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Public Choice Society Annual Meeting
San Antonio, Texas
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| 2008 Annual Meeting | |
| Provisional Sessions | |
| Assignments | |
| Papers | |
| Participants |
Papers
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| Plenary Lectures | ||||
| Last Name | First Name | Title | ||
| BALINSKI | Michel | École Polytechnique GERRYMANDERPROOF DISTRICTING |
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| EDELMAN | Paul | Vanderbilt University MATHEMATICS AND THE LAW |
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| MOULIN | Herve | Rice University FAIRNESS BY LOTTERIES AND TIME-SHARING: NEW GUISES FOR AN OLD IDEA |
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| Last Name | First Name | Paper Title | Coauthors | |
| Adams | James | Multiparty Elections with Policy-Seeking Parties and Valence Issues: A Spatial Model and Empirical Tests Based upon the Comparative Manifesto Data | Michael Clark Samuel Merrill III |
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| Aguiar | Christiane | The Political and Economic Impact of Constitutional Choices | Marcelo Lacombe | |
| Ahlert | Marlies | A New Approach to Procedural Freedom in Game Forms | ||
| Alger | Dan | Coasian Voting | John Ledyard | |
| Ali | Nageeb | Waiting to Settle: Multilateral Bargaining with Subjective Biases | ||
| Amegashie | Atsu | Sabotaging Potential Rivals | Marco Runkel | |
| Annen | Kurt | Lies and Slander: The Value of a Reputation in Repeated Games with Communication | ||
| Anwar | Mumtaz | The Political Economy of US Aid to Pakistan | Katharina Michaelowa | |
| Araral | Eduardo | The Malignant Equilibrium Problem | ||
| Arce M. | Daniel | The Whistle Blower: Hero or Rat? | ||
| Asan | Goksel | On the Stability and Optimality of Coalitions Voluntarily Providing Impure Public Goods | M. Remzi Sanver | |
| Ashworth | John | Government Weakness and Local Public Debt: Developments in Flemish Municipalities | Benny Geys Bruno Heyndels |
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| Austin | Andrew | City and Suburban Competition | ||
| Aysan | Ahmet | Inequality, Efficiency of Redistributive Institutions, and Redistribution: Is Government Effectiveness the Missing Link between Inequality and Redistribution? | ||
| Aysan | Ahmet | The Role of Institutions on the Macroeconomic Policy Choices and Investment Climate: The Case of Middle East and North Africa | Mustapha K. Nabli Marie-Ange Veganzones-Varoudakis |
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| Balinski | Michel | PLENARY: Gerrymanderproof districting | ||
| Bandyopadhyay | Siddhartha | Coalition Governments in a Model of Parliamentary Democracy | Mandar Oak | |
| Bandyopadhyay | Siddhartha | Crime as a Local Public Bad: Neighbourhood Observation and Reporting | Kalyan Chatterjee | |
| Bartolini | David | Non-Cooperative Regulation: The Water Sector Case | ||
| Berger | Helge | How Should Large and Small Countries Be Represented in a Currency Union? A Model of Optimal Representation in a Federal Central Bank | Till Mueller | |
| Bergh | Andreas | The Problem of Cooperation and Reputation-Based Choice | Peter Engseld | |
| Berkowitz | Daniel | The Effect of Judicial Independence on Courts: Evidence from the American States | Karen Clay | |
| Berndt | Colleen | Delphi and the Separation of Church and State | ||
| Bildirici | Melike | Debt Structure in Turkey | Tahsin Bakirtaş Seckin Sunal |
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| Bildirici | Melike | FTPL Theory in Turkish Economy | Seckin Sunal | |
| Bjørnskov | Christian | Do Leftwing Governments Meddle More with the Economy? | ||
| Botello | Stephanie | The Fiscal Impact of Immigrants and State Redistributive Policy | ||
| Bragin | Vladimir | The Demand for Democratic Institutions and Consumption Behavior | Sergey G. Shulgin | |
| Brams | Steven | Cutting a Pie Is Not a Piece of Cake | Julius B. Barbanel | |
| Brandauer | Stefan | Rent Seeking and Electoral Accountability | ||
| Brandauer | Stefan | A Model of Delegation in Contests | Florian Englmaier | |
| Brennan | Geoffrey | Majoritarian Inconsistency, Arrow Impossibility, and the Comparative Interpretation: A Context-Based View | Michael Baurmann | |
| Broude | Tomer | Can Behavioral Theory Inform Public Choice Approaches to International Law? | ||
