sociology, developmental psychology, and political science. One of the main research areas of the political socialization literature is concerned with the long-term shift in the significance of structural, attitudinal, and issue or candidate-specific factors in determining voting behavior. Empirical studies reveal that the structural divisions in societies, such as class and religion, still play a significant role in party choice, as do ideological

orientations (measured, for example, on a standard left-right scale). The quantitative influence of these factors has however declined after the end of the cold war.

To some extent the decline of “cleavage politics” (Franklin, 1992) is a consequence of generational replacement. Van der Brug (2010, 602-3), for example, conjectures that “people do not only ‘get stuck in their ways’ in terms of party preferences, values, or the propensity to turn out to vote. They also get used to evaluating parties by certain criteria”. The generation that was politically socialized in an environment characterized by a clear stratification in terms of class and religion still vote in line with these structural considerations, whereas the generation that grew up after 1950 in an environment in which parties competed with ideological arguments tend to put more weight on the ideological dimension of voting. The voting behavior of the youngest generation born after 1970 appears to correspond best to the voter model embraced by modern political economy, i.e. these voters tend to apply a case by case evaluation of government performance, candidate ability, and, in referenda, the specific issues at hand. Social structure and party ideology which used to provide the voters with convenient information and behavior guidelines thus appear to become increasingly obsolete in modern individualistic societies.

The political socialization literature thus establishes that the political environment prevailing in a voter’s formative years has a distinct influence on his or her voting behavior. This imprint may not so much be indicative of the individual voter’s party preference for the rest of his life; but it will to some extent determine how he or she will evaluate the political issues to be resolved by a vote or referendum. The period of political attitude gestation is therefore vitally important for the ideas underlying the voters’ reasoning and subsequent behavior. As far as the period of life is concerned in which political gestation takes place, Sears and Valentino (1997) have ascertained that periodic political events catalyze adolescent socialization, generating predispositions that persist into later life stages, and Franklin (2004) finds that elections that do (not) stimulate high turnout among young adults leave a ‘footprint’ of high (low) turnout in the respective age bracket of the electorate. The study on political attitudes of twins conducted by Hatemi et al. (2009) corroborates this picture by showing that during childhood and adolescence the youngsters’ social environment has a strong bearing on the development of political attitudes, whereas genetic factors do not matter. Only after leaving home in early adulthood do genetic influences begin to take effect. These results of learning certain behavioral patterns up to the age of early adulthood are perfectly in line with our

proposition that university students are well suited for studying the development and consolidation of political attitudes.

The other strand of literature that is closely related to our study is a hobby horse of economists and investigates whether economists are different. The dimensions in which economists have been suspected to be different are manifold. First of all, economists have investigated whether studying economics has a significant impact on the appreciation of basic insights from economic reasoning. Especially differences in the assessment of the market allocation mechanism have attracted a great deal of interest (see Haucap and Just 2009 for a recent contribution). But also other basic economic tenets have been investigated. Goossens and Méon (2010), for example, investigate whether the field of study influences to what extent students believe that voluntary transactions yield mutual benefits. In his provocative monograph, Caplan (2007), finally, compares non-economists' and Ph.D. economists' responses to a large number of economic policy questions and arrives at the conclusion that Economists base their beliefs on logic and evidence, whereas the general public holds systematically biased beliefs. Second, since modern economics curricula put more emphasis on the literature deriving from the *Wealth of Nations* than on the literature in the tradition of the *Moral Sentiments*, naïve economics students may be suspected to confuse positive economic theory of human behavior with normative instruction (cf. Rubinstein 2006). The question therefore arises as to whether economists are more selfish than their fellow students. In this context, cooperative versus free riding behavior in Prisoner's Dilemma laboratory and field experiments (in particular in situations of private provision of public goods) have been extensively investigated, but also generosity in ultimatum games, altruism in dictator games, and gift giving in situations calling for solidarity (Selten and Ockenfels 1998, Bauman and Rose 2011). A third line of investigation goes even further and asks whether economists, in an overzealous attempt to conform to a misconceived notion of the selfish *homo economicus*, are more prone to violate well established and generally acknowledged ethical and legal norms. Frank and Schulze (2000), for example, focus on corruptibility; dishonest behavior (pilferage) is investigated by Frank, Gilovich and Regan (1993) and Yezer, Goldfarb and Poppen (1996). The general picture that emerges from this entire literature has not changed much since Kirchgässner's magisterial survey (Kirchgässner 2005) in which he summarizes the conflicting evidence by observing "that at least in some respect and, especially with respect to their perception of economic mechanisms, political economists are different."

Given the long catalogue of attributes that have been studied in this context, it is surprising that political attitudes have not been included so far. The by now classical treatise by George Stigler (1959) in which he claimed that academic economists espouse distinctive political attitudes appears to be the only attempt to squarely address this issue. In the late 1950s US economists firmly advocated freedom in competitive markets. Nowadays, as documented by Klein and Stern (2006), their stance appears to have somewhat softened; but they still do not support the Democrats as fervently as anthropologists, historians, philosophers, political scientists, and sociologists. In a similar attempt, Gandal et al. (2005) identify differences in value priorities (hedonism, power, achievement, benevolence, and universalism) between economists and other social scientists. Even though the identified differences may contribute to shaping different political attitudes, all of these contributions do not add up to a systematic and reasonably encompassing investigation of the relationship between academic training in economics and the development of political attitudes.

Apart from establishing that economists are indeed different, two further themes pursued by the literature on the behavioral characteristics of economists are of special importance for our investigation. The first issue concerns the root causes of the observed differences. Are economists different because their training makes them different, or have they become economists precisely because they have already been different when they chose to study economics? In other words, are economists special because of self-selection (nature) or because of indoctrination (nurture)? Some of the studies that identify differences between economists and some comparison group go on to investigate the reason for the observed differences. The established method of discriminating between the nature and nurture hypotheses, which do however not exclude each other, is to exploit longitudinal data. Most studies use a set-up with two points of time, one before the students have been exposed to economic reasoning and one afterwards (Carter and Irons 1991, Frank and Schulze 2000, Gandal et al. 2005, Haucap and Just 2009). Studies distinguishing three points of time also exist (Gossens and Méon 2010, Baumann and Rose 2011) and one study (Frey and Meier, 2003) exploits biannual observations over the entire duration of study. The upshot of these investigations is that economics students do not change their value judgments and priorities (Gandal et al. 2005) and their behavior that directly derives from these values such as generosity (Carter and Irons 1991) altruism (Frey and Meier 2003), and corruption (Frank and Schulze 2000). If it comes however to evaluating the pros and cons of the market system vis-à-vis other allocation mechanism, some learning effects have been identified (Gossens and

Méon 2010, Haucap and Just 2009). Interestingly, Bauman and Rose (2011) show that even though economics majors are not susceptible to indoctrination, non-majors become less altruistic if exposed to introductory and intermediate microeconomics courses. It thus appears that indoctrination attempts only work if the value system of the target is greatly at variance with the conveyed message.

The second theme of the literature that ties in with our study concerns gender: do male and female economists behave differently? Behavioral economists have investigated behavioral differences across gender for a long time. The evidence is still somewhat inconclusive mainly because field and lab studies typically fail to control for the host of demographic factors that might bias measures of gender differences (see, for example, the survey on risky choices by Eckel and Grossman 2008). Since the literature on the behavioral characteristics of economists by nature works with relatively homogenous test groups, this caveat appears to be less severe. In their solidarity game, Selten and Ockenfels (1998), for example, found that male economists are less generous than students of other fields, but female economists are not, interpreting this evidence to imply that the gender effect on generosity is a general phenomenon, whereas the learning effect is restricted to males. Frank and Schulze (2000) find a slightly different gender pattern in their field experiment: male economics students turned out to be the most corrupt, male non-economists the least, and female students appear to be moderately corrupt independent of their field of study.

3. Institutions and Data

We use data from a student survey administered by the Research Group on Higher Education at the University of Konstanz. Beginning in the winter semester of 1982/83, data on more than 8000 university students have been collected every two or three years. Students are asked to answer questions about their socio-economic background, motivation, expectations, strategies, and how satisfied they are with student life. Moreover, the survey contains questions about life style and political attitudes. Mutrus (2004) notes that the dataset is representative for German students studying at universities, institutes of technology, and universities of applied science regarding the distribution of basic attributes such as gender, field of study, and age.

The questions inquiring about the students' political attitudes were first included in the second wave and have been asked ever since. The dataset contains 95536 observations collected in eleven waves and comprises more than 900 variables, most of which were included in several waves. The students are always asked in the winter semester.¹ Because most students begin to study in winter, the dataset contains about four times as many students whose record shows an odd number of semesters than students with even number of semesters. Students whose record shows an even number of semester may, for example, have changed their field of study, served in the army, or had a baby. The group of students whose record shows an even number of semester is thus quite heterogeneous and differs from the much larger group of students whose records shows an odd number of semesters. We therefore focus on the 'regular' students in our baseline model and refer to results of the overall sample in the section on robustness tests. The prescribe period of undergraduate study in Germany has been nine semesters and has now, because of the Bologna reform, been reduced to six semesters. We therefore focus on students who have not studied longer than nine semesters. In the robustness tests section, we also refer to results that take longer periods of study into account.

We distinguish eight fields of study: humanities, social sciences, law, economics, medicine, engineering, natural sciences, and other subjects. Table 1 shows that about 16% of the students study humanities, 12% social sciences, 7% law, 15% economics, 8% medicine, 21% engineering, 15% natural sciences, and 5% other subjects.

The response on political attitudes was elicited by questions on the four major parties that have been in the German federal parliament (Bundestag) for the last 30 years: the Christian Democrats CDU/CSU, the market-oriented Free Democrats FDP, the Social Democrats SPD, and the Green party.² The students have been asked to express their views on the four party positions by a scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7).

4. Political attitudes and fields of study

4.1 Descriptive analysis

The descriptive statistics shows that the students' political attitudes differ across fields of study. To focus on the self-selection effect, we examine students' political attitudes in the first

¹ In Germany the academic year is divided in two semesters, the winter semester and the summer semester.

² Since 1990, the socialist party „PDS/DIE LINKE“ is also represented in the German federal parliament. The questionnaire does however not contain questions on socialist party preferences.

semester by field of study. Table 2 shows the mean scores of the students' attitudes towards the four parties. Students who have chosen to study humanities or social sciences are less in favour of Christian democratic and free democratic policies than the average student, but are more in favour of social democratic and environmentalist (green) positions. By contrast, students who have chosen to study law, economics and medicine are more in favour of Christian democratic and free democratic policies than the average student, but are less in favour of social democratic and green positions. Natural science students are the least politically polarized group. Since our survey contains a large number of potential covariates of political attitudes we now use an econometric model to firmly establish that the choice of a student's field of study depends on his or her political attitudes.

