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Public Choice Society Annual Meeting

San Antonio, Texas
   March 6 –9, 2005

2008 Annual Meeting  
Provisional Sessions program
Assignments program
Papers list of papers
Participants participants list
 
 Papers
A B C D E F G H I J K L M
N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
 
    Plenary Lectures    
Last Name First Name Title    
BALINSKI Michel École Polytechnique
GERRYMANDERPROOF DISTRICTING
EDELMAN Paul Vanderbilt University
MATHEMATICS AND THE LAW
MOULIN Herve Rice University
FAIRNESS BY LOTTERIES AND TIME-SHARING: NEW GUISES FOR AN OLD IDEA
         
Last Name First Name Paper Title   Coauthors
Adams James Multiparty Elections with Policy-Seeking Parties and Valence Issues: A Spatial Model and Empirical Tests Based upon the Comparative Manifesto Data   Michael Clark
Samuel Merrill III
Aguiar Christiane The Political and Economic Impact of Constitutional Choices   Marcelo Lacombe
Ahlert Marlies A New Approach to Procedural Freedom in Game Forms    
Alger Dan Coasian Voting   John Ledyard
Ali Nageeb Waiting to Settle: Multilateral Bargaining with Subjective Biases    
Amegashie Atsu Sabotaging Potential Rivals   Marco Runkel
Annen Kurt Lies and Slander: The Value of a Reputation in Repeated Games with Communication    
Anwar Mumtaz The Political Economy of US Aid to Pakistan   Katharina Michaelowa
Araral Eduardo The Malignant Equilibrium Problem    
Arce M. Daniel The Whistle Blower: Hero or Rat?    
Asan Goksel On the Stability and Optimality of Coalitions Voluntarily Providing Impure Public Goods   M. Remzi Sanver
Ashworth John Government Weakness and Local Public Debt: Developments in Flemish Municipalities   Benny Geys
Bruno Heyndels
Austin Andrew City and Suburban Competition    
Aysan Ahmet Inequality, Efficiency of Redistributive Institutions, and Redistribution: Is Government Effectiveness the Missing Link between Inequality and Redistribution?    
Aysan Ahmet The Role of Institutions on the Macroeconomic Policy Choices and Investment Climate: The Case of Middle East and North Africa   Mustapha K. Nabli
Marie-Ange Veganzones-Varoudakis
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Balinski Michel PLENARY: Gerrymanderproof districting    
Bandyopadhyay Siddhartha Coalition Governments in a Model of Parliamentary Democracy   Mandar Oak
Bandyopadhyay Siddhartha Crime as a Local Public Bad: Neighbourhood Observation and Reporting   Kalyan Chatterjee
Bartolini David Non-Cooperative Regulation: The Water Sector Case    
Berger Helge How Should Large and Small Countries Be Represented in a Currency Union? A Model of Optimal Representation in a Federal Central Bank   Till Mueller
Bergh Andreas The Problem of Cooperation and Reputation-Based Choice   Peter Engseld
Berkowitz Daniel The Effect of Judicial Independence on Courts: Evidence from the American States   Karen Clay
Berndt Colleen Delphi and the Separation of Church and State    
Bildirici Melike Debt Structure in Turkey   Tahsin Bakirtaş
Seckin Sunal
Bildirici Melike FTPL Theory in Turkish Economy   Seckin Sunal
Bjørnskov Christian Do Leftwing Governments Meddle More with the Economy?    
Botello Stephanie The Fiscal Impact of Immigrants and State Redistributive Policy    
Bragin Vladimir The Demand for Democratic Institutions and Consumption Behavior   Sergey G. Shulgin