| Bruegger | Esther | Learning, Voting, and the Information Trap | Aleksander Berentsen Simon Loertscher |
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| Brunell | Thomas | Rethinking Redistricting: How Drawing Districts Packed with Partisans Improves Representation and Attitudes Towards Congress | ||
| Buchanan | Jim | All Voting Is Strategic | Yong J. Yoon | |
| Butterfield | William | Local Government Competition, Ideological Sorting, and Centralization: Are There "Two Americas"? | ||
| Caballero | Gonzalo | Institutional Change from Francoism to Democracy in Spain: A Historical Institutional Analysis | ||
| Caballero | Gonzalo | Property Rights, Transactions, and Hierarchies in the Industrial Organization of the Spanish Congress | ||
| Calcagno | Peter | Political Determinants of Fiscal Performance: An Analysis of U.S. States | Monica Escaleras | |
| Caporale | Tony | Political Regimes and the Cost of Disinflation | Barbara Caporale | |
| Carden | Art | Trial by Fury: Lawlessness and Post-Reconstruction Southern Development | ||
| Castro | Massimo | Where Are You From? Cultural Differences in A Standard VCM Experiment | ||
| Chappell | Henry | Committee Decisions on Monetary Policy: The FOMC under Arthur Burns and Alan Greenspan | Rob Roy McGregor Todd Vermilyea |
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| Chaturvedi | Ashish | Competitive Proposals of Policies by Lobbies | Amihai Glazer | |
| Cho | Seok-ju | Retrospective Voting and Political Representation: A Model of Electoral Accountability and Legislative Voting | ||
| Chortareas | Georgios | Optimal Monetary Policy Delegation to Individuals vs Committees | Stephen M. Miller | |
| Clarke | George | The Politics and Economics of Bank Privatization in Developing Countries | ||
| Coats | Morris | Barriers Facing Women in the Competition for Legislative Seats | Thomas R. Dalton Gökhan Karahan |
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| Congleton | Roger | Economic Development and Democracy: Does Industrialization Lead to Universal Sufferage? | ||
| Cooper | Duane | Quantifying Fairness to Individual Voters in Multimember vs. Single-Member Districts | ||
| Coyle | Dennis | Choosing Public Choice | ||
| Craig | Steven | Cities as the Center of Compassion: A Chronicle of Cutthroat Competition | Stephanie Botello Andrew Austin |
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| Dakhlia | Sami | Farsightedly Stable Agenda Formation | Frank H. Page | |
| Davies | Todd | Analyzing the Dimensions of Social Choice Functions | Raja Shah | |
| Dellis | Arnaud | Blame-Game Politics in a Coalition Government | ||
| Denzau | Arthur | Mental Models and Game Theory: Cognitive Constructions of Multiple Nash Equilibria | Ravi K. Roy | |
| de Ridder | Annelies | On Some Procedures of Forming a Coalition | Agnieszka Rusinowska | |
| de Swart | Harrie | Applying the MacBeth and RelVieW Software to Coalition Formation: | ||
| Applying Relational Algebra and RelView to Coalition Formation? | Agnieszka Rusinowska Rudolf Berghammer |
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| Using MacBeth to determine utilities of governments to parties in coalition formation | Marc Roubens Agnieszka Rusinowska |
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| Dima | Bogdan | Agency, Association, and Culture: A Tale of State and Society | Ioan Talpoş Cosmin Enache Mihai Mutaşcu |
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| Djoundourian | Salpie | Environmental Activism and Industry Response in a Developing Country | ||
| Doi | Takero | Japan's Fiscal Deficits and Local Expenditures | Toshihiro Ihori | |
| Dreher | Axel | Do IMF and World Bank Influence Voting in the UN General Assembly? | Jan-Egbert Sturm | |
| Dreher | Axel | How Do Institutions Affect Corruption and the Shadow Economy? | Christos Kotsogiannis Steve McCorriston |
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| Dur | Robert | Incentives and Workers' Motivation in the Public Sector | Josse Delfgaauw | |
| Edelman | Paul | PLENARY: Mathematics and the Law | ||
| Eichhorn | Christoph | The Implications of Tax Evasion for Economic Growth | ||
| Ekbladh | Margareta | Group Specific Social Norms and Economic Incentives in a General Welfare System | ||
| Endersby | James | The Size of State Legislative Chambers | ||
| Ensley | Michael | Individual Campaign Contributors in Senate Elections, 1980–2004 | ||