4.2 Econometric analysis

Because the four variables on attitudes toward the political parties are categorical (values from 1 to 7), we specify an ordered probit model of the form:

$$\text{Political attitude}_{ij} = \sum_k \delta_k \text{Field}_{ik} + \sum_l \zeta_l x_{il} + u_{ij}$$

with $i = 1, \dots, 59853$; $j=1, \dots, 4$; $k=1, \dots, 7$; $l=1, \dots, 12$; (1)

where $\text{Political attitude}_{ij}$ is the political attitude of individual i towards party j (strongly disagree, ... , strongly agree). We distinguish between the four party positions: Christian democratic, free democratic, social democratic, and green. Field_{ik} are dummy variables for each field of study. We choose the natural sciences as the reference category because the natural sciences are the least politicized. x_{il} are the control variables, including a gender dummy variable (female=1), dummy variables on students' attitudes towards becoming self-employed in the future (yes, maybe, not likely, no; reference category "do not know"), dummy variables on students' attitudes on expected job perspective (excellent, good, intermediate, bad; reference category "do not know"), a variable describing the students' attitudes on the future financial situation (assumes values from 0 to 6), a dummy variable when the father is a blue collar worker, a dummy variable when the father is self-employed, a East/West German dummy variable, and dummy variables for the different survey waves. We include the control variables consecutively because not all control variables are available for the entire sample. Inferences do not change when including/excluding control variables.

We estimate the ordered probit model with robust standard errors for the four parties and thus end up with 8 Tables of coefficient estimates and marginal effects. To save space, we will present and discuss in more detail the results on the economics students' attitudes towards free democratic (FDP) and social democratic (SPD) policies, and only briefly discuss the results for the other students and party preferences. All estimation results are to be found in the Appendix.

4.3 Results

Table 3 presents the coefficient estimates of the support for the FDP. Column (1) shows the results when only the field of study dummy variables are included, column (2) shows the results when also the wave dummy variables are included. In columns (3) to (8), the other explanatory variables are included consecutively. The coefficients of the "Law", "Economics" and "Medicine" variable are statistically significant at the 1% level and have a positive sign in columns (1) to (8). This means that the incoming law, economics, and medicine students favor the market-oriented position of the free democrats more than the natural science students. The coefficients of the "Other subjects" variable are statistically significant at the 1% or 5% level and have a negative sign in columns (1) to (8). The coefficients of the "Humanities" and "Social Sciences" variables have a negative sign but lack statistical significance when the full set of explanatory variables is included. The coefficients of the "Engineering" variables have a positive sign but also lack statistical significance when the full set of explanatory variables is included.

Table 4 shows the marginal effects corresponding to the regression which includes all control variables, i.e. the regression in column (8) of Table 3. Table (4) has seven columns because the dependent variable assumes seven different values. The marginal effects reported in columns (1) to (7) show by how much (in percent) the probability of ticking category (1) to (7) differs as compared to a natural science student (reference category). The marginal effects of the "Law", "Economics" and "Medicine" variable are statistically significant at the 1% or 5% level and have in columns (1) to (7) a negative sign for opposing the free democratic positions and a positive sign for agreeing with them. The numerical meaning of the effects is, for example, that the probability of a law student to tick category 6 (agree with FDP) is 4.78 percent higher than for a natural sciences student. The probability for an economics student to tick category 6 is 4.24 percent higher, and for a medicine student it is 5.21 percent. By

contrast, the marginal effects of the “Humanities”, “Social Sciences” (except column 4) and “Engineering” students do not turn out to be statistically significant, indicating that natural science students resemble humanities, social science and engineering students more than they resemble either law, economics, or medical students.

The control variables display the expected effects. The FEMALE variable shows that women are less in favour of the FDP than men. The SELF EMPLOYMENT variables show that the more unlikely it is that a student expects to start his own business after graduation, the less he favors the policies advocated by the FDP. The BAD JOB PERSPECTIVES variables show that the more pessimistic a student is to find a good job after graduation, the more unlikely he is to have a favourable view of the policies advocated by the FDP. Being faced with a BAD FINANCIAL SITUATION has the same effect and students whose father is a blue collar worker are also unfavourably disposed towards the FDP, whereas students whose father is self-employed are more favourably disposed towards the FDP.

All these observations can be attributed to economic self-interest. Whereas someone whose employment prospects do not look bright or suffers from material hardship will appreciate the securities of a welfare system, someone who expects to be a net contributor to the system opposes it. The fact that women usually espouse more leftist policies than men is well known and can be explained by the greater economic vulnerability of women. The estimated coefficients of the two FATHER variables indicate that the students’ family background (working vs. middle or upper class) influences their political attitudes. This influence can be explained by class specific socialization processes. Alternatively, the students may still identify with their parents’ station in life because their well-being may still dependent on their parents’ income.

Table 5 presents the coefficient estimates of the support for the social democratic party and Table 6 the respective marginal effects corresponding to the regression in column (8) of Table 5. The marginal effects of the “Law”, “Economics”, “Medicine”, “Engineering” and “Other subjects” variables do not turn out to be statistically significant (except the Medicine variable in column 5). By contrast, the marginal effects of the “Humanities” and “Social sciences” variables are statistically significant and indicate that humanities and social science students have decidedly more socialist leanings than their natural science peers. The sign pattern across columns (1) to (7) in Table 6 is perfectly in line with this interpretation, the numerical meaning of the effects implying, for example, that the probability of a social science student

to tick category 6 (agree with SPD) is 4.71 percent higher than for a natural sciences student and the probability to tick category 2 (disagree with SPD) is 1.28 percent lower.

The combined evidence from the marginal effects for the different political positions and subject groups supports the hypotheses that social science students indeed exhibit a stronger support of social democratic and a weaker support of free-market positions than students in the natural sciences after controlling for their economic self-interest and their family background. Economics students, on the other hand, support social democratic positions less and the positions taken by the free democrats more strongly than natural sciences students. Engineering students' political attitudes do not differ significantly from the policy stance of science students, law and medical students' political attitudes however resemble the political attitudes of economics and law students.

The results for the Christian democratic and green party positions mirror and thus confirm this picture. Students studying law, economics, medicine, and engineering are significantly more in favor of Christian democratic policies than our benchmark student group, the natural scientist. The signs of the marginal effects (Table 8) change from negative to positive and thus confirm the overall impression provided by the positive coefficient estimates of the crucial field of study variables in Table 7. The probability of a law student to tick category 6 (agree with CDU/CSU) is 8.84 percent higher than for a natural sciences student, for an economics student it is 6.89 percent, for a medical student 3.65 percent, and for a engineering student 1.68 percent. By contrast, the social science students' political attitudes are significantly less aligned with the policies advocated by the Christian democrats. The probability of a social science student to tick category 6 (agree with CDU/CSU) is, for example, 2.23 percent lower than for a natural sciences student and the probability of ticking category 1 (strongly disagree with CDU/CSU) is 3.15 percent higher. The political leanings of the humanities and "other" students do not differ (in a statistically significant manner) from the CDU/CSU ratings of the natural science students.

The regression results shown in Table 9 reveal that law, economics and engineering students do significantly less agree with green policy positions than the benchmark students (natural scientist). This result is confirmed by the sign pattern of the disagreement/agreement coefficients in Table 10. The political attitudes of social science students, on the other hand, are significantly more aligned with green policies. Students studying humanities, medicine,

and other subjects cannot be distinguished from their fellow students studying science as far as their support for green policies is concerned.

5. Nature or nurture?

In this section we analyze whether the students political attitudes change as a consequence of the training in their specific field of study. Again, we first present and discuss the descriptive statistics.

5.1 Descriptive analysis

The average rating of social democratic policy positions - which range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) – of all incoming (first semester or freshman) economics students, independent of when they entered university (which is sometime between 1982 and 2010), amounts to about 4.6. Figure 1 reports the average economics students' ratings of all party positions and at all stages of their student career, i.e. we depict this data not only for incoming students but also for students studying in their third, fifth, seventh, and ninth semester. Notice, however, that we are dealing here with a pseudo panel, i.e. the responses across the five points of time (semesters) are not from the same students. Yet, inferences that are drawn from a pseudo panel usually approximate reasonably well the respective inferences that are directly drawn from a true panel.

Figure 1 indicates that the political attitudes of economics students do indeed change during the course of their studies: the further economics students progress, the more they favor the policy positions advocated by the free democrats and the Christian democrats. In the first semester, the average support for the FDP policy platform is 4.37 and for the CDU/CSU platform 4.03. In the fifth semester, the average support increases to 4.55 and 4.08 and in the ninth semester to 4.69 and 4.16, respectively. This is however not to say that economists become more conservative during their academic training. Economics students also become more favourably disposed towards the left-leaning German Green party: the average rating increases from 3.88 in the first semester to 3.91 in the fifth semester and 4.10 in the ninth semester. By contrast, economics students rather tend to turn away from social democratic policy positions as they become more proficient in their chosen field of study: the average

rating decreases from 4.58 in the first semester to 4.49 in the fifth semester and finally to 4.48 in the ninth semester.

Changes in political attitudes pointing almost in the opposite direction can be surmised by inspecting the time trends for the humanities and social science students in Figures 2 and 3. The development of the students' political attitudes as they progress in their course of studies is more ambiguous and less linear in the other fields of study. In any event, we now focus on the economics students and use an econometric model to show that the changes in political attitudes suggested by the descriptive statistics are really due to the students' advancing in the economics curriculum and not because of incidental changes in other factors that co-determine political attitudes. That is, we discuss the results for the economics students in detail and only briefly refer to the respective results relating to the other fields of study.

5.2 Econometric analysis

We specify an ordered probit model of the form:

$$\text{Political attitude}_{ijm} = \beta_m \text{Semester}_{im} + \sum_{l=1}^{12} \zeta_{lm} x_{ilm} + u_{ijm}$$

with $i = 1, \dots, 7957$; $j = 1, \dots, 4$; $l = 1, \dots, 12$; $m = 1, \dots, 8$ (2)

where $\text{Political attitude}_{ijm}$ is the political attitude of individual i (studying field m) on party position j . Semester_{im} is the number of semesters that individual i has been enrolled in field m . The set-up of this ordered probit model is similar to the ordered probit model in equation (1); the difference is that we now analyze the subsample pertaining to each individual field of study m .

We estimate the ordered probit model with robust standard errors for the eight fields of study and the four party positions. We thus end up with 32 Tables of coefficient estimates and marginal effects. To save space, we will present and discuss in more detail the results on the attitudes of economics students towards the policy positions of the free democrats and the social democrats and briefly discuss the results for the other party preferences and fields of study. All results are available upon request.

5.3 Results

Table 11 shows that economics students' support of FDP policy positions increases significantly in the course of their studies. Table 12 shows the marginal effects corresponding to the regression which includes all the control variables (Table 11, column 8). Table 12 shows that the probability of an economics student ticking category 6 (agree with FDP) increases each semester by 0.5 percent. Assume that a student studies for nine semesters. The probability that he or she agrees with the policies advocated by the free democrats will then increase on average by 4.5 percent between matriculation and graduation. Tables 14, 16, and 18 provide the respective information for the policy attitudes towards the policies advocated by the social democrats, the Christian democrats, and the greens. The probability to agree with the policies of the SPD decreases by 4.5 percent, the probability of agreeing with the CDU/CSU increases 3.6 percent, and the probability to agree with the greens increases by 2.7 percent between matriculation and graduation.