Brams Steven Cutting a Pie Is Not a Piece of Cake   Julius B. Barbanel
Brandauer Stefan Rent Seeking and Electoral Accountability    
Brandauer Stefan A Model of Delegation in Contests   Florian Englmaier
Brennan Geoffrey Majoritarian Inconsistency, Arrow Impossibility, and the Comparative Interpretation: A Context-Based View   Michael Baurmann
Broude Tomer Can Behavioral Theory Inform Public Choice Approaches to International Law?    
Bruegger Esther Learning, Voting, and the Information Trap   Aleksander Berentsen
Simon Loertscher
Brunell Thomas Rethinking Redistricting: How Drawing Districts Packed with Partisans Improves Representation and Attitudes Towards Congress    
Buchanan Jim All Voting Is Strategic   Yong J. Yoon
Butterfield William Local Government Competition, Ideological Sorting, and Centralization: Are There "Two Americas"?    
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Caballero Gonzalo Institutional Change from Francoism to Democracy in Spain: A Historical Institutional Analysis    
Caballero Gonzalo Property Rights, Transactions, and Hierarchies in the Industrial Organization of the Spanish Congress    
Calcagno Peter Political Determinants of Fiscal Performance: An Analysis of U.S. States   Monica Escaleras
Caporale Tony Political Regimes and the Cost of Disinflation   Barbara Caporale
Carden Art Trial by Fury: Lawlessness and Post-Reconstruction Southern Development    
Castro Massimo Where Are You From? Cultural Differences in A Standard VCM Experiment    
Chappell Henry Committee Decisions on Monetary Policy: The FOMC under Arthur Burns and Alan Greenspan   Rob Roy McGregor
Todd Vermilyea
Chaturvedi Ashish Competitive Proposals of Policies by Lobbies   Amihai Glazer
Cho Seok-ju Retrospective Voting and Political Representation: A Model of Electoral Accountability and Legislative Voting    
Chortareas Georgios Optimal Monetary Policy Delegation to Individuals vs Committees   Stephen M. Miller
Clarke George The Politics and Economics of Bank Privatization in Developing Countries    
Coats Morris Barriers Facing Women in the Competition for Legislative Seats   Thomas R. Dalton
Gökhan Karahan
Congleton Roger Economic Development and Democracy: Does Industrialization Lead to Universal Sufferage?    
Cooper Duane Quantifying Fairness to Individual Voters in Multimember vs. Single-Member Districts    
Coyle Dennis Choosing Public Choice    
Craig Steven Cities as the Center of Compassion: A Chronicle of Cutthroat Competition   Stephanie Botello
Andrew Austin
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Dakhlia Sami Farsightedly Stable Agenda Formation   Frank H. Page
Davies Todd Analyzing the Dimensions of Social Choice Functions   Raja Shah
Dellis Arnaud Blame-Game Politics in a Coalition Government    
Denzau Arthur Mental Models and Game Theory: Cognitive Constructions of Multiple Nash Equilibria   Ravi K. Roy
de Ridder Annelies On Some Procedures of Forming a Coalition   Agnieszka Rusinowska
de Swart Harrie Applying the MacBeth and RelVieW Software to Coalition Formation:    
      Applying Relational Algebra and RelView to Coalition Formation?   Agnieszka Rusinowska
Rudolf Berghammer
      Using MacBeth to determine utilities of governments to parties in coalition formation