| Eusepi | Giuseppe | Who Shall Keep the Keepers Themselves? On the Moral Foundations of the Separation of Powers | ||
| Evrenk | Haldun | When Honest Politicians (Do Not) Support Anti-Corruption Reforms: A Multi-Candidate Analysis | ||
| Falaschetti | Dino | Electoral Accountability and Consumer Monopsonists: Evidence from Elected vs. Appointed Regulators | ||
| Feld | Lars | On the Effectiveness of Debt Brakes: The Swiss Experience | Gebhard Kirchgässner | |
| Feldmann | Sven | A Theory of Delegation, Lobbying, and Venue Choice | ||
| Feltovich | Nick | Loss Aversion, Equilibrium Selection, and Learning: An Experimental | Atsushi Iwasaki Sobei H. Oda |
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| Fernandes Gonçalves da Silva | Marcos | The Economic and Governance Approaches to the Study of Corruption: | Paulo Roberto Arvate | |
| Fey | Mark | Engineering Peace through Institutional Design: Uncertainty, Efficiency | Kris Ramsay | |
| Fischer | Justina | The Impact of Direct Democracy on Education: Evidence for Switzerland | ||
| Fiva | Jon | Property Taxation as a Determinant of School District Efficiency | Marte Rønning | |
| Florence | Robert | Rent Generation in an All-Pay Auction Framework | Catherine Maritan | |
| Forte | Francesco | The Constitutional Power of the Voting Owners in the European Parlia | Silvia Fedeli | |
| Frasure | Lorrie | An Empirical Analysis of Immigrant and Ethnic Minority Migration in Suburban America | ||
| Freytag | Andreas | Financial Supervision Unification and Central Bank Independence: Is There Any Trade Off? | Donato Masciandaro | |
| Freytag | Andreas | Monetary Commitment, Institutional Constraints and Inflation: Empirical Evidence for OECD Countries since the 1950s | Friedrich Schneider | |
| Frisell | Lars | Populism | ||
| Frohlich | Norman | A Cognitive Model of Political and Economic Choice Bearing on the Underpinnings of Prospect Theory | Joe Oppenheimer Najam Saqib |
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| Fuchs | Thomas | School Choice under Restricted Mobility Regimes | ||
| Fujii | Seiji | Political Shirking: Proposition 13 vs. Proposition 8 | ||
| Funk | Patricia | Theory and Evidence on the Role of Social Norms in Voting | ||
| Furstenberg | Eric | The Informational Value of Affirmative Action in College Admissions | ||
| Gailmard | Sean | The Returns to Oversight and Administrative Law | Jeffrey Milyo | |
| Gasper | John | Positioning for Profits: The Market for News Coverage | ||
| Gathmann | Christina | Voter Preferences and Fiscal Policy: New Evidence from the Introducti | Patricia Funk | |
| Gehlbach | Scott | Businessmen Candidates: Special-Interest Politics in Weakly Institutionalized Environments | Konstantin Sonan | |
| Ghosh | Indranil | A Note on the Incompatability between Efficiency and Equity | Rajat Deb Tae Kun Seo |
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| Ghosh | Suman | A Case for Bundling Public Goods Contributions | Alexander Karaivanov Mandar Oak |
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| Giannetti | Daniela | Party Factions and Split Roll-Call Voting in the Italian DS Party | Michael Laver | |
| Gick | Evelyn | Explaining Tradition in Hayek's Theory of Cultural Evolution: Cognitive
Game Theory, Imitation, and Best Reply Behavior |
Wolfgang Gick | |
| Giuranno | Michele Giusep | Income Inequality and the Size of the Public Sector | ||
| Glazer | Amihai | Rent Seeking and Bargaining | ||
| Glazer | Amihai | Trade Protection to Reduce Redistribution | Priya Ranjan | |
| Godfrey | Joseph | On the Size and Location of the Yolk: Results Using CyberSenate Software | Nicholas Miller | |
| Gokcekus | Omer | Campaign Contributions and U.S. Cotton Subsidies | Richard Fishler | |
| Grant | Darren | Rationality of Voter Turnout in U.S. Union Certification Elections: 1994-2001 | Michael Toma | |
| Grofman | Bernie | Evaluating Partisan and Other Electoral Consequences of Changes in | Tom Brunell | |
| Gupta | Rupayan | Structuring International Institutions for Multilateral Provisioning of Global Security | ||
| Halcoussis | Dennis | School District Characteristics and Changes in Student Performance | Donna Driscoll Shirley Svorny |
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| Hanson | Robin | Uncommon Priors Require Origin Disputes | ||
| Hanson | Robin | Manipulators Increase Information Market Accuracy | Ryan Oprea | |