The econometric results relating to the other fields of studies indicate that these students' political attitudes change much less than the attitudes of the economists. To be more precise, the political attitudes of individual students may change a great deal, but these changes are less synchronized with their immediate peers. Only the economics students appear to change their political attitudes in conjunction with their fellow economics students. In this respect economics students are thus clearly different. This is not to say that we have not identified any nurture effects in the other fields of study. But these effects are smaller and do not encompass the whole political spectrum. Engineering and medical students become more prone to accept Christian democratic policy positions. Humanities, social science, and natural sciences students all become more environmentalist (green), and humanities students, moreover, also become somewhat more prone to accept social democratic policy positions and less likely to endorse policies advocated by the free democrats. Also the social science students turn away from the free democrats, whereas law students become more likely to endorse the free-market policies advocated by the free democrats.

5.4 Females versus males

We have investigated whether the students' self-selection effect and the changes in political attitudes as a consequence of the training in their specific field of study differs between

female and male students. To do so, we have estimated subsamples for females and males separately. The results show that differences in self-selection only occur for political support of social democratic positions: while the field of study chosen by males does not influence political support of social democratic positions, female students who have chosen to study social sciences are more in favour of social democratic positions.

The training in the specific field of study has had different influences on female and male students: females' policy attitudes have changed more in the course of studying than males' policy positions. Independent of the sex, economics students have however changed their political attitudes more than students of other disciplines. Male economics students become more favourably disposed towards the market-oriented FDP and the left-leaning German Green party and less favourably disposed towards the leftwing SPD. Whereas female economics students also become more favourably disposed towards the market-oriented FDP, they also become more favourably disposed towards the conservative CDU, and did not change their attitudes towards the the left-leaning German Green party and the leftwing SPD. Male students of engineering, law, humanities and natural sciences become more favourably disposed towards the left-leaning German Green party. While female students of humanities, social sciences, natural sciences, and other subjects also become more favourably disposed towards the left-leaning German Green party, they changed their political attitudes towards other political parties as well. For example, female students of humanities and social sciences become less favourably disposed towards the FDP. Female students of humanities and other subjects become more favourably disposed and female students of medicine become less favourably disposed towards the SPD.

6. Robustness Tests

We test the robustness of our results by replacing the dependent variables (political attitudes towards the four major German parties) by attitudes on policy issues that are indicative of political attitudes in general. The survey contains for example a question on the protection of free markets and private entrepreneurship and a question on the retrenchment of the welfare state and the social system. The results show that, in the first semester, students' attitudes on these questions differ across fields of study. Students who have chosen to study law, economics, medicine, and engineering are much more in favour of protecting free markets and private entrepreneurship than natural science students and, in particular, humanities and social

science students. By way of contrast, students who have chosen to study humanities or social sciences are much less in favour of reducing the generosity of the welfare state than students who have chosen to study economics and engineering.

We also test how students' attitudes towards the protection of free markets and private entrepreneurship, and on the retrenchment of the welfare state change in the course of their studies. The results show that only humanities and economics students have changed their attitude towards free markets and private entrepreneurship: humanities students become less market-oriented whereas economics students become much more market-oriented. Regarding the retrenchment of the welfare state, only economics students do somewhat change their attitude towards reducing the welfare state. These findings confirm that especially economics students change their political attitudes as a consequence of the training in their field of study.

We have focused on students whose record shows an odd number of semesters in our baseline model because the group of students whose record shows an even number of semesters is heterogeneous and it differs from the much larger group of "regular" students. We have re-estimated our results for the entire sample and also only for the group of students whose record shows an even number of semester. Inferences do not change at all for the entire sample. When using only the sample with the "irregular students" we can however not replicate our results relating to training induced changes in political attitudes. This finding indeed suggests that students whose record shows an even number of semester are different.

Because up to very recent times the standard period of study in Germany has been nine semesters, we have focused on students who have not studied longer than nine semesters. We have however re-estimated the results by using a larger sample that also includes students who have studied up to eleven semesters. The results for economics students do not change. The results do however not reveal anymore that law students become during their studenthood more market-oriented and that social sciences students become more prone to accept social democratic policy positions. Maybe law students who need more than nine semesters to graduate are rather mediocre and therefore do not assume that they can prosper in a market-oriented society, and students studying social sciences (an unprofitable art to begin with) for more than nine semesters probably have rich parents and are thus not likely to espouse socialist policies.

7. Conclusions

Our finding that university students select themselves into fields of study that correspond to the values and behavioral attitudes they have acquired before making this first important career choice, is perfectly in line with the extensive literature that investigates to what extent economists are special and why they are special. The value added of our study in this respect is that we have established that the values that co-determine the choice of a student's field of study also encompass the student's political attitude. To a large extent, students enrolled in different fields of study thus hold different values and behave differently because of self-selection which, in turn, is driven by socialization before they reach adulthood, and to a lesser degree maybe also by "nature", i.e. by genetic predispositions.

Somewhat at variance with received wisdom is our second result maintaining that the students' value systems are systematically influenced by some academic programs, implying that political attitudes are malleable up to the age of early adulthood. We have been able to establish this result only for economics students, believe however that also other kinds of professional training programs may influence the students' political attitudes. It is conceivable that we have failed to identify these programs because of the coarseness of the fields that we investigated; especially the fields "humanities" and "social sciences" are probably too heterogeneous to yield the sought-after results.

We have thus shown that economics students are special in terms of their political attitudes because of "nature" and "nurture" effects. Our preferred interpretation of the "nurture" result is not that economics students are brainwashed or indoctrinated by their instructors. This is why we prefer to use the term "nurture effect" and not the more established term "indoctrination effect". In particular, we agree with George Stigler who firmly believed that the cause of the economists' political "conservatism" derives from their training which, in turn, provides them with special insights. Because of these insights it becomes impossible for the trained economist to believe certain absurd arguments which are, however, often used in the political discourse with resounding success (Stigler 1959, section III). The systematic change that we observe in the economists' political attitudes during the course of their studies is most likely due to the informational content of the economics curriculum which changes the way in which the students derive their political attitudes from their more basic value system.

Here, however, a caveat is called for because one can think of alternative explanations of what is driving the nurture effect in the professional training of economists. The first one relies on external selection. It is at least conceivable that students embracing political attitudes that are not aligned with the attitudes of most members of the economics profession are likely to fail more often than their better adapted peers. Again following Stigler (1959), we do, however, not accord much credibility to this argument that implies that economists need to sell their souls to the capitalists in order to succeed; because, as Stigler argues, “(t)he current rates of pay for good economists are much below what I would assume to be the going price for a soul“ (p. 528). A second alternative interpretation could be construed by observing that progressing in one’s course of studies is not only associated with human capital accumulation and group-specific socialization but also with advancing, time-wise, towards professional life with the attendant vested interests. Freshman students can without much concern express socialist or fundamentalist green attitudes in order to parade or gratify some adopted identity. Briefly before graduation such expressive behavior becomes more costly and is therefore likely to be downgraded to a peccadillo of youth.


In any event, our novel result of a statistically significant nurture effect sheds some new light on our profession. Before drawing far reaching conclusions, the mechanisms giving rise to this effect need however to be investigated more closely.

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
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Figure 1: Changing political attitudes during studies: **Economics**




Notes: Values on political support between 1 (do not agree at all) and 7 (fully agree)

Figure 2: Changing political attitudes during studies: **Humanities**




Notes: Values on political support between 1 (do not agree at all) and 7 (fully agree)

Figure 3: Changing political attitudes during studies: **Social Sciences**




Notes: Values on political support between 1 (do not agree at all) and 7 (fully agree)

Figure 4: Changing political attitudes during studies: **Law**




Notes: Values on political support between 1 (do not agree at all) and 7 (fully agree)

Figure 5: Changing political attitudes during studies: **Medicine**




Notes: Values on political support between 1 (do not agree at all) and 7 (fully agree)

Figure 6: Changing political attitudes during studies: **Engineering**




Notes: Values on political support between 1 (do not agree at all) and 7 (fully agree)

Figure 7: Changing political attitudes during studies: **Natural Sciences**



Notes: Values on political support between 1 (do not agree at all) and 7 (fully agree)

Figure 8: Changing political attitudes during studies: **Other subjects**



Notes: Values on political support between 1 (do not agree at all) and 7 (fully agree)

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Conservative christian	53816	3.47	1.77	1	7
Liberal	53591	4.00	1.54	1	7
Social democratic	53678	4.71	1.37	1	7
Green alternative	53795	4.50	1.60	1	7
Humanities	59419	0.16	0.37	0	1
Social Sciences	59419	0.12	0.32	0	1
Law	59419	0.07	0.26	0	1
Economics	59419	0.15	0.36	0	1
Medicine	59419	0.08	0.27	0	1
Engineering	59419	0.21	0.41	0	1
Natural Sciences	59419	0.17	0.37	0	1
Other Subjects	59419	0.05	0.21	0	1
Semester	59853	4.42	2.71	1	9
Female	59607	0.45	0.50	0	1
Self employed? (yes)	26775	0.11	0.31	0	1
Self employed? (maybe)	26775	0.34	0.47	0	1
Self employed? (not likely)	26775	0.25	0.43	0	1
Self employed? (no)	26775	0.23	0.42	0	1
Job perspectives (excellent)	59388	0.22	0.41	0	1
Job perspectives (good)	59388	0.42	0.49	0	1
Job perspectives (intermediate)	59388	0.14	0.34	0	1
Job perspectives (bad)	59388	0.15	0.35	0	1
Bad financial situation	59533	2.43	2.03	0	6
Father blue collar worker	58844	0.17	0.37	0	1
Father self employed	58844	0.05	0.22	0	1
East Germany	59853	0.20	0.40	0	1
Wave 2	59853	0.10	0.30	0	1
Wave 3	59853	0.10	0.29	0	1
Wave 4	59853	0.08	0.28	0	1
Wave 5	59853	0.10	0.29	0	1
Wave 6	59853	0.09	0.28	0	1
Wave 7	59853	0.07	0.26	0	1
Wave 8	59853	0.09	0.28	0	1
Wave 9	59853	0.11	0.31	0	1
Wave 10	59853	0.09	0.29	0	1
Wave 11	59853	0.09	0.29	0	1

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics.

Political attitudes and subjects studied. Mean values. Deviations from the total means in brackets.

First semester.

	Christian conservative	Liberal	Social democratic	Green/ alternative
Humanities	3.13 (-0.34)	3.77 (-0.23)	4.85 (+0.14)	4.84 (+0.34)
Social sciences	2.85 (-0.62)	3.65 (-0.35)	4.97 (+0.28)	5.06 (+0.56)
Law	3.93 (+0.46)	4.35(+0.35)	4.51 (-0.20)	3.94 (-0.56)
Economics	4.04 (+0.57)	4.48 (+0.48)	4.53 (-0.18)	3.95 (-0.55)
Medicine	3.79 (+0.32)	4.22 (+0.22)	4.65 (-0.06)	4.48 (-0.02)
Engeneering	3.65(+0.18)	3.98 (-0.02)	4.65 (-0.06)	4.34 (-0.16)
Natural Sciences	3.29 (-0.18)	3.92 (-0.08)	4.73 (+0.02)	4.66 (+0.16)
Other	3.23 (-0.24)	3.78 (-0.22)	4.67 (-0.04)	4.71 (+0.21)
Total	3.47	4.00	4.71	4.50

Notes: Values between 1 (do not agree at all) and 7 (fully agree)

Table 3: Regression Results.

Ordered Probit.