  Marc Roubens
Agnieszka Rusinowska
Dima Bogdan Agency, Association, and Culture: A Tale of State and Society   Ioan Talpoş
Cosmin Enache
Mihai Mutaşcu
Djoundourian Salpie Environmental Activism and Industry Response in a Developing Country    
Doi Takero Japan's Fiscal Deficits and Local Expenditures   Toshihiro Ihori
Dreher Axel Do IMF and World Bank Influence Voting in the UN General Assembly?   Jan-Egbert Sturm
Dreher Axel How Do Institutions Affect Corruption and the Shadow Economy?   Christos Kotsogiannis
Steve McCorriston
Dur Robert Incentives and Workers' Motivation in the Public Sector   Josse Delfgaauw
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Edelman Paul PLENARY: Mathematics and the Law    
Eichhorn Christoph The Implications of Tax Evasion for Economic Growth    
Ekbladh Margareta Group Specific Social Norms and Economic Incentives in a General Welfare System    
Endersby James The Size of State Legislative Chambers    
Ensley Michael Individual Campaign Contributors in Senate Elections, 1980–2004
Eusepi Giuseppe Who Shall Keep the Keepers Themselves? On the Moral Foundations of the Separation of Powers    
Evrenk Haldun When Honest Politicians (Do Not) Support Anti-Corruption Reforms: A Multi-Candidate Analysis    
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Falaschetti Dino Electoral Accountability and Consumer Monopsonists: Evidence from Elected vs. Appointed Regulators    
Feld Lars On the Effectiveness of Debt Brakes: The Swiss Experience   Gebhard Kirchgässner
Feldmann Sven A Theory of Delegation, Lobbying, and Venue Choice
Feltovich Nick Loss Aversion, Equilibrium Selection, and Learning: An Experimental   Atsushi Iwasaki
Sobei H. Oda
Fernandes Gonçalves da Silva Marcos The Economic and Governance Approaches to the Study of Corruption:   Paulo Roberto Arvate
Fey Mark Engineering Peace through Institutional Design: Uncertainty, Efficiency   Kris Ramsay
Fischer Justina The Impact of Direct Democracy on Education: Evidence for Switzerland    
Fiva Jon Property Taxation as a Determinant of School District Efficiency   Marte Rønning
Florence Robert Rent Generation in an All-Pay Auction Framework   Catherine Maritan
Forte Francesco The Constitutional Power of the Voting Owners in the European Parlia   Silvia Fedeli
Frasure Lorrie An Empirical Analysis of Immigrant and Ethnic Minority Migration in Suburban America
Freytag Andreas Financial Supervision Unification and Central Bank Independence: Is There Any Trade Off?   Donato Masciandaro
Freytag Andreas Monetary Commitment, Institutional Constraints and Inflation: Empirical Evidence for OECD Countries since the 1950s   Friedrich Schneider
Frisell Lars Populism
Frohlich Norman A Cognitive Model of Political and Economic Choice Bearing on the Underpinnings of Prospect Theory   Joe Oppenheimer
Najam Saqib
Fuchs Thomas School Choice under Restricted Mobility Regimes
Fujii Seiji Political Shirking: Proposition 13 vs. Proposition 8
Funk Patricia Theory and Evidence on the Role of Social Norms in Voting
Furstenberg Eric The Informational Value of Affirmative Action in College Admissions
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Gailmard Sean The Returns to Oversight and Administrative Law   Jeffrey Milyo
Gasper John Positioning for Profits: The Market for News Coverage
Gathmann Christina Voter Preferences and Fiscal Policy: New Evidence from the Introducti   Patricia Funk
Gehlbach Scott Businessmen Candidates: Special-Interest Politics in Weakly Institutionalized Environments   Konstantin Sonan
Ghosh Indranil A Note on the Incompatability between Efficiency and Equity   Rajat Deb
Tae Kun Seo
Ghosh Suman A Case for Bundling Public Goods Contributions   Alexander Karaivanov
Mandar Oak
Giannetti Daniela Party Factions and Split Roll-Call Voting in the Italian DS Party   Michael Laver
Gick Evelyn Explaining Tradition in Hayek's Theory of Cultural Evolution: Cognitive Game Theory, Imitation, and Best Reply Behavior
  Wolfgang Gick
Giuranno Michele Giusep Income Inequality and the Size of the Public Sector
Glazer Amihai Rent Seeking and Bargaining
Glazer Amihai Trade Protection to Reduce Redistribution   Priya Ranjan
Godfrey Joseph On the Size and Location of the Yolk: Results Using CyberSenate Software   Nicholas Miller
Gokcekus Omer Campaign Contributions and U.S. Cotton Subsidies   Richard Fishler
Grant Darren Rationality of Voter Turnout in U.S. Union Certification Elections: 1994-2001   Michael Toma
Grofman Bernie Evaluating Partisan and Other Electoral Consequences of Changes in   Tom Brunell
Gupta Rupayan Structuring International Institutions for Multilateral Provisioning of Global Security    
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Halcoussis Dennis School District Characteristics and Changes in Student Performance   Donna Driscoll
Shirley Svorny
Hanson Robin Uncommon Priors Require Origin Disputes
Hanson Robin Manipulators Increase Information Market Accuracy Ryan Oprea
Hanssen Andrew How Bad Can a Government Be? Neighborhood Constraints and the Quality of National Governments   Robert K. Fleck
Hayo Bernd Inflation, Central Bank Independence, and the Legal System   Stefan Voigt
Heijnen Pim Environmental Groups in Monopolistic Markets Lambert Schoonbeek
Heinemann Friedrich Explaining Reform Deadlocks
Heinesen Eskil Class Size, Teacher Hours, and Educational Attainment   Martin Browning
Heyes Anthony Whistleblowers
Hibbs Douglas Institutions, Corruption, and Tax Evasion in the Unofficial Economy   Violeta Piculescu
Hirsch Moshe Adjusted Winner and the Future Negotiations over East Jerusalem    
Ho Yi-Cheng Relative Efficiencies of Public and Private Institutions of Learning
in Taiwan: Accounting for Organization Characteristics Effects and
Statistical Noise in Data Envelopment Analysis
   