| Hanssen | Andrew | How Bad Can a Government Be? Neighborhood Constraints and the Quality of National Governments | Robert K. Fleck | |
| Hayo | Bernd | Inflation, Central Bank Independence, and the Legal System | Stefan Voigt | |
| Heijnen | Pim | Environmental Groups in Monopolistic Markets | Lambert Schoonbeek | |
| Heinemann | Friedrich | Explaining Reform Deadlocks | ||
| Heinesen | Eskil | Class Size, Teacher Hours, and Educational Attainment | Martin Browning | |
| Heyes | Anthony | Whistleblowers | ||
| Hibbs | Douglas | Institutions, Corruption, and Tax Evasion in the Unofficial Economy | Violeta Piculescu | |
| Hirsch | Moshe | Adjusted Winner and the Future Negotiations over East Jerusalem | ||
| Ho | Yi-Cheng | Relative Efficiencies of Public and Private Institutions of Learning in Taiwan: Accounting for Organization Characteristics Effects and Statistical Noise in Data Envelopment Analysis |
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| Ho | Yi-Cheng | The Effect of Political Pressure on the Management of Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund | Jenn-Shyong Kuo | |
| Hodler | Roland | Redistribution and Inequality in a Truly Heterogenous Society | ||
| Hodler | Roland | How Fiscal Decentralization Flattens Progressive Taxes | Kurt Schmidheiny | |
| Holcombe | Randy | Institutions and the Impact of Investment on Growth | James Gwartney Robert Lawson |
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| Holm | Håkan | Interpersonal Trust and Collective Decision Mechanisms | Paul Nystedt | |
| Holm | Håkan | Where to Conduct a Raid? | Hans Carlsson | |
| Hoover | Gary | Elected or Appointed School Administration: Is There a Difference in Public Accessibility or Performance? | ||
| Hosli | Madeleine | Political Actors and ECB Policy Making | Christine Arnold | |
| Hosli | Madeleine | Collective and Distributive Effects of United Nations Decision-Making Reform | ||
| Ivanenko | Vlad | Inefficiency of Non-Monetary Payments: Quantifying Russian Case | ||
| Jankowski | Richard | Altruism and Rational Choice | ||
| Jennings | Colin | Expressive Choice: Survey and Synthesis | ||
| Jerome-Speziari | VJronique | Is There Spatial Dynamics of the Electoral Behaviors among the Europe... | Bruno Jerome Michael Lewis-Beck |
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| Johns | Leslie | Knowing the Unknown: Executive Evaluation and International Crisis Outcomes | ||
| Jones | Michael | The Geometry Behind Paradoxes of Voting Power | ||
| Jordhal | Henrik | Trust and Growth in the 1990s: A Robustness Analysis | Mikael Bengtsson Niclas Berggren |
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| Kang | Insun | Informative Campaign Strategies for Challengers in Electoral Competititon with Valence Difference | ||
| Karahan | Gökhan | Flags of Our Fathers: Voting on Confederate Symbols in the State of Georgia | Michael Reksulak William F. Shughart II |
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| Kenny | Larry | The Public Choice of Educational Choice | ||
| Kiefer | David | |||
| Kilgour | Marc | A Minimax Procedure for Electing Committees | Steven J. Brams M. Remzi Sanver |
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| Kingston | Christopher | Collective Action and Corruption | ||
| Klamler | Christian | Measuring Distance between Chioce Functions: An Axiomatic Approach | ||
| Kliemt | Hartmut | N/A | ||
| Klor | Esteban | On Terrorism and Electoral Outcomes: Theory and Evidence from the Israeli-Palesti | Claude Berrebi | |
| Knack | Stephan | Political Institutions and Market-Liberalizing Policy Reform | Jac Heckelman | |
| Kocher | Martin | Government Strength and Public Debt Redux | Jesus Crespo Cuaresma Gerhard Reitschuler |
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| Konow | James | Double Standards: Social Preferences and Their Self-Serving Biases | Rachel Croson | |
| Kruse | Agneta | Political Economy and Pensions in Aging Societies: A Note on How an "Impossible" Reform Was Implemented in Sweden | ||
| Kurrild-Klitgaard | Peter | The Equivocal "Will of the People": Voting Paradoxes in Simulated Versions of Seven Danish Elections | ||
| Lacombe | Donald | An Examination of a Congressional Vote Using Beyesian Spatial Probit Techniques | Timothy M. Shaughnessy | |
| Ladha | Krishna | On the Virtues of War: War, Fairness, and Democracy | ||
| Langbein | Laura | Management by Results: Student Evaluation of Faculty Teaching and the Mismeasurement of Performance | ||