Dependent Variable: Support of liberal positions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Humanities	-0.0636**	-0.0644**	-0.0357	-0.0272	0.00973	0.0132	0.00752	0.00762
	(-2.05)	(-2.08)	(-1.13)	(-0.65)	(0.23)	(0.31)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Social Sciences	-0.174***	-0.175***	-0.142***	-0.105**	-0.0798*	-0.0736	-0.0654	-0.0650
	(-5.17)	(-5.17)	(-4.14)	(-2.33)	(-1.76)	(-1.62)	(-1.42)	(-1.41)
Law	0.267***	0.287***	0.298***	0.242***	0.269***	0.261***	0.267***	0.266***
	(5.92)	(6.33)	(6.57)	(3.61)	(3.98)	(3.86)	(3.91)	(3.90)
Economics	0.303***	0.308***	0.305***	0.235***	0.235***	0.236***	0.240***	0.240***
	(9.42)	(9.52)	(9.45)	(5.25)	(5.24)	(5.23)	(5.26)	(5.27)
Medicine	0.295***	0.303***	0.322***	0.319***	0.300***	0.298***	0.289***	0.290***
	(7.06)	(7.23)	(7.68)	(5.63)	(5.27)	(5.25)	(5.07)	(5.08)
Engineering	0.0607**	0.0759**	0.0549*	-0.0181	-0.0158	-0.00711	-0.00527	-0.00504
	(2.06)	(2.57)	(1.83)	(-0.41)	(-0.36)	(-0.16)	(-0.12)	(-0.11)
Other Subjects	-0.121**	-0.120**	-0.108**	-0.198***	-0.176***	-0.168***	-0.171***	-0.170***
	(-2.50)	(-2.47)	(-2.22)	(-3.19)	(-2.83)	(-2.68)	(-2.68)	(-2.67)
Female			-0.103***	-0.0918***	-0.0728***	-0.0678**	-0.0677**	-0.0674**
			(-5.18)	(-3.39)	(-2.67)	(-2.48)	(-2.45)	(-2.44)
Self employed? (yes)				0.332***	0.317***	0.322***	0.320***	0.320***
				(5.33)	(5.08)	(5.14)	(5.06)	(5.06)
Self employed? (maybe)				0.220***	0.206***	0.206***	0.210***	0.210***
				(4.21)	(3.94)	(3.92)	(3.97)	(3.97)
Self employed? (not likely)				0.157***	0.148***	0.144***	0.149***	0.149***
				(2.93)	(2.76)	(2.68)	(2.76)	(2.75)
Self employed? (no)				0.0625	0.0528	0.0493	0.0642	0.0641
				(1.15)	(0.97)	(0.91)	(1.17)	(1.17)
Job perspectives (excellent)					0.195***	0.191***	0.186***	0.186***
					(4.64)	(4.55)	(4.37)	(4.37)

Job perspectives (good)					0.0959**	0.100***	0.0962**	0.0962**
					(2.52)	(2.62)	(2.48)	(2.49)
Job perspectives (intermediate)					-0.00485	0.000214	-0.00625	-0.00635
					(-0.10)	(0.00)	(-0.13)	(-0.13)
Job perspectives (bad)					-0.0396	-0.0236	-0.0338	-0.0337
					(-0.72)	(-0.43)	(-0.61)	(-0.60)
Bad financial situation						-0.0180***	-0.0148**	-0.0148**
						(-2.68)	(-2.16)	(-2.15)
Father blue collar worker							-0.0712**	-0.0704**
							(-2.13)	(-2.09)
Father self employed							0.194***	0.194***
							(2.95)	(2.94)
East Germany								-0.00797
								(-0.30)
Wave dummies	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
N	12779	12779	12737	6600	6578	6555	6434	6434
Chi2	313.8	453.7	477.8	254.6	283.2	283.6	290.9	291.0
Pseudo R2	0.00703	0.0100	0.0106	0.0110	0.0126	0.0128	0.0136	0.0136

Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 4: Marginal effects
Support of liberal positions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Humanities	-0.000893 (-0.18)	-0.000981 (-0.18)	-0.000792 (-0.18)	-0.000236 (-0.17)	0.000985 (0.18)	0.00130 (0.18)	0.000621 (0.18)
Social Sciences	0.00793 (1.36)	0.00846 (1.39)	0.00665 (1.43)	0.00152* (1.90)	-0.00860 (-1.38)	-0.0109 (-1.43)	-0.00506 (-1.47)
Law	-0.0259*** (-4.78)	-0.0321*** (-4.22)	-0.0290*** (-3.77)	-0.0172** (-2.55)	0.0297*** (4.74)	0.0478*** (3.73)	0.0267*** (3.21)
Economics	-0.0248*** (-5.90)	-0.0296*** (-5.48)	-0.0258*** (-5.08)	-0.0129*** (-3.54)	0.0282*** (5.83)	0.0424*** (5.04)	0.0225*** (4.55)
Medicine	-0.0280*** (-6.15)	-0.0348*** (-5.49)	-0.0316*** (-4.90)	-0.0191*** (-3.28)	0.0320*** (6.19)	0.0521*** (4.82)	0.0293*** (4.15)
Engineering	0.000594 (0.11)	0.000650 (0.11)	0.000523 (0.11)	0.000150 (0.11)	-0.000654 (-0.11)	-0.000856 (-0.11)	-0.000407 (-0.11)
Other Subjects	0.0225** (2.39)	0.0226*** (2.60)	0.0167*** (2.86)	0.00132 (1.10)	-0.0234** (-2.54)	-0.0276*** (-2.82)	-0.0121*** (-3.06)
Female	0.00789** (2.46)	0.00867** (2.44)	0.00701** (2.43)	0.00211** (2.19)	-0.00870** (-2.45)	-0.0115** (-2.42)	-0.00550** (-2.40)
Self employed? (yes)	-0.0312*** (-6.10)	-0.0385*** (-5.43)	-0.0348*** (-4.89)	-0.0206*** (-3.29)	0.0355*** (6.16)	0.0573*** (4.85)	0.0322*** (4.10)
Self employed? (maybe)	-0.0236*** (-4.10)	-0.0266*** (-4.02)	-0.0221*** (-3.90)	-0.00826*** (-3.07)	0.0262*** (4.11)	0.0362*** (3.90)	0.0181*** (3.68)
Self employed? (not likely)	-0.0164*** (-2.91)	-0.0188*** (-2.80)	-0.0157*** (-2.70)	-0.00623** (-2.12)	0.0184*** (2.88)	0.0258*** (2.69)	0.0130** (2.55)
Self employed? (no)	-0.00733 (-1.20)	-0.00819 (-1.18)	-0.00672 (-1.16)	-0.00228 (-1.01)	0.00815 (1.19)	0.0110 (1.16)	0.00536 (1.13)
Job perspectives (excellent)	-0.0205*** (-4.67)	-0.0235*** (-4.44)	-0.0197*** (-4.24)	-0.00800*** (-3.17)	0.0230*** (4.57)	0.0324*** (4.26)	0.0164*** (3.98)

Job perspectives (good)	-0.0111**	-0.0123**	-0.0100**	-0.00323**	0.0123**	0.0165**	0.00797**
	(-2.52)	(-2.50)	(-2.46)	(-2.17)	(2.51)	(2.47)	(2.42)
Job perspectives (intermediate)	0.000750	0.000820	0.000659	0.000188	-0.000825	-0.00108	-0.000513
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(-0.13)	(-0.13)	(-0.13)
Job perspectives (bad)	0.00405	0.00437	0.00347	0.000882	-0.00442	-0.00568	-0.00267
	(0.59)	(0.60)	(0.61)	(0.71)	(-0.60)	(-0.61)	(-0.62)
Bad financial situation	0.00174**	0.00190**	0.00153**	0.000447**	-0.00191**	-0.00251**	-0.00120**
	(2.14)	(2.15)	(2.15)	(2.06)	(-2.14)	(-2.15)	(-2.14)
Father blue collar worker	0.00858**	0.00916**	0.00720**	0.00166**	-0.00931**	-0.0118**	-0.00548**
	(2.02)	(2.07)	(2.12)	(2.57)	(-2.05)	(-2.12)	(-2.18)
Father self employed	-0.0198***	-0.0238***	-0.0209***	-0.0108**	0.0226***	0.0343***	0.0183**
	(-3.40)	(-3.09)	(-2.85)	(-2.01)	(3.33)	(2.83)	(2.53)
East Germany	0.000939	0.00103	0.000827	0.000239	-0.00103	-0.00135	-0.000645
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(-0.30)	(-0.30)	(-0.30)
N	6434	6434	6434	6434	6434	6434	6434

Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 5: Regression Results.

Ordered Probit.

Dependent Variable: Support of social democratic positions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Humanities	0.109*** (3.61)	0.109*** (3.59)	0.0873*** (2.83)	0.0882** (2.10)	0.0866** (2.03)	0.0847** (1.98)	0.0824* (1.91)	0.0840* (1.95)
Social Sciences	0.226*** (6.76)	0.219*** (6.51)	0.190*** (5.53)	0.207*** (4.65)	0.199*** (4.42)	0.199*** (4.39)	0.198*** (4.34)	0.203*** (4.44)
Law	-0.0590 (-1.26)	-0.0313 (-0.67)	-0.0386 (-0.82)	0.0332 (0.48)	0.0294 (0.42)	0.0248 (0.36)	0.0231 (0.33)	0.0228 (0.32)
Economics	-0.0420 (-1.33)	-0.0343 (-1.09)	-0.0319 (-1.01)	0.0422 (0.95)	0.0376 (0.84)	0.0354 (0.79)	0.0337 (0.75)	0.0389 (0.86)
Medicine	0.00600 (0.15)	0.0114 (0.28)	-0.00328 (-0.08)	0.0573 (1.03)	0.0570 (1.03)	0.0575 (1.03)	0.0654 (1.17)	0.0761 (1.36)
Engineering	-0.000739 (-0.03)	0.0236 (0.81)	0.0412 (1.39)	0.0498 (1.12)	0.0483 (1.08)	0.0461 (1.03)	0.0469 (1.04)	0.0495 (1.10)
Other Subjects	-0.0346 (-0.73)	-0.0341 (-0.71)	-0.0453 (-0.95)	-0.0743 (-1.18)	-0.0824 (-1.30)	-0.0845 (-1.33)	-0.0835 (-1.29)	-0.0748 (-1.15)
Female			0.0886*** (4.42)	0.0902*** (3.30)	0.0850*** (3.08)	0.0804*** (2.90)	0.0817*** (2.92)	0.0853*** (3.05)
Self employed? (yes)				-0.0970 (-1.50)	-0.0978 (-1.51)	-0.101 (-1.56)	-0.0839 (-1.28)	-0.0812 (-1.23)
Self employed? (maybe)				-0.0949* (-1.70)	-0.100* (-1.78)	-0.0929* (-1.66)	-0.0763 (-1.34)	-0.0779 (-1.37)
Self employed? (not likely)				0.0130 (0.23)	0.00742 (0.13)	0.0142 (0.25)	0.0227 (0.40)	0.0208 (0.36)
Self employed? (no)				-0.00649 (-0.11)	-0.0101 (-0.18)	-0.00360 (-0.06)	0.00237 (0.04)	0.00123 (0.02)
Job perspectives (excellent)					-0.00262	0.00194	0.00376	0.00356