Ho Yi-Cheng The Effect of Political Pressure on the Management of Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund   Jenn-Shyong Kuo
Hodler Roland Redistribution and Inequality in a Truly Heterogenous Society
Hodler Roland How Fiscal Decentralization Flattens Progressive Taxes   Kurt Schmidheiny
Holcombe Randy Institutions and the Impact of Investment on Growth   James Gwartney
Robert Lawson
Holm Håkan Interpersonal Trust and Collective Decision Mechanisms   Paul Nystedt
Holm Håkan Where to Conduct a Raid?   Hans Carlsson
Hoover Gary Elected or Appointed School Administration: Is There a Difference in Public Accessibility or Performance?    
Hosli Madeleine Political Actors and ECB Policy Making   Christine Arnold
Hosli Madeleine Collective and Distributive Effects of United Nations Decision-Making Reform    
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Ivanenko Vlad Inefficiency of Non-Monetary Payments: Quantifying Russian Case    
         
Jankowski Richard Altruism and Rational Choice
Jennings Colin Expressive Choice: Survey and Synthesis
Jerome-Speziari VJronique Is There Spatial Dynamics of the Electoral Behaviors among the Europe...   Bruno Jerome
Michael Lewis-Beck
Johns Leslie Knowing the Unknown: Executive Evaluation and International Crisis Outcomes    
Jones Michael The Geometry Behind Paradoxes of Voting Power
Jordhal Henrik Trust and Growth in the 1990s: A Robustness Analysis   Mikael Bengtsson
Niclas Berggren
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Kang Insun Informative Campaign Strategies for Challengers in Electoral Competititon with Valence Difference    
Karahan Gökhan Flags of Our Fathers: Voting on Confederate Symbols in the State of Georgia   Michael Reksulak
William F. Shughart II
Kenny Larry The Public Choice of Educational Choice
Kiefer David