| Larcinese | Valentino | The Allocation of the US Federal Budget to the States: Evidence on the Power of the President | Leonzio Rizzo Cecilia Testa |
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| Ledyard | Meg | Smaller Schools or Longer Bus Rides? Returns to Scale and School Choice | ||
| Leech | Dennis | Voting Power and Voting Blocs | Robert Leech | |
| Leech | Dennis | Algorithms for Computing Voting Power Indices: A Website Resource for Voting Power Analysis | Robert Leech | |
| Legrenzi | Gabriella | The Openness of the Economy in the Growth of Governments | ||
| Legrenzi | Gabriella | Non-Linear Fiscal Policy | ||
| Levy | David | TITLE TO COME | Sandra Peart | |
| Lockard | Alan | Campaign Expenditures under Proportional Representation and Plurality Voting | ||
| Loertscher | Simon | Fair Endowment Lotteries: Allocating Wealth via a Veil of Ignorance | ||
| López | Edward | Strategic Institutional Choice: Voters, States, and Congressional Term Limits | R. Todd Jewell | |
| Lott | John | Is Newspaper Coverage of Economic Events Politically Biased? | Kevin A. Hassett | |
| Lowenberg | Anton | An Interest Group Analysis of Transnational Terrorism | William H. Kaempfer William Mertens |
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| Lowenberg | Anton | Why Iraq? | Timothy Mathews | |
| MacDonald | Lynn | The Impact of Government Structure on Local Public Expenditures | Tim R. Sass | |
| McGinnis | John | The Condorcet Jury Theorem Case for Supermajority Rules | Michael Rappaport | |
| Marktanner | Marcus | The Effects of Social and Political Conflict on the Provision of Public Capital and Economic Growth | ||
| Marktanner | Marcus | Social vs. Political Conflict and Regime Choice | ||
| Marroquin | Andres | Where Did the Miracle Come From? Exploring Botswana's Economic Performance | ||
| Matsusaka | John | Direct Democracy and the Executive Branch | ||
| Maurice | Diane | Elitism in Political Economics: Regulatory Policy Gone Astray | ||
| Mehta | Nimai | Taxation and the Limits to Conceit | ||
| Merlin | Vincent | The Probability of Disputable Election Outcomes | Jack Nagel | |
| Merrill | Samuel | Policy-Seeking Parties in Three-Party Elections: Why Small, Centrist Third Parties Motivate Peripheral Parties to Diverge in the Policy Space | James Adams | |
| Miller | Nicholas | In Search of the Uncovered Set | ||
| Milyo | Jeffrey | Election Night Calls as Evidence of Partisan Media Bias | ||
| Milyo | Jeffrey | Inequality and Public Good Provision: An Experimental Analysis | Lisa Anderson |
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| Milyo | Jeffrey | Campaign Contributions and Access to State Legislators: A Field Experiment | Robert K. Fleck | |
| Milyo | Jeffrey | Reconsidering the Causes and Consequences of Social Capital | Lindsey Leininger | |
| Mitchell | David | The Microfoundations of the Public Finance Ratchet Effect | ||
| Moser | Scott | Voting by Adaptive Agents in Multi-Candidate Elections | ||
| Moulin | Herve | PLENARY: Fairness by Lotteries and Time-Sharing: New Guises for an Old Idea | ||
| Mukherji | Arnab | Do Elections Incite Violent Crime? | Ashish Chaturvedi | |
| Munger | Michael | Lotto, Blotto, or Frontrunner:
U.S. Presidential Elections and the Nature of "Mistakes" |
Jennifer Merolla Michael Tofias |
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| Naka | Shigeto | An Economic Analysis of Collectivistic, Group-Oriented Societies: Implications for Japan | Arthur Fleischer III Hiromasa Takahashi |
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| New | Michael | The Indirect Impact of the Citizen Initiative on State Fiscal Policy Outcomes | ||
| Nureev | Rustem | COAUTHOR; see Yanovskiy | ||
| Nystedt | Paul | Trust in Surveys and GamesCA Matter of Money and Location? | Håkan Holm | |
| Oak | Mandar | Damdupat: Economic Analysis of the Hindu Law of Limitations | Anand V. Swamy | |
| Oak | Mandar | Policy Responsiveness During Conflict: A Case of Hawkish Drift? | Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay | |
| Okui | Katsuyoshi | Causality between Political Freedom and Economic Freedom | ||
| O'Neill | Barry | Sequential Decomposition of Simple Games | ||
| Ozdemir | Ugur | Dictatorial Domains in Preference Aggregation | M. Remzi Sanver | |
| Panagopoulos | Costas | The Calculus of Voting in Compulsory Voting Systems | ||