Job perspectives (good)								
Job perspectives (intermediate)								
Job perspectives (bad)								
Bad financial situation								
Father blue collar worker								
Father self employed								
East Germany								
Wave dummies	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
N	12789	12789	12748	6626	6604	6580	6458	6458
Chi2	89.92	251.8	273.4	136.6	141.0	139.2	147.5	159.1
Pseudo R2	0.00213	0.00593	0.00641	0.00616	0.00635	0.00632	0.00682	0.00738

Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 6: Marginal effects
Support of social democratic positions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Humanities	-0.00427** (-2.04)	-0.00563** (-1.99)	-0.00815** (-1.97)	-0.0136* (-1.91)	0.00117*** (2.72)	0.0198* (1.95)	0.0107* (1.87)
Social Sciences	-0.00943*** (-4.90)	-0.0128*** (-4.72)	-0.0191*** (-4.61)	-0.0337*** (-4.25)	0.000202 (0.17)	0.0471*** (4.52)	0.0278*** (3.98)
Law	-0.00120 (-0.33)	-0.00156 (-0.33)	-0.00223 (-0.33)	-0.00366 (-0.32)	0.000422 (0.38)	0.00538 (0.32)	0.00285 (0.32)
Economics	-0.00203 (-0.88)	-0.00264 (-0.87)	-0.00380 (-0.87)	-0.00625 (-0.85)	0.000685 (1.07)	0.00916 (0.86)	0.00488 (0.84)
Medicine	-0.00382 (-1.45)	-0.00506 (-1.41)	-0.00736 (-1.38)	-0.0124 (-1.33)	0.000920*** (2.69)	0.0179 (1.36)	0.00984 (1.29)
Engineering	-0.00256 (-1.14)	-0.00336 (-1.12)	-0.00483 (-1.10)	-0.00799 (-1.08)	0.000823 (1.46)	0.0117 (1.10)	0.00625 (1.07)
Other Subjects	0.00428 (1.07)	0.00537 (1.11)	0.00749 (1.13)	0.0116 (1.19)	-0.00229 (-0.88)	-0.0177 (-1.15)	-0.00873 (-1.22)
Female	-0.00461*** (-2.97)	-0.00593*** (-2.98)	-0.00842*** (-3.00)	-0.0135*** (-3.06)	0.00193** (2.55)	0.0201*** (3.04)	0.0104*** (3.05)
Self employed? (yes)	0.00463 (1.16)	0.00582 (1.19)	0.00812 (1.22)	0.0126 (1.27)	-0.00243 (-0.95)	-0.0192 (-1.23)	-0.00953 (-1.30)
Self employed? (maybe)	0.00427 (1.34)	0.00546 (1.35)	0.00771 (1.36)	0.0123 (1.38)	-0.00192 (-1.19)	-0.0184 (-1.37)	-0.00940 (-1.39)
Self employed? (not likely)	-0.00110 (-0.37)	-0.00143 (-0.37)	-0.00204 (-0.36)	-0.00333 (-0.36)	0.000412 (0.39)	0.00491 (0.36)	0.00258 (0.36)
Self employed? (no)	-0.0000661 (-0.02)	-0.0000853 (-0.02)	-0.000122 (-0.02)	-0.000197 (-0.02)	0.0000263 (0.02)	0.000292 (0.02)	0.000152 (0.02)
Job perspectives (excellent)	-0.000190 (-0.08)	-0.000246 (-0.08)	-0.000351 (-0.08)	-0.000568 (-0.08)	0.0000753 (0.08)	0.000841 (0.08)	0.000438 (0.08)

Job perspectives (good)	-0.00324 (-1.58)	-0.00420 (-1.58)	-0.00601 (-1.57)	-0.00981 (-1.56)	0.00119* (1.65)	0.0144 (1.57)	0.00761 (1.55)
Job perspectives (intermediate)	-0.00237 (-0.94)	-0.00310 (-0.92)	-0.00447 (-0.91)	-0.00739 (-0.89)	0.000756 (1.24)	0.0108 (0.91)	0.00578 (0.88)
Job perspectives (bad)	-0.00232 (-0.85)	-0.00304 (-0.84)	-0.00439 (-0.83)	-0.00727 (-0.81)	0.000726 (1.17)	0.0106 (0.82)	0.00569 (0.80)
Bad financial situation	-0.000129 (-0.35)	-0.000167 (-0.35)	-0.000237 (-0.35)	-0.000384 (-0.35)	0.0000515 (0.35)	0.000569 (0.35)	0.000296 (0.35)
Father blue collar worker	-0.00340** (-1.99)	-0.00447** (-1.96)	-0.00646* (-1.93)	-0.0107* (-1.89)	0.00102** (2.43)	0.0156* (1.92)	0.00843* (1.85)
Father self employed	0.0134*** (2.90)	0.0159*** (3.13)	0.0213*** (3.34)	0.0301*** (3.88)	-0.00980** (-2.23)	-0.0489*** (-3.52)	-0.0220*** (-4.02)
East Germany	0.00520*** (3.31)	0.00662*** (3.39)	0.00935*** (3.45)	0.0148*** (3.51)	-0.00238*** (-2.77)	-0.0223*** (-3.48)	-0.0114*** (-3.54)
N	6458	6458	6458	6458	6458	6458	6458

Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 7: Regression Results.

Ordered Probit.

Dependent Variable: Support of conservative Christian positions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Humanities	-0.122*** (-3.97)	-0.126*** (-4.09)	-0.0829*** (-2.65)	-0.0489 (-1.17)	-0.0241 (-0.57)	-0.0221 (-0.52)	-0.0336 (-0.78)	-0.0318 (-0.74)
Social Sciences	-0.282*** (-8.51)	-0.283*** (-8.51)	-0.237*** (-7.01)	-0.189*** (-4.31)	-0.164*** (-3.70)	-0.146*** (-3.29)	-0.142*** (-3.17)	-0.137*** (-3.05)
Law	0.370*** (7.73)	0.388*** (8.11)	0.404*** (8.47)	0.453*** (6.37)	0.475*** (6.70)	0.481*** (6.75)	0.470*** (6.54)	0.471*** (6.57)
Economics	0.383*** (12.21)	0.390*** (12.40)	0.388*** (12.30)	0.357*** (8.09)	0.366*** (8.25)	0.376*** (8.44)	0.373*** (8.29)	0.380*** (8.44)
Medicine	0.259*** (6.22)	0.259*** (6.22)	0.288*** (6.89)	0.228*** (4.04)	0.217*** (3.83)	0.210*** (3.71)	0.192*** (3.37)	0.205*** (3.60)
Engineering	0.164*** (5.63)	0.180*** (6.15)	0.154*** (5.17)	0.0839* (1.87)	0.0872* (1.94)	0.0991** (2.20)	0.0939** (2.06)	0.0975** (2.14)
Other Subjects	-0.0575 (-1.24)	-0.0684 (-1.47)	-0.0509 (-1.09)	-0.0124 (-0.20)	0.00497 (0.08)	0.0331 (0.54)	0.0378 (0.61)	0.0485 (0.78)
Female			-0.150*** (-7.46)	-0.128*** (-4.71)	-0.116*** (-4.23)	-0.0981*** (-3.55)	-0.0935*** (-3.35)	-0.0893*** (-3.20)
Self employed? (yes)				0.198*** (3.18)	0.191*** (3.05)	0.211*** (3.37)	0.197*** (3.10)	0.201*** (3.15)
Self employed? (maybe)				0.0857* (1.67)	0.0807 (1.56)	0.0893* (1.72)	0.0864 (1.64)	0.0846 (1.60)
Self employed? (not likely)				0.0563 (1.08)	0.0597 (1.14)	0.0611 (1.16)	0.0489 (0.92)	0.0466 (0.87)
Self employed? (no)				0.101* (1.88)	0.0969* (1.80)	0.0971* (1.80)	0.102* (1.86)	0.101* (1.84)
Job perspectives (excellent)					0.118***	0.110***	0.113***	0.114***

					(2.79)	(2.60)	(2.64)	(2.65)
Job perspectives (good)					-0.0220	-0.00982	-0.0114	-0.00955
					(-0.57)	(-0.25)	(-0.29)	(-0.24)
Job perspectives (intermediate)					0.00510	0.0179	0.0197	0.0184
					(0.11)	(0.37)	(0.40)	(0.38)
Job perspectives (bad)					-0.0701	-0.0369	-0.0323	-0.0304
					(-1.27)	(-0.66)	(-0.58)	(-0.54)
Bad financial situation						-0.0525***	-0.0511***	-0.0503***
						(-7.85)	(-7.47)	(-7.33)
Father blue collar worker							-0.0579*	-0.0472
							(-1.71)	(-1.39)
Father self employed							0.153**	0.145**
							(2.27)	(2.15)
East Germany								-0.114***
								(-4.21)
Wave dummies	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
N	12831	12831	12789	6636	6614	6591	6469	6469
Chi2	550.1	652.9	712.3	302.6	321.1	380.6	380.8	399.1
Pseudo R2	0.0118	0.0138	0.0150	0.0125	0.0133	0.0161	0.0164	0.0171

Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 8: Marginal effects:
Support of conservative Christian positions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Humanities	0.00699 (0.73)	0.00456 (0.74)	0.00114 (0.77)	-0.00150 (-0.71)	-0.00394 (-0.73)	-0.00532 (-0.74)	-0.00194 (-0.75)
Social Sciences	0.0315*** (2.90)	0.0192*** (3.14)	0.00412*** (3.84)	-0.00744*** (-2.59)	-0.0173*** (-2.98)	-0.0223*** (-3.16)	-0.00778*** (-3.31)
Law	-0.0798*** (-8.80)	-0.0710*** (-6.59)	-0.0299*** (-4.82)	0.00132 (0.41)	0.0471*** (9.08)	0.0884*** (6.09)	0.0439*** (4.59)
Economics	-0.0711*** (-9.80)	-0.0568*** (-8.12)	-0.0206*** (-6.32)	0.00730*** (6.27)	0.0419*** (9.39)	0.0689*** (7.80)	0.0305*** (6.39)
Medicine	-0.0402*** (-4.00)	-0.0306*** (-3.50)	-0.0101*** (-2.89)	0.00570*** (6.77)	0.0237*** (3.87)	0.0365*** (3.41)	0.0151*** (3.04)
Engineering	-0.0204** (-2.22)	-0.0143** (-2.11)	-0.00409* (-1.91)	0.00377** (2.52)	0.0118** (2.19)	0.0168** (2.09)	0.00646** (1.99)
Other Subjects	-0.0103 (-0.80)	-0.00707 (-0.77)	-0.00196 (-0.73)	0.00199 (0.87)	0.00590 (0.79)	0.00829 (0.77)	0.00314 (0.75)
Female	0.0193*** (3.22)	0.0129*** (3.19)	0.00339*** (3.06)	-0.00395*** (-3.24)	-0.0110*** (-3.20)	-0.0151*** (-3.18)	-0.00560*** (-3.10)
Self employed? (yes)	-0.0400*** (-3.46)	-0.0298*** (-3.08)	-0.00956*** (-2.58)	0.00610*** (5.38)	0.0234*** (3.36)	0.0354*** (3.02)	0.0144*** (2.71)
Self employed? (maybe)	-0.0181 (-1.62)	-0.0123 (-1.59)	-0.00331 (-1.52)	0.00361* (1.69)	0.0103 (1.61)	0.0144 (1.59)	0.00539 (1.56)
Self employed? (not likely)	-0.00999 (-0.88)	-0.00676 (-0.87)	-0.00182 (-0.83)	0.00199 (0.92)	0.00570 (0.88)	0.00791 (0.86)	0.00297 (0.85)
Self employed? (no)	-0.0212* (-1.90)	-0.0147* (-1.82)	-0.00416* (-1.67)	0.00401** (2.11)	0.0122* (1.87)	0.0173* (1.80)	0.00662* (1.73)
Job perspectives (excellent)	-0.0240*** (-2.73)	-0.0166*** (-2.62)	-0.00467** (-2.40)	0.00455*** (3.00)	0.0138*** (2.69)	0.0195*** (2.60)	0.00744** (2.48)