Party and Voter-Revealed Preferences: Six Countries

Kilgour Marc A Minimax Procedure for Electing Committees   Steven J. Brams
M. Remzi Sanver
Kingston Christopher Collective Action and Corruption
Klamler Christian Measuring Distance between Chioce Functions: An Axiomatic Approach
Kliemt Hartmut N/A
Klor Esteban On Terrorism and Electoral Outcomes: Theory and Evidence from the Israeli-Palesti   Claude Berrebi
Knack Stephan Political Institutions and Market-Liberalizing Policy Reform Jac Heckelman
Kocher Martin Government Strength and Public Debt Redux   Jesus Crespo Cuaresma
Gerhard Reitschuler
Konow James Double Standards: Social Preferences and Their Self-Serving Biases   Rachel Croson
Kruse Agneta Political Economy and Pensions in Aging Societies: A Note on How an "Impossible" Reform Was Implemented in Sweden    
Kurrild-Klitgaard Peter The Equivocal "Will of the People": Voting Paradoxes in Simulated Versions of Seven Danish Elections    
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Lacombe Donald An Examination of a Congressional Vote Using Beyesian Spatial Probit Techniques   Timothy M. Shaughnessy
Ladha Krishna On the Virtues of War: War, Fairness, and Democracy
Langbein Laura Management by Results: Student Evaluation of Faculty Teaching and the Mismeasurement of Performance    
Larcinese Valentino The Allocation of the US Federal Budget to the States: Evidence on the Power of the President   Leonzio Rizzo
Cecilia Testa
Ledyard Meg Smaller Schools or Longer Bus Rides? Returns to Scale and School Choice
Leech Dennis Voting Power and Voting Blocs   Robert Leech
Leech Dennis Algorithms for Computing Voting Power Indices: A Website Resource for Voting Power Analysis   Robert Leech
Legrenzi Gabriella The Openness of the Economy in the Growth of Governments
Legrenzi Gabriella Non-Linear Fiscal Policy
Levy David TITLE TO COME   Sandra Peart
Lockard Alan Campaign Expenditures under Proportional Representation and Plurality Voting
Loertscher Simon Fair Endowment Lotteries: Allocating Wealth via a Veil of Ignorance
López Edward Strategic Institutional Choice: Voters, States, and Congressional Term Limits   R. Todd Jewell
Lott John Is Newspaper Coverage of Economic Events Politically Biased?   Kevin A. Hassett
Lowenberg Anton An Interest Group Analysis of Transnational Terrorism   William H. Kaempfer
William Mertens
Lowenberg Anton Why Iraq?   Timothy Mathews
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MacDonald Lynn The Impact of Government Structure on Local Public Expenditures   Tim R. Sass
McGinnis John The Condorcet Jury Theorem Case for Supermajority Rules   Michael Rappaport
Marktanner Marcus The Effects of Social and Political Conflict on the Provision of Public Capital and Economic Growth    
Marktanner Marcus Social vs. Political Conflict and Regime Choice
Marroquin Andres Where Did the Miracle Come From? Exploring Botswana's Economic Performance
Matsusaka John Direct Democracy and the Executive Branch    
Maurice Diane Elitism in Political Economics: Regulatory Policy Gone Astray    
Mehta Nimai Taxation and the Limits to Conceit
Merlin Vincent The Probability of Disputable Election Outcomes   Jack Nagel
Merrill Samuel Policy-Seeking Parties in Three-Party Elections: Why Small, Centrist Third Parties Motivate Peripheral Parties to Diverge in the Policy Space   James Adams
Miller Nicholas In Search of the Uncovered Set    
Milyo Jeffrey Election Night Calls as Evidence of Partisan Media Bias    
Milyo Jeffrey Inequality and Public Good Provision: An Experimental Analysis  

Lisa Anderson
Jennifer Mellor

Milyo Jeffrey Campaign Contributions and Access to State Legislators: A Field Experiment   Robert K. Fleck
Milyo Jeffrey Reconsidering the Causes and Consequences of Social Capital   Lindsey Leininger
Mitchell David The Microfoundations of the Public Finance Ratchet Effect
Moser Scott Voting by Adaptive Agents in Multi-Candidate Elections  
Moulin Herve PLENARY: Fairness by Lotteries and Time-Sharing: New Guises for an Old Idea    
Mukherji Arnab Do Elections Incite Violent Crime?   Ashish Chaturvedi
Munger Michael Lotto, Blotto, or Frontrunner: U.S. Presidential Elections and the Nature of "Mistakes"
  Jennifer Merolla
Michael Tofias
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Naka Shigeto An Economic Analysis of Collectivistic, Group-Oriented Societies: Implications for Japan   Arthur Fleischer III
Hiromasa Takahashi
New Michael The Indirect Impact of the Citizen Initiative on State Fiscal Policy Outcomes
Nureev Rustem COAUTHOR; see Yanovskiy
Nystedt Paul Trust in Surveys and GamesCA Matter of Money and Location?   Håkan Holm
         