| Parker | Glenn | The Rules Committee, Latent Institutional Functions, and the Economic Organization of Legislatures | Roger Larocca Glenn Parker Suzanne Parker Selvin Akkus Brandon Barker Mitchell Ousley Abigaile Van Horn Linjing Wang |
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| Patti | Dario Maimone Ansaldo | Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective: An Empirical Investigation Acemoglu and Robinsons Theory | Leone Leonida Pietro Navarra |
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| Pecorino | Paul | Rent Seeking with Scarce Talent: A Model of Preemptive Hiring? | Sami Dakhlia | |
| Péreau | Jean-Christophe | Bargaining with Nonmonolithic Players | Alejandro Caparrós Tarik Tazdaït |
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| Peress | Michael | Securing the Base: Electoral Competititon under Variable Turnout | ||
| Potthoff | Dick | A New Look at the Methodology of Estimating Legislators' Spatial Positions from Roll-Call Votes | ||
| Poulsen | Odile | The Long Winding Road: Social Capital and Commuting | Tingaard Svendsen | |
| Poutvaara | Panu | Public Education in an Integrated Europe: Studying to Migrate and Teaching to Stay? | ||
| Poutvaara | Panu | Why Are More Redistributive Social Security Systems Smaller? A Median Voter Approach | Marko Köthenbürger Paola Profeta |
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| Priks | Mikael | Firm Competition and Incentive Pay | ||
| Puglisi | Ricardo | Being the New York Times: The Political Behaviour of a Newspaper | ||
| Ramirez | Carlos | Legislator Ideology and the Business Cycle | Edward J. López | |
| Ramirez | Shawn | Influence in Terrorist Networks: From Undirected to Directed Graphs | Steven J. Brams Hande Mutlu |
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| Ratliff | Tommy | Selecting Committees | ||
| Razzolini | Laura | Hiding in Plain Sight: Using Signals to Detect Terrorism | Atin Basuchoudhary | |
| Roberson | Brian | Electoral Poaching and Party Identification | Dan Kovenock | |
| Roelfsema | Hein | Legislative Bargaining and Lobbying in the European Union | ||
| Rowley | Charles | Fragmenting Parchment and the Winds of War: The Constitution of the United States: 1860-2004 | ||
| Rusinowska | Agnieszka | Measures for Bipartite Directed Graphs Using Success and Power in Binary Voting Situations | Rene van den Brink | |
| Sadiraj | Vjollca | Voting Cycles When a Dominant Point Exists | Frans van Winden Jan Tuinstra |
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| Saiegh | Sebastian | Vote Buying in Legislatures with Cross-Pressured Legislators | ||
| Samuel | Anthony | |||
| Sanver | Remzi | Ensuring Pareto Optimality by Referendum Voting | Ipek Özkal-Sanver | |
| Schaltegger | Christoph | Trust and Fiscal Performance: A Panel Analysis with Swiss Data | Benno Torgler | |
| Schap | David | NOT PRESENTING | ||
| Schelker | Mark | Controlling Government by Democratically Elected, Competing Political Bodies | Reiner Eichenberger | |
| Schelker | Mark | Distributional Effects of Fiscal Federalism: Empirical Evidence from Switzerland | ||
| Schmidheiny | Kurt | Income Segregation from Local Income Taxation When Households Differ in Both Preferences and Incomes | ||
| Schneider | Fritz | Taxes and Benefits: Two Distinct Options to Cheat on the State? | Martin Halla | |
| Schneider | Fritz | The Political Economy of Privatizations in OECD CountriesCA Panel Study on the | Ansgar Belke | |
| Schofield | Norman | The Mean Voter Theorem under Proportional and Plurality Rule | ||
| Schubert | Christian | Toward a Naturalistic Foundation of the Social Contract | Christian Cordes | |
| Schütz | Gabriela | Education Policy and Equality of Opportunity | Heinrich W. Ursprung Ludger Wößmann |
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| Shulgin | Sergey | Wealth, Needs and The Demand for Independent Media | Andrey Kunov | |
| Schwarz | Mordechai | Two-Sided Contests and Over-Dissipation | Gil S. Epstein Shmuel Nitzan |
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| Sitnikov | Alexei | Shifting Preferences and Changing Parties: The Russian Electorate from 1995 to 20 | Dmitry Shakin | |
| Slutsky | Steven | Polarization in the Electorate: Evidence from the 2004 Presidential Election | Deborah Fletcher Uri Possen |
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| Stephan | Paul | Process Values, International Law, and Justice | ||