Job perspectives (good)	0.00208 (0.24)	0.00137 (0.24)	0.000354 (0.24)	-0.000433 (-0.24)	-0.00118 (-0.24)	-0.00160 (-0.24)	-0.000592 (-0.24)
Job perspectives (intermediate)	-0.00396 (-0.38)	-0.00266 (-0.38)	-0.000703 (-0.37)	0.000805 (0.39)	0.00225 (0.38)	0.00311 (0.38)	0.00116 (0.37)
Job perspectives (bad)	0.00670 (0.53)	0.00435 (0.55)	0.00108 (0.57)	-0.00145 (-0.52)	-0.00377 (-0.54)	-0.00507 (-0.55)	-0.00184 (-0.56)
Bad financial situation	0.0109*** (7.27)	0.00725*** (7.15)	0.00188*** (6.59)	-0.00227*** (-6.52)	-0.00620*** (-7.11)	-0.00846*** (-7.13)	-0.00312*** (-6.98)
Father blue collar worker	0.0104 (1.36)	0.00674 (1.40)	0.00165 (1.47)	-0.00227 (-1.30)	-0.00586 (-1.37)	-0.00785 (-1.40)	-0.00285 (-1.42)
Father self employed	-0.0292** (-2.33)	-0.0214** (-2.10)	-0.00672* (-1.79)	0.00468*** (3.44)	0.0171** (2.26)	0.0254** (2.07)	0.0102* (1.90)
East Germany	0.0252*** (4.12)	0.0162*** (4.24)	0.00397*** (4.30)	-0.00549*** (-3.87)	-0.0141*** (-4.15)	-0.0189*** (-4.22)	-0.00686*** (-4.24)
N	6469	6469	6469	6469	6469	6469	6469

Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 9: Regression Results.

Ordered Probit.

Dependent Variable: Support of green/alternative positions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Humanities	0.155*** (4.97)	0.158*** (5.08)	0.101*** (3.16)	0.0925** (2.17)	0.0753* (1.74)	0.0769* (1.77)	0.0662 (1.51)	0.0679 (1.54)
Social Sciences	0.328*** (9.79)	0.317*** (9.43)	0.250*** (7.29)	0.212*** (4.67)	0.191*** (4.16)	0.192*** (4.19)	0.182*** (3.91)	0.187*** (4.02)
Law	-0.395*** (-8.73)	-0.418*** (-9.21)	-0.438*** (-9.64)	-0.418*** (-6.15)	-0.435*** (-6.39)	-0.438*** (-6.41)	-0.463*** (-6.73)	-0.464*** (-6.72)
Economics	-0.414*** (-13.10)	-0.420*** (-13.28)	-0.416*** (-13.16)	-0.385*** (-8.67)	-0.394*** (-8.84)	-0.396*** (-8.86)	-0.394*** (-8.73)	-0.389*** (-8.60)
Medicine	-0.0647 (-1.51)	-0.0674 (-1.56)	-0.108** (-2.48)	-0.0369 (-0.63)	-0.0237 (-0.40)	-0.0228 (-0.39)	-0.0460 (-0.78)	-0.0338 (-0.57)
Engineering	-0.191*** (-6.37)	-0.202*** (-6.70)	-0.163*** (-5.36)	-0.145*** (-3.20)	-0.147*** (-3.24)	-0.147*** (-3.22)	-0.148*** (-3.21)	-0.145*** (-3.14)
Other Subjects	0.101** (2.12)	0.0987** (2.07)	0.0705 (1.47)	0.0407 (0.64)	0.0210 (0.33)	0.0176 (0.28)	0.00515 (0.08)	0.0152 (0.23)
Female			0.212*** (10.53)	0.201*** (7.38)	0.189*** (6.87)	0.185*** (6.68)	0.189*** (6.78)	0.194*** (6.92)
Self employed? (yes)				-0.0949 (-1.53)	-0.0888 (-1.43)	-0.0932 (-1.49)	-0.104 (-1.63)	-0.101 (-1.59)
Self employed? (maybe)				0.0138 (0.25)	0.0162 (0.30)	0.0159 (0.29)	0.00697 (0.13)	0.00510 (0.09)
Self employed? (not likely)				0.0975* (1.78)	0.0987* (1.80)	0.101* (1.83)	0.0849 (1.52)	0.0825 (1.47)
Self employed? (no)				0.00173 (0.03)	0.00352 (0.06)	0.00337 (0.06)	-0.00516 (-0.09)	-0.00677 (-0.12)
Job perspectives (excellent)					-0.120***	-0.115***	-0.121***	-0.121***

Job perspectives (good)								
Job perspectives (intermediate)								
Job perspectives (bad)								
Bad financial situation								
Father blue collar worker								
Father self employed								
East Germany								
Wave dummies	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
N	12821	12821	12779	6630	6607	6583	6461	6461
Chi2	690.7	847.4	959.3	483.8	505.2	504.1	510.8	528.3
Pseudo R2	0.0148	0.0181	0.0205	0.0197	0.0207	0.0207	0.0215	0.0222

Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 10: Marginal effects:
Support of green/alternative positions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Humanities	-0.00684 (-1.59)	-0.00787 (-1.56)	-0.00672 (-1.54)	-0.00541 (-1.48)	0.00352* (1.70)	0.0163 (1.54)	0.00702 (1.49)
Social Sciences	-0.0175*** (-4.43)	-0.0210*** (-4.18)	-0.0186*** (-3.98)	-0.0162*** (-3.59)	0.00760*** (5.79)	0.0449*** (4.02)	0.0209*** (3.61)
Law	0.0672*** (5.08)	0.0586*** (6.40)	0.0398*** (8.11)	0.0170*** (11.30)	-0.0464*** (-4.88)	-0.104*** (-7.50)	-0.0327*** (-9.30)
Economics	0.0504*** (7.02)	0.0482*** (7.92)	0.0355*** (8.98)	0.0200*** (11.78)	-0.0333*** (-6.41)	-0.0895*** (-9.00)	-0.0312*** (-9.80)
Medicine	0.00361 (0.56)	0.00400 (0.57)	0.00331 (0.57)	0.00249 (0.59)	-0.00204 (-0.54)	-0.00808 (-0.57)	-0.00329 (-0.59)
Engineering	0.0164*** (2.90)	0.0175*** (3.05)	0.0140*** (3.19)	0.00981*** (3.56)	-0.00992*** (-2.67)	-0.0344*** (-3.18)	-0.0133*** (-3.40)
Other Subjects	-0.00156 (-0.24)	-0.00177 (-0.23)	-0.00149 (-0.23)	-0.00117 (-0.23)	0.000839 (0.24)	0.00363 (0.23)	0.00153 (0.23)
Female	-0.0206*** (-6.50)	-0.0228*** (-6.64)	-0.0190*** (-6.77)	-0.0144*** (-6.94)	0.0115*** (6.04)	0.0463*** (6.90)	0.0191*** (6.78)
Self employed? (yes)	0.0112 (1.50)	0.0121 (1.56)	0.00980 (1.61)	0.00704* (1.75)	-0.00665 (-1.40)	-0.0240 (-1.60)	-0.00946* (-1.70)
Self employed? (maybe)	-0.000531 (-0.09)	-0.000598 (-0.09)	-0.000502 (-0.09)	-0.000390 (-0.09)	0.000290 (0.09)	0.00122 (0.09)	0.000510 (0.09)
Self employed? (not likely)	-0.00830 (-1.52)	-0.00955 (-1.49)	-0.00816 (-1.47)	-0.00659 (-1.41)	0.00426 (1.63)	0.0198 (1.47)	0.00854 (1.42)
Self employed? (no)	0.000708 (0.12)	0.000795 (0.12)	0.000666 (0.12)	0.000514 (0.12)	-0.000389 (-0.12)	-0.00162 (-0.12)	-0.000674 (-0.12)
Job perspectives (excellent)	0.0132*** (2.66)	0.0144*** (2.75)	0.0118*** (2.82)	0.00863*** (3.00)	-0.00770** (-2.52)	-0.0288*** (-2.82)	-0.0115*** (-2.91)

Job perspectives (good)	-0.00186	-0.00210	-0.00176	-0.00137	0.00101	0.00430	0.00180
	(-0.45)	(-0.45)	(-0.44)	(-0.44)	(0.45)	(0.44)	(0.44)
Job perspectives (intermediate)	-0.00114	-0.00129	-0.00109	-0.000849	0.000617	0.00264	0.00111
	(-0.22)	(-0.22)	(-0.22)	(-0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Job perspectives (bad)	-0.00142	-0.00160	-0.00135	-0.00106	0.000762	0.00328	0.00138
	(-0.25)	(-0.24)	(-0.24)	(-0.24)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Bad financial situation	-0.000451	-0.000507	-0.000425	-0.000330	0.000246	0.00104	0.000431
	(-0.63)	(-0.63)	(-0.63)	(-0.63)	(0.63)	(0.63)	(0.63)
Father blue collar worker	0.0143***	0.0154***	0.0124***	0.00884***	-0.00852***	-0.0304***	-0.0119***
	(3.51)	(3.64)	(3.79)	(4.11)	(-3.23)	(-3.77)	(-4.01)
Father self employed	0.0183**	0.0191**	0.0150**	0.00999***	-0.0115**	-0.0370**	-0.0139***
	(2.17)	(2.33)	(2.50)	(3.02)	(-1.98)	(-2.46)	(-2.74)
East Germany	0.0116***	0.0128***	0.0106***	0.00797***	-0.00657***	-0.0259***	-0.0105***
	(3.90)	(3.97)	(4.01)	(4.10)	(-3.72)	(-4.03)	(-4.09)
N	6461	6461	6461	6461	6461	6461	6461

Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 11: Regression Results

Dependent variable: Support for Liberal positions: Economists

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Semester	0.0266*** [6.04]	0.0292*** [6.54]	0.0292*** [6.53]	0.0278*** [4.30]	0.0266*** [4.09]	0.0264*** [4.03]	0.0250*** [3.80]	0.0237*** [3.58]
Female			-0.3044*** [12.74]	-0.3421*** [10.11]	-0.3139*** [9.17]	-0.3033*** [8.77]	-0.3027*** [8.69]	-0.2970*** [8.48]
Self employed? (yes)				0.2204** [2.38]	0.2056** [2.21]	0.2020** [2.13]	0.2159** [2.24]	0.2203** [2.29]
Self employed? (maybe)				0.1346 [1.55]	0.1253 [1.43]	0.1156 [1.29]	0.1397 [1.53]	0.1402 [1.54]
Self employed? (not likely)				0.0663 [0.72]	0.0702 [0.76]	0.0589 [0.63]	0.0826 [0.87]	0.0831 [0.87]
Self employed? (no)				-0.0705 [0.71]	-0.067 [0.67]	-0.0733 [0.72]	-0.0328 [0.32]	-0.0332 [0.32]
Job perspectives (excellent)					0.3286*** [5.33]	0.3092*** [5.00]	0.3050*** [4.87]	0.3078*** [4.92]
Job perspectives (good)					0.1573*** [2.75]	0.1601*** [2.79]	0.1551*** [2.66]	0.1617*** [2.77]
Job perspectives (intermediate)					0.0504 [0.64]	0.0668 [0.85]	0.0592 [0.74]	0.0687 [0.85]
Job perspectives (bad)					0.0368 [0.43]	0.0697 [0.80]	0.0635 [0.72]	0.0693 [0.78]
Bad financial situation						-0.0480*** [5.38]	-0.0429*** [4.70]	-0.0424*** [4.64]
Father blue collar worker							-0.1248*** [2.75]	-0.1164** [2.55]
Father self employed							0.0819 [1.13]	0.0825 [1.14]
East Germany								-0.0766** [2.08]
Wave dummies		no	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
N	7935	7935	7912	3860	3852	3837	3780	3780
Chi2	8.766	60.55	116.8	59.86	66.24	76.00	89.79	92.22
Pseudo R2	0.000637	0.00466	0.00936	0.00849	0.00930	0.0104	0.0120	0.0123

Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 12: Marginal effects

Dependent variable: Support for Liberal positions: Economists.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Semester	-0.00165*** (-3.49)	-0.00241*** (-3.54)	-0.00252*** (-3.51)	-0.00285*** (-3.52)	0.00148*** (3.45)	0.00503*** (3.56)	0.00292*** (3.55)
Female	0.0214*** (7.44)	0.0305*** (7.69)	0.0315*** (7.97)	0.0345*** (7.84)	-0.0193*** (-7.18)	-0.0626*** (-8.34)	-0.0360*** (-7.96)
Self employed? (yes)	-0.0137** (-2.53)	-0.0211** (-2.43)	-0.0231** (-2.33)	-0.0292** (-2.11)	0.0105*** (3.21)	0.0465** (2.31)	0.0299** (2.08)
Self employed? (maybe)	-0.00972 (-1.53)	-0.0142 (-1.54)	-0.0149 (-1.55)	-0.0169 (-1.54)	0.00864 (1.55)	0.0297 (1.54)	0.0174 (1.53)
Self employed? (not likely)	-0.00551 (-0.91)	-0.00824 (-0.90)	-0.00882 (-0.88)	-0.0104 (-0.84)	0.00469 (0.98)	0.0176 (0.87)	0.0107 (0.84)
Self employed? (no)	0.00237 (0.32)	0.00342 (0.32)	0.00355 (0.32)	0.00390 (0.33)	-0.00218 (-0.31)	-0.00705 (-0.32)	-0.00401 (-0.33)
Job perspectives (excellent)	-0.0194*** (-5.03)	-0.0295*** (-5.14)	-0.0322*** (-4.92)	-0.0402*** (-4.48)	0.0149*** (5.89)	0.0648*** (4.94)	0.0416*** (4.43)
Job perspectives (good)	-0.0112*** (-2.71)	-0.0163*** (-2.79)	-0.0172*** (-2.77)	-0.0196*** (-2.72)	0.00986*** (2.79)	0.0343*** (2.76)	0.0201*** (2.73)
Job perspectives (intermediate)	-0.00453 (-0.90)	-0.00679 (-0.88)	-0.00729 (-0.86)	-0.00867 (-0.82)	0.00384 (0.97)	0.0146 (0.85)	0.00885 (0.82)
Job perspectives (bad)	-0.00456 (-0.83)	-0.00684 (-0.81)	-0.00735 (-0.79)	-0.00877 (-0.74)	0.00385 (0.89)	0.0147 (0.78)	0.00895 (0.75)
Bad financial situation	0.00295*** (4.37)	0.00431*** (4.51)	0.00452*** (4.56)	0.00510*** (4.53)	-0.00265*** (-4.38)	-0.00900*** (-4.61)	-0.00522*** (-4.53)
Father blue collar worker	0.00870** (2.35)	0.0122** (2.45)	0.0124** (2.53)	0.0130*** (2.73)	-0.00823** (-2.26)	-0.0246** (-2.55)	-0.0135*** (-2.70)
Father self employed	-0.00538 (-1.22)	-0.00811 (-1.18)	-0.00874 (-1.15)	-0.0105 (-1.08)	0.00449 (1.34)	0.0175 (1.14)	0.0107 (1.08)
East Germany	0.00547** (2.01)	0.00787** (2.05)	0.00817** (2.08)	0.00900** (2.12)	-0.00501** (-1.97)	-0.0162** (-2.08)	-0.00925** (-2.12)
N	3780	3780	3780	3780	3780	3780	3780

Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 13: Regression Results

Dependent variable: Support for social democratic positions: Economists

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Semester	-0.00825*	-0.00774*	-0.00814*	-0.0189***	-0.0203***	-0.0201***	-0.0178***	-0.0188***
	(-1.89)	(-1.76)	(-1.85)	(-2.97)	(-3.17)	(-3.13)	(-2.74)	(-2.89)
Female			0.168***	0.161***	0.148***	0.140***	0.148***	0.152***
			(6.91)	(4.75)	(4.33)	(4.06)	(4.25)	(4.37)
Self employed? (yes)				-0.315***	-0.309***	-0.306***	-0.268**	-0.264**
				(-3.13)	(-3.06)	(-3.02)	(-2.58)	(-2.54)
Self employed? (maybe)				-0.150	-0.143	-0.133	-0.116	-0.116
				(-1.55)	(-1.48)	(-1.38)	(-1.17)	(-1.16)
Self employed? (not likely)				-0.143	-0.139	-0.122	-0.123	-0.123
				(-1.41)	(-1.38)	(-1.20)	(-1.19)	(-1.18)
Self employed? (no)				-0.157	-0.161	-0.151	-0.164	-0.164
				(-1.45)	(-1.49)	(-1.39)	(-1.47)	(-1.47)
Job perspectives (excellent)					0.000371	0.0218	0.0308	0.0328
					(0.01)	(0.34)	(0.48)	(0.51)
Job perspectives (good)					0.0179	0.0218	0.0324	0.0375
					(0.30)	(0.36)	(0.53)	(0.61)
Job perspectives (intermediate)					0.0681	0.0664	0.0672	0.0748
					(0.82)	(0.80)	(0.80)	(0.88)
Job perspectives (bad)					0.276***	0.258***	0.258***	0.262***
					(3.03)	(2.81)	(2.78)	(2.82)
Bad financial situation						0.0270***	0.0191**	0.0195**
						(3.01)	(2.08)	(2.13)
Father blue collar worker							0.124***	0.131***
							(2.70)	(2.84)
Father self employed							-0.267***	-0.267***
							(-4.09)	(-4.08)
East Germany								-0.0598
								(-1.61)
Wave dummies	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
N	7951	7951	7929	3876	3868	3852	3794	3794
Chi2	3.581	136.3	189.2	139.7	152.5	164.9	188.8	190.3
Pseudo R2	0.000131	0.00483	0.00658	0.0100	0.0110	0.0119	0.0139	0.0142

Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 14: Marginal effects

Dependent variable: Support for social democratic positions: Economists.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Semester	0.000997*** (2.82)	0.00175*** (2.85)	0.00224*** (2.85)	0.00245*** (2.87)	-0.00108*** (-2.79)	-0.00448*** (-2.88)	-0.00187*** (-2.85)
Female	-0.00798*** (-4.21)	-0.0141*** (-4.23)	-0.0181*** (-4.27)	-0.0199*** (-4.30)	0.00847*** (4.16)	0.0362*** (4.33)	0.0153*** (4.25)
Self employed? (yes)	0.0164** (2.16)	0.0266** (2.35)	0.0318** (2.52)	0.0301*** (2.98)	-0.0199** (-2.07)	-0.0619*** (-2.61)	-0.0232*** (-2.83)
Self employed? (maybe)	0.00620 (1.15)	0.0108 (1.16)	0.0138 (1.16)	0.0150 (1.17)	-0.00675 (-1.15)	-0.0276 (-1.17)	-0.0115 (-1.16)
Self employed? (not likely)	0.00705 (1.09)	0.0119 (1.13)	0.0147 (1.17)	0.0150 (1.27)	-0.00823 (-1.04)	-0.0291 (-1.19)	-0.0114 (-1.25)
Self employed? (no)	0.00992 (1.29)	0.0163 (1.38)	0.0197 (1.46)	0.0191* (1.68)	-0.0120 (-1.22)	-0.0385 (-1.50)	-0.0146 (-1.64)
Job perspectives (excellent)	-0.00172 (-0.52)	-0.00303 (-0.51)	-0.00390 (-0.51)	-0.00430 (-0.51)	0.00184 (0.53)	0.00782 (0.51)	0.00329 (0.51)
Job perspectives (good)	-0.00198 (-0.61)	-0.00348 (-0.61)	-0.00446 (-0.62)	-0.00488 (-0.61)	0.00214 (0.62)	0.00893 (0.61)	0.00373 (0.61)
Job perspectives (intermediate)	-0.00372 (-0.94)	-0.00673 (-0.92)	-0.00882 (-0.89)	-0.0102 (-0.85)	0.00371 (1.05)	0.0179 (0.88)	0.00783 (0.84)
Job perspectives (bad)	-0.0111*** (-3.43)	-0.0214*** (-3.22)	-0.0298*** (-2.99)	-0.0389** (-2.55)	0.00728*** (5.47)	0.0624*** (2.87)	0.0316** (2.35)
Bad financial situation	-0.00103** (-2.12)	-0.00182** (-2.11)	-0.00232** (-2.12)	-0.00254** (-2.11)	0.00112** (2.09)	0.00465** (2.13)	0.00194** (2.11)
Father blue collar worker	-0.00639*** (-2.99)	-0.0116*** (-2.95)	-0.0154*** (-2.85)	-0.0180*** (-2.69)	0.00613*** (3.45)	0.0313*** (2.83)	0.0140*** (2.63)
Father self employed	0.0178*** (3.21)	0.0278*** (3.67)	0.0322*** (4.00)	0.0282*** (5.22)	-0.0224*** (-3.11)	-0.0617*** (-4.23)	-0.0219*** (-4.90)
East Germany	0.00324 (1.55)	0.00563 (1.58)	0.00713 (1.60)	0.00766 (1.63)	-0.00359 (-1.53)	-0.0142 (-1.61)	-0.00584 (-1.63)
N	3794	3794	3794	3794	3794	3794	3794

Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 15: Regression Results

Dependent variable: Support for conservative Christian positions: Economists

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Semester	0.00858** (1.97)	0.0102** (2.30)	0.0104** (2.36)	0.0233*** (3.64)	0.0231*** (3.59)	0.0219*** (3.41)	0.0204*** (3.14)	0.0179*** (2.75)
Female			-0.287*** (-11.76)	-0.269*** (-8.00)	-0.256*** (-7.52)	-0.240*** (-6.97)	-0.237*** (-6.84)	-0.226*** (-6.51)
Self employed? (yes)				0.131 (1.41)	0.123 (1.31)	0.123 (1.30)	0.0972 (1.01)	0.106 (1.09)
Self employed? (maybe)				0.0301 (0.34)	0.0245 (0.27)	0.0189 (0.21)	0.0180 (0.20)	0.0186 (0.20)
Self employed? (not likely)				0.0291 (0.31)	0.0303 (0.32)	0.0190 (0.20)	0.0235 (0.25)	0.0248 (0.26)
Self employed? (no)				0.00320 (0.03)	0.00278 (0.03)	-0.000970 (-0.01)	0.0172 (0.16)	0.0168 (0.16)
Job perspectives (excellent)					0.136** (2.20)	0.108* (1.74)	0.0977 (1.54)	0.103 (1.62)
Job perspectives (good)					0.0656 (1.12)	0.0700 (1.19)	0.0552 (0.92)	0.0682 (1.13)
Job perspectives (intermediate)					0.0750 (0.96)	0.0930 (1.18)	0.0736 (0.92)	0.0933 (1.16)
Job perspectives (bad)					-0.0326 (-0.37)	0.000421 (0.00)	-0.0116 (-0.13)	-0.000413 (-0.00)
Bad financial situation						-0.0549*** (-6.09)	-0.0481*** (-5.20)	-0.0472*** (-5.09)
Father blue collar worker							-0.164*** (-3.64)	-0.148*** (-3.25)
Father self employedr							0.130* (1.80)	0.131* (1.82)
East Germany								-0.149*** (-4.04)
Wave dummies	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
N	7965	7965	7942	3877	3869	3854	3796	3796
Chi2	3.869	68.57	202.6	97.42	107.5	147.7	163.8	180.7
Pseudo R2	0.000131	0.00232	0.00711	0.00680	0.00734	0.0102	0.0114	0.0126

Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 16: Marginal effects

Dependent variable: Support for conservative Christian positions: Economists.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Semester	-0.00251*** (-2.73)	-0.00242*** (-2.73)	-0.00156*** (-2.72)	-0.000630*** (-2.63)	0.00160*** (2.71)	0.00388*** (2.74)	0.00164*** (2.72)
Female	0.0323*** (6.25)	0.0305*** (6.35)	0.0193*** (6.28)	0.00742*** (5.15)	-0.0205*** (-6.18)	-0.0486*** (-6.42)	-0.0204*** (-6.12)
Self employed? (yes)	-0.0142 (-1.14)	-0.0141 (-1.10)	-0.00938 (-1.07)	-0.00434 (-0.95)	0.00883 (1.17)	0.0230 (1.09)	0.0102 (1.04)
Self employed? (maybe)	-0.00261 (-0.20)	-0.00251 (-0.20)	-0.00161 (-0.20)	-0.000655 (-0.20)	0.00166 (0.20)	0.00403 (0.20)	0.00170 (0.20)
Self employed? (not likely)	-0.00344 (-0.26)	-0.00334 (-0.26)	-0.00217 (-0.26)	-0.000910 (-0.25)	0.00218 (0.26)	0.00538 (0.26)	0.00230 (0.26)
Self employed? (no)	-0.00233 (-0.16)	-0.00226 (-0.16)	-0.00147 (-0.16)	-0.000613 (-0.15)	0.00148 (0.16)	0.00364 (0.16)	0.00155 (0.16)
Job perspectives (excellent)	-0.0141* (-1.66)	-0.0138 (-1.63)	-0.00909 (-1.60)	-0.00402 (-1.45)	0.00883* (1.69)	0.0224 (1.61)	0.00975 (1.56)
Job perspectives (good)	-0.00954 (-1.13)	-0.00920 (-1.13)	-0.00593 (-1.13)	-0.00243 (-1.10)	0.00607 (1.13)	0.0148 (1.13)	0.00626 (1.12)
Job perspectives (intermediate)	-0.0124 (-1.22)	-0.0124 (-1.17)	-0.00835 (-1.13)	-0.00399 (-0.98)	0.00765 (1.28)	0.0204 (1.15)	0.00911 (1.08)
Job perspectives (bad)	0.0000579 (0.00)	0.0000557 (0.00)	0.0000358 (0.00)	0.0000145 (0.00)	-0.0000369 (-0.00)	-0.0000892 (-0.00)	-0.0000377 (-0.00)
Bad financial situation	0.00661*** (5.00)	0.00637*** (4.99)	0.00409*** (4.92)	0.00166*** (4.38)	-0.00422*** (-4.87)	-0.0102*** (-5.02)	-0.00431*** (-4.96)
Father blue collar worker	0.0222*** (3.02)	0.0201*** (3.21)	0.0122*** (3.40)	0.00374*** (4.06)	-0.0144*** (-2.98)	-0.0314*** (-3.30)	-0.0124*** (-3.47)
Father self employed	-0.0169** (-1.98)	-0.0174* (-1.85)	-0.0119* (-1.74)	-0.00604 (-1.45)	0.0103** (2.11)	0.0287* (1.79)	0.0132* (1.66)
East Germany	0.0217*** (3.85)	0.0202*** (3.98)	0.0126*** (4.07)	0.00446*** (4.05)	-0.0139*** (-3.79)	-0.0319*** (-4.03)	-0.0130*** (-4.16)
N	3796	3796	3796	3796	3796	3796	3796

Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 17: Regression Results

Dependent variable: Support for green/alternative positions: Economists

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Semester	0.0140*** (3.20)	0.0129*** (2.93)	0.0127*** (2.89)	0.0156** (2.51)	0.0161** (2.56)	0.0160** (2.55)	0.0160** (2.53)	0.0145** (2.28)
Female			0.260*** (10.76)	0.246*** (7.29)	0.240*** (7.02)	0.235*** (6.83)	0.243*** (7.00)	0.250*** (7.19)
Self employed? (yes)				-0.169 (-1.56)	-0.162 (-1.50)	-0.165 (-1.51)	-0.164 (-1.48)	-0.159 (-1.44)
Self employed? (maybe)				-0.0642 (-0.61)	-0.0594 (-0.57)	-0.0566 (-0.54)	-0.0681 (-0.64)	-0.0678 (-0.64)
Self employed? (not likely)				-0.0583 (-0.54)	-0.0539 (-0.50)	-0.0452 (-0.41)	-0.0585 (-0.53)	-0.0580 (-0.52)
Self employed? (no)				-0.0942 (-0.81)	-0.0925 (-0.80)	-0.0889 (-0.76)	-0.0958 (-0.81)	-0.0959 (-0.81)
Job perspectives (excellent)					-0.0931 (-1.45)	-0.0818 (-1.27)	-0.0745 (-1.14)	-0.0716 (-1.10)
Job perspectives (good)					-0.0414 (-0.68)	-0.0368 (-0.60)	-0.0315 (-0.51)	-0.0238 (-0.39)
Job perspectives (intermediate)					-0.112 (-1.39)	-0.107 (-1.32)	-0.102 (-1.25)	-0.0908 (-1.11)
Job perspectives (bad)					0.0438 (0.49)	0.0494 (0.55)	0.0532 (0.59)	0.0598 (0.66)
Bad financial situation						0.00629 (0.69)	0.00541 (0.58)	0.00601 (0.64)
Father blue collar worker							0.00973 (0.22)	0.0200 (0.45)
Father self employed							-0.0549 (-0.83)	-0.0547 (-0.82)
East Germany								-0.0903** (-2.53)
Wave dummies	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
N	7957	7957	7934	3875	3866	3850	3792	3792
Chi2	10.27	120.6	230.6	113.7	122.7	121.4	125.6	132.8
Pseudo R2	0.000362	0.00410	0.00811	0.00834	0.00890	0.00885	0.00929	0.00975

Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 18: Marginal effects

Dependent variable: Support for green/alternative positions: Economists.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Semester	-0.00205** (-2.27)	-0.00220** (-2.27)	-0.00119** (-2.26)	-0.000187* (-1.84)	0.00218** (2.26)	0.00283** (2.27)	0.000615** (2.24)
Female	-0.0349*** (-6.98)	-0.0377*** (-6.95)	-0.0206*** (-6.79)	-0.00383*** (-3.29)	0.0368*** (6.97)	0.0491*** (7.09)	0.0110*** (5.80)
Self employed? (yes)	0.0240 (1.35)	0.0242 (1.43)	0.0122 (1.53)	0.000412 (0.39)	-0.0248 (-1.39)	-0.0299 (-1.49)	-0.00614 (-1.56)
Self employed? (maybe)	0.00961 (0.64)	0.0103 (0.64)	0.00554 (0.64)	0.000850 (0.63)	-0.0102 (-0.64)	-0.0132 (-0.64)	-0.00287 (-0.64)
Self employed? (not likely)	0.00843 (0.51)	0.00882 (0.52)	0.00464 (0.54)	0.000507 (0.89)	-0.00887 (-0.52)	-0.0112 (-0.53)	-0.00237 (-0.54)
Self employed? (no)	0.0143 (0.77)	0.0146 (0.81)	0.00747 (0.86)	0.000402 (0.61)	-0.0149 (-0.79)	-0.0181 (-0.84)	-0.00375 (-0.88)
Job perspectives (excellent)	0.0103 (1.08)	0.0109 (1.10)	0.00576 (1.12)	0.000703 (1.32)	-0.0109 (-1.09)	-0.0138 (-1.11)	-0.00295 (-1.12)
Job perspectives (good)	0.00337 (0.39)	0.00362 (0.39)	0.00195 (0.39)	0.000303 (0.39)	-0.00358 (-0.39)	-0.00465 (-0.39)	-0.00101 (-0.38)
Job perspectives (intermediate)	0.0136 (1.05)	0.0138 (1.11)	0.00708 (1.17)	0.000393 (0.76)	-0.0141 (-1.08)	-0.0172 (-1.15)	-0.00356 (-1.19)
Job perspectives (bad)	-0.00814 (-0.68)	-0.00902 (-0.66)	-0.00505 (-0.64)	-0.00112 (-0.50)	0.00873 (0.68)	0.0119 (0.65)	0.00269 (0.62)
Bad financial situation	-0.000850 (-0.64)	-0.000912 (-0.64)	-0.000493 (-0.64)	-0.0000775 (-0.63)	0.000903 (0.64)	0.00117 (0.64)	0.000255 (0.64)
Father blue collar worker	-0.00280 (-0.45)	-0.00302 (-0.45)	-0.00165 (-0.45)	-0.000286 (-0.41)	0.00298 (0.45)	0.00392 (0.45)	0.000859 (0.44)
Father self employed	0.00800 (0.80)	0.00832 (0.82)	0.00435 (0.85)	0.000416 (1.49)	-0.00840 (-0.80)	-0.0105 (-0.84)	-0.00221 (-0.87)
East Germany	0.0131** (2.45)	0.0137** (2.53)	0.00725** (2.57)	0.000853* (1.94)	-0.0137** (-2.49)	-0.0174** (-2.56)	-0.00372** (-2.50)
N	3792	3792	3792	3792	3792	3792	3792

Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%