Oak Mandar Damdupat: Economic Analysis of the Hindu Law of Limitations   Anand V. Swamy
Oak Mandar Policy Responsiveness During Conflict: A Case of Hawkish Drift?   Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay
Okui Katsuyoshi Causality between Political Freedom and Economic Freedom
O'Neill Barry Sequential Decomposition of Simple Games
Ozdemir Ugur Dictatorial Domains in Preference Aggregation   M. Remzi Sanver
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Panagopoulos Costas The Calculus of Voting in Compulsory Voting Systems
Parker Glenn The Rules Committee, Latent Institutional Functions, and the Economic Organization of Legislatures   Roger Larocca
Glenn Parker
Suzanne Parker
Selvin Akkus
Brandon Barker
Mitchell Ousley
Abigaile Van Horn
Linjing Wang
Patti Dario Maimone Ansaldo Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective: An Empirical Investigation Acemoglu and Robinson’s Theory   Leone Leonida
Pietro Navarra
Pecorino Paul Rent Seeking with Scarce Talent: A Model of Preemptive Hiring?   Sami Dakhlia
Péreau Jean-Christophe Bargaining with Nonmonolithic Players   Alejandro Caparrós
Tarik Tazdaït
Peress Michael Securing the Base: Electoral Competititon under Variable Turnout
Potthoff Dick A New Look at the Methodology of Estimating Legislators' Spatial Positions from Roll-Call Votes    
Poulsen Odile The Long Winding Road: Social Capital and Commuting   Tingaard Svendsen
Poutvaara Panu Public Education in an Integrated Europe: Studying to Migrate and Teaching to Stay?    
Poutvaara Panu Why Are More Redistributive Social Security Systems Smaller? A Median Voter Approach   Marko Köthenbürger
Paola Profeta
Priks Mikael Firm Competition and Incentive Pay
Puglisi Ricardo Being the New York Times: The Political Behaviour of a Newspaper    
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Ramirez Carlos Legislator Ideology and the Business Cycle   Edward J. López
Ramirez Shawn Influence in Terrorist Networks: From Undirected to Directed Graphs   Steven J. Brams
Hande Mutlu
Ratliff Tommy Selecting Committees
Razzolini Laura Hiding in Plain Sight: Using Signals to Detect Terrorism   Atin Basuchoudhary
Roberson Brian Electoral Poaching and Party Identification   Dan Kovenock
Roelfsema Hein Legislative Bargaining and Lobbying in the European Union
Rowley Charles Fragmenting Parchment and the Winds of War: The Constitution of the United States: 1860-2004
Rusinowska Agnieszka Measures for Bipartite Directed Graphs Using Success and Power in Binary Voting Situations   Rene van den Brink
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Sadiraj Vjollca Voting Cycles When a Dominant Point Exists   Frans van Winden
Jan Tuinstra
Saiegh Sebastian Vote Buying in Legislatures with Cross-Pressured Legislators
Samuel Anthony
Sanver Remzi Ensuring Pareto Optimality by Referendum Voting   Ipek Özkal-Sanver
Schaltegger Christoph Trust and Fiscal Performance: A Panel Analysis with Swiss Data   Benno Torgler
Schap David NOT PRESENTING
Schelker Mark Controlling Government by Democratically Elected, Competing Political Bodies   Reiner Eichenberger
Schelker Mark Distributional Effects of Fiscal Federalism: Empirical Evidence from Switzerland
Schmidheiny Kurt Income Segregation from Local Income Taxation When Households Differ in Both Preferences and Incomes    
Schneider Fritz Taxes and Benefits: Two Distinct Options to Cheat on the State?   Martin Halla
Schneider Fritz The Political Economy of Privatizations in OECD CountriesCA Panel Study on the   Ansgar Belke
Schofield Norman The Mean Voter Theorem under Proportional and Plurality Rule
Schubert Christian Toward a Naturalistic Foundation of the Social Contract   Christian Cordes
Schütz Gabriela Education Policy and Equality of Opportunity   Heinrich W. Ursprung
Ludger Wößmann
Shulgin Sergey Wealth, Needs and The Demand for Independent Media   Andrey Kunov
Schwarz Mordechai Two-Sided Contests and Over-Dissipation   Gil S. Epstein
Shmuel Nitzan
Sitnikov Alexei Shifting Preferences and Changing Parties: The Russian Electorate from 1995 to 20   Dmitry Shakin
Slutsky Steven Polarization in the Electorate: Evidence from the 2004 Presidential Election   Deborah Fletcher
Uri Possen
Stephan Paul Process Values, International Law, and Justice    
Stevenson Taylor Senate Voting: Ideology Matters, Most of the Time   James F. Couch
Bret King
Stratmann Thomas Is Interest Group Pressure to Preserve the Status Quo More Effective Than Interest Group Pressure to Change It? Evidence from Ballot Measures    
Su Xuejuan A Political Economy Model of Public Budget Allocation across Education Stages    
Suphachalasai Suphachol Bureaucratic Corruption and Mass Media
Sutter Daniel Is the Media Liberal? An Indirect Test Using Newsmagazine Circulation    
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Tavares José