| Stevenson | Taylor | Senate Voting: Ideology Matters, Most of the Time | James F. Couch Bret King |
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| Stratmann | Thomas | Is Interest Group Pressure to Preserve the Status Quo More Effective Than Interest Group Pressure to Change It? Evidence from Ballot Measures | ||
| Su | Xuejuan | A Political Economy Model of Public Budget Allocation across Education Stages | ||
| Suphachalasai | Suphachol | Bureaucratic Corruption and Mass Media | ||
| Sutter | Daniel | Is the Media Liberal? An Indirect Test Using Newsmagazine Circulation | ||
| Tavares | José | Women Prefer Larger Governments: Growth, Structural Transformation and Government Size |
Tiago V. de V. Cavalcanti | |
| Tavares | Samia | Does Rapid Trade Liberalization Increase Corruption? | ||
| Tellier | GeneviPve | Explaining Subnational Government Popularity in Federal Systems: The Canadian Provincial Case | ||
| Temimi | Akram | Lotteries, Group Size, and Public Good Provision | Paul Pecorino | |
| Theisen | Theis | A Comparative Study of Equity Judgements in Lithuania and Norway | J.A. Jungeilges | |
| Thompson | Earl | Optimal and Actual Constitutional Principles | ||
| Tideman | Nicolaus | Paying the Partners | ||
| Tila | Dorina | New Approach to Aggregation of Individual Choice | ||
| Ting | Michael | Interest Groups and the Electoral Control of Politicians | James Snyder | |
| Tonon | Joseph | Earmarked: The Political Economy of Agricultural Research Appropriations | Marc Law Gary Miller |
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| Tuinstra | Jan | On the Size of the Winning Set in the Presence of Interest Groups | Vjollca Sadiraj Frans van Winden |
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| Tullock | Gordon | Mystery of Brazil | ||
| Ueda | Yoshifumi | The Rational Foundations of Leadership: Who Stands Up First? | ||
| Uppal | Yogesh | The (Dis)advantaged Incumbents: Estimating Incumbency Effects in Indian State Legislatures | ||
| Vaidya | Samarth | The Nature of Corruption Deterrence in a Competitive Media Sector | ||
| VanDeemen | Adrian | The Formation of Coalition Preferences in Hedonic Coalition Games | ||
| Vanberg | Christoph | On the Implications of Campaign Contribution Limits for Political Communications and Elections | ||
| Vanberg | Viktor | The Complementarity of Liberalism and Democracy: A Hayekian Perspective | ||
| Viani | Bruno | Why Do Governments Award Monopoly Rights to Privatized Telephone Firms? | ||
| Voigt | Stefan | Power over Prosecutors Corrupts Politicians: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Indicator | Lars P. Feld Anne van Aaken |
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| Voigt | Stefan | The Economic Effects of Judicial Accountability: Some Preliminary Insights | ||
| Wang | Jianxun | Constitutional Choice of Villages in China | ||
| Wang | Lu | The Composition of State and Local Government Expenditures and Economic Growth | Otto A. Davis | |
| Warneryd | Karl | Long-Run Selection and the Work Ethic | Jens Josephson | |
| Wenzel | Nikolai | Ideology and Institutional Choice: The European Constitution as Reflection of Europe's Emergent Postmodernism | ||
| Widgrén | Mika | The Allocation of EU Budget before and after Enlargement | Heikki Kauppi | |
| Wittman | Donald | Pressure Groups and Political Advertising: How Uninformed Voters Can Use Strategic Rules of Thumb | ||
| Woldesenbet | Trufat | Efficiency of Representative Democracy: A Comparative Study of Two Competing Models | ||
| Wolfson | Jonathan | Does Tort Reform Increase Minority Access to Medical Care? | ||
| Wu | Wenbo | Freedom and Growth: A Dynamic Panel Data Model | Otto A. Davis | |
| Yanovskiy | Konstantin | Constitutional Choice on the Post-Soviet Area: Case Studies of the Georgia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Russia | Sergey Zhavoronkov | |
| Yanovskiy | Konstantin | Demand for the Democratic Institutions and Natural Rent Income: Case of Russia | Rustem Nureev Vladimir Mau |
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| Yanovskiy | Konstantin | Incentives for Opportunistic Behavior under the War Against Terrorism | Sergey G. Shulgin Ilia Zatkovecky |
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| Yildirim | Huseyin | Proposal Power and Majority Rule in Multilateral Bargaining with Costly Recognition | ||
| Yoon | Yong | Sex and Sen: A Reality Liberal Paradox | ||