Women Prefer Larger Governments: Growth, Structural Transformation and Government Size

  Tiago V. de V. Cavalcanti
Tavares Samia Does Rapid Trade Liberalization Increase Corruption?
Tellier GeneviPve Explaining Subnational Government Popularity in Federal Systems: The Canadian Provincial Case    
Temimi Akram Lotteries, Group Size, and Public Good Provision   Paul Pecorino
Theisen Theis A Comparative Study of Equity Judgements in Lithuania and Norway J.A. Jungeilges
Thompson Earl Optimal and Actual Constitutional Principles
Tideman Nicolaus Paying the Partners
Tila Dorina New Approach to Aggregation of Individual Choice
Ting Michael Interest Groups and the Electoral Control of Politicians   James Snyder
Tonon Joseph Earmarked: The Political Economy of Agricultural Research Appropriations   Marc Law
Gary Miller
Tuinstra Jan On the Size of the Winning Set in the Presence of Interest Groups   Vjollca Sadiraj
Frans van Winden
Tullock Gordon Mystery of Brazil
         
Ueda Yoshifumi The Rational Foundations of Leadership: Who Stands Up First?
Uppal Yogesh The (Dis)advantaged Incumbents: Estimating Incumbency Effects in Indian State Legislatures    
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Vaidya Samarth The Nature of Corruption Deterrence in a Competitive Media Sector
VanDeemen Adrian The Formation of Coalition Preferences in Hedonic Coalition Games
Vanberg Christoph On the Implications of Campaign Contribution Limits for Political Communications and Elections    
Vanberg Viktor The Complementarity of Liberalism and Democracy: A Hayekian Perspective
Viani Bruno Why Do Governments Award Monopoly Rights to Privatized Telephone Firms?
Voigt Stefan Power over Prosecutors Corrupts Politicians: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Indicator   Lars P. Feld
Anne van Aaken
Voigt Stefan The Economic Effects of Judicial Accountability: Some Preliminary Insights
         
Wang Jianxun Constitutional Choice of Villages in China
Wang Lu The Composition of State and Local Government Expenditures and Economic Growth   Otto A. Davis
Warneryd Karl Long-Run Selection and the Work Ethic   Jens Josephson
Wenzel Nikolai Ideology and Institutional Choice: The European Constitution as Reflection of Europe's Emergent Postmodernism    
Widgrén Mika The Allocation of EU Budget before and after Enlargement   Heikki Kauppi
Wittman Donald Pressure Groups and Political Advertising: How Uninformed Voters Can Use Strategic Rules of Thumb    
Woldesenbet Trufat Efficiency of Representative Democracy: A Comparative Study of Two Competing Models    
Wolfson Jonathan Does Tort Reform Increase Minority Access to Medical Care?
Wu Wenbo Freedom and Growth: A Dynamic Panel Data Model   Otto A. Davis
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Yanovskiy Konstantin Constitutional Choice on the Post-Soviet Area: Case Studies of the Georgia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Russia   Sergey Zhavoronkov
Yanovskiy Konstantin Demand for the Democratic Institutions and Natural Rent Income: Case of Russia   Rustem Nureev
Vladimir Mau
Yanovskiy Konstantin Incentives for Opportunistic Behavior under the War Against Terrorism   Sergey G. Shulgin
Ilia Zatkovecky
Yildirim Huseyin Proposal Power and Majority Rule in Multilateral Bargaining with Costly Recognition    
Yoon Yong Sex and Sen: A Reality Liberal Paradox
Yuval Fany A Political Approach to the Economic Theory of Voting
         