| Yuval | Fany | A Political Approach to the Economic Theory of Voting | ||
| Zhang | Yongjing | Public Choice and China: An Introduction | ||
| Zillante | Arthur | Reputation Effects in Gold Glove Award Voting | ||
| CANCELLED | ||||
| Alevy | Jonathan | Public and Private Choices and the Shadow Economy in Mongolia | Clifford Zinnes | |
| Asay | Garrett | Why Negative Campaigning? The Chaotic Dynamics of an Election | Donald G. Saari | |
| Belfrage | Carl-Johan | The Political Economy of Barriers to Firm Relocation | Fredrik Gallo | |
| Biderman | Ciro | Fiscal War and Fiscal Interaction between Brazilian States (1988/1998) | Paulo Arvate, Fernanda Teles de Lima | |
| Bossi | Luca | Inequality, Social Mobility, and the Welfare State: A Political Economy Model | Gulcin Gumus | |
| Chang | Jannet | |||
| Chatterjee | Kalyan | When Neighbours Report Crime: Effects of Crime Reporting on Crime | ||
| Devaraj | Nirupama | Exit and Voice: An Empirical Analysis of Direct Participation in a Tiebout Framework | ||
| Degan | Arianna | |||
| Durant | Clark | Vote-Saving and Cyclical Proportional Representation: Toward Turn-Taking, Spiral Approximation, and a Self-Enforcing Constitutionalism | ||
| Englmaier | Florian | A Model of Delegation in Contests | Florian Englmaier | |
| Fregert | Klas | Fiscal Policy in Sweden in the Age of Liberty 1718–72: The Role of the Constitution and Party Politics | ||
| Gifford | Adam | The Evolution of Culture, Public Information and Public Goods | ||
| Gomberg | Andrei | Group Decision Making in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Stu | Alexander Elbittar Laura Sour |
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| Harnay | Sophie | Innovation, Leadership, and Conservatism in Judicial Decision Making: | Alain Marciano | |
| Huck | Steffen | Moral Cost, Commitment, and Committee Size | Kai Konrad | |
| Johnson | Mark | The Structure and Two Complexities of Economic Choice Semiautomata | ||
| Jordan | Stu | A Model of Rule Making under Participatory Administrative Procedures | ||
| Kauppi | Heikki | Eastern Enlargement and EU Budget | Mika WidgrJn | |
| Kıbrıs | Özgür | Bargaining with Nonanonymous Disagreement | Ipek Gürsel | |
| Kochetkova | Olga | Immigrants' Adaptation Costs and Strategies Reflection in the Electoral Reaction of | Konstantin Yanovskiy | |
| Köthenbürger | Marko | See Poutvaara-Köthenbürger-Profeta, above. | Panu Poutvaara Paola Profeta |
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| Lewis-Beck | Michael | COAUTHOR; see Jerome-Speziari | Bruno Jerome Veronique Jerome-Speziari |
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| Lohmann | Susanne | How Universities Think: The Hidden Work of a Complex Institution | ||
| Lucinda | Claudio | A Study on the Shadow Economy and the Tax-Gap: The Case of CPMF in Brazil | Paulo Roberto Arvate | |
| Maravall Rodríguez | Carlos | The Consequences of Commitment When Candidates Have Private Information | ||
| Marzano | Elisabetta | Q Theory, Incentives to Capital Accumulation and Irregular Production | Bruno Chiarini Francesco Busato Pasquale de Angelis |
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| Paxson | Nathaniel | Voting and the Static Fallacy: The Unraveling of the Rational Voter Hypothesis and the Misapplication of Probability Theory | ||
| Pommerenke | Kai | Cooperation with Rivals | ||
| Poulsen | Anders | Can Information Backfire? Experimental Evidence from the Ultimatum Game | Jonathan Tan | |
| Poulsen | Anders | Endogenous Preferences and Institutions | Odile Poulsen | |
| Reksulak | Michael | COAUTHOR; see Karahan | Gökhan R. Karahan William F. Shughart II |
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| Rumi | Cecilia | Expenditures Cycles in a Federal Framework: Evidence from Argentina | ||
| Storino | Fabio | Will the Fiscal Results in Latin-American Countries Depend More on the Government? | Paulo Arvate Henrique Guilherme Carlos Heidtmann Neto |
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| Teles de Lima | Fernanda | The Parties' Left-Right Positions Determine the Effects of Corruption Types on Government Expenditures | ||
| Toukan | Amjad | Risk of Expropriation and Rybczynski's Theorem | ||
| Tyszler | Marcelo | The Economic Incentives of the Law of Fiscal Incentives to Cultural Investment | Ciro Biderman | |
| Please email questions or comments to the Public Choice Society | ||||