Zhang Yongjing Public Choice and China: An Introduction
Zillante Arthur Reputation Effects in Gold Glove Award Voting
     
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Alevy Jonathan Public and Private Choices and the Shadow Economy in Mongolia   Clifford Zinnes
Asay Garrett Why Negative Campaigning? The Chaotic Dynamics of an Election   Donald G. Saari
Belfrage Carl-Johan The Political Economy of Barriers to Firm Relocation   Fredrik Gallo
Biderman Ciro Fiscal War and Fiscal Interaction between Brazilian States (1988/1998)   Paulo Arvate, Fernanda Teles de Lima
Bossi Luca Inequality, Social Mobility, and the Welfare State: A Political Economy Model   Gulcin Gumus
Chang Jannet
Chatterjee Kalyan When Neighbours Report Crime: Effects of Crime Reporting on Crime
Devaraj Nirupama Exit and Voice: An Empirical Analysis of Direct Participation in a Tiebout Framework    
Degan Arianna
Durant Clark Vote-Saving and Cyclical Proportional Representation: Toward Turn-Taking, Spiral Approximation, and a Self-Enforcing Constitutionalism   to top of page
Englmaier Florian A Model of Delegation in Contests   Florian Englmaier
Fregert Klas Fiscal Policy in Sweden in the Age of Liberty 1718–72: The Role of the Constitution and Party Politics
Gifford Adam The Evolution of Culture, Public Information and Public Goods
Gomberg Andrei Group Decision Making in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Stu   Alexander Elbittar
Laura Sour
Harnay Sophie Innovation, Leadership, and Conservatism in Judicial Decision Making:   Alain Marciano
Huck Steffen Moral Cost, Commitment, and Committee Size   Kai Konrad
Johnson Mark The Structure and Two Complexities of Economic Choice Semiautomata    
Jordan Stu A Model of Rule Making under Participatory Administrative Procedures
Kauppi Heikki Eastern Enlargement and EU Budget   Mika WidgrJn
Kıbrıs Özgür Bargaining with Nonanonymous Disagreement   Ipek Gürsel
Kochetkova Olga Immigrants' Adaptation Costs and Strategies Reflection in the Electoral Reaction of   Konstantin Yanovskiy
Köthenbürger Marko See Poutvaara-Köthenbürger-Profeta, above.   Panu Poutvaara
Paola Profeta
Lewis-Beck Michael COAUTHOR; see Jerome-Speziari   Bruno Jerome
Veronique Jerome-Speziari
Lohmann Susanne How Universities Think: The Hidden Work of a Complex Institution
Lucinda Claudio A Study on the Shadow Economy and the Tax-Gap: The Case of CPMF in Brazil   Paulo Roberto Arvate
Maravall Rodríguez Carlos The Consequences of Commitment When Candidates Have Private Information
Marzano Elisabetta Q Theory, Incentives to Capital Accumulation and Irregular Production   Bruno Chiarini
Francesco Busato
Pasquale de Angelis
Paxson Nathaniel Voting and the Static Fallacy: The Unraveling of the Rational Voter Hypothesis and the Misapplication of Probability Theory
Pommerenke Kai Cooperation with Rivals
Poulsen Anders Can Information Backfire? Experimental Evidence from the Ultimatum Game   Jonathan Tan
Poulsen Anders Endogenous Preferences and Institutions   Odile Poulsen
Reksulak Michael COAUTHOR; see Karahan   Gökhan R. Karahan
William F. Shughart II
Rumi Cecilia Expenditures Cycles in a Federal Framework: Evidence from Argentina
Storino Fabio Will the Fiscal Results in Latin-American Countries Depend More on the Government?   Paulo Arvate
Henrique Guilherme Carlos Heidtmann Neto
Teles de Lima Fernanda The Parties' Left-Right Positions Determine the Effects of Corruption Types on Government Expenditures    
Toukan Amjad Risk of Expropriation and Rybczynski's Theorem
Tyszler Marcelo The Economic Incentives of the Law of Fiscal Incentives to Cultural Investment   Ciro Biderman